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FOREWORD 
n the decades preceding the Great Crisis of 2007-2009, banking systems 
underwent a profound transformation, progressively moving away 
from a type of banking centred on personal relationships towards one 
based on more standardised and impersonal rapport. It was thought that, 
through this transformation – driven by ICT progress – banks could better 
exploit the opportunities offered to them by financial liberalisation. That 
change was also favoured by the banks’ need to cut costs, thus raising 
profits to levels previously unimaginable in banking but now required by 
ever-more demanding investors. So, from being the economy’s most 
regulated and traditional sector, banking became rather fashionable. And 
being a banker, once labelled as the safe but tedious profession of the ‘three 
threes’ – the mortgage rate is 3%, the spread between lending and deposit 
interest rates is 3% and at 3 p.m. the banker goes to play golf (or tennis) – 
metamorphosed into one of the most dynamic, increasingly better paid jobs 
that, alas, yielded less and less spare time. The change, designed to 
generate the highest returns and based on big consulting theories, 
prescribed attuning the banks to financial markets and modifying the bank 
business model. 
Also, the relationship between banks and their customers changed. 
Liberalisation, managers’ empire-building, the perception – later proved 
mostly unfounded – of large economies of scale, and even fashion set in 
motion intense consolidation in banking. Banks merged to form financial 
megagroups, sometimes holding assets beyond the size of the public 
budget of their state of establishment. Bank decision centres moved away 
from the clients. The substitution of the personal relationship with an 
impersonal rapport – ATMs, internet banking, etc. – proliferated. The front 
office shrank to the advantage of the back office and headquarters, and 
manager turnover intensified. Thus the individual found it more and more 
difficult to identify stable counterparts at his bank. 
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In truth, not all banks followed this trend or, at least, not all changed 
at the same speed. Specifically, cooperative banks were relatively less 
involved in the transformation. They were anchored to their tradition by 
regulation and, even more so, by the demands of their members. Perhaps 
their participation in the bank meetings was not always assiduous, but 
most members would oppose changes that could take ‘their’ bank away 
from them. Generally, cooperative banks were deemed archaic and no 
longer adequate to meet the new and sophisticated needs of the time. More 
than that, even the authorities disregarded cooperative banks, sometimes 
even showing a prejudice towards them. In various countries and contexts, 
many cooperative banks demutualised. Unfortunately, the common 
wisdom lagged in recognising that demutualisation poses not only 
problems pertaining to intergenerational equity – neither past generations, 
who contributed to build the bank, nor future ones, who would miss out on 
the same cooperative bank, could vote on the decision to demutualise – but 
also, too often, opened the way to unscrupulous management, leading to 
fragility and crisis. 
All that is in the past. After the Great Crisis of 2007-2009, much is 
rapidly changing, with several forces joining to return the banks to their 
traditional business model. The virtues of banking consolidation are 
undergoing drastic reassessment, with various countries considering 
breaking up financial colossi to reduce systemic risk. Regulation is stiffening 
on the more complex and opaque financial contracts, attracting to official 
multilateral markets what was exchanged bilaterally over the counter. 
Proprietary trading will be limited, if not forbidden. Top manager 
compensation schemes are under scrutiny, to avoid the related bias 
towards excessive risk-taking. The perception is spreading that, in the 
future, banking should focus more on financing the real economy and be 
less involved with financial deals, and that bank returns should decrease to 
the historical levels preceding the metamorphosis of the banking business 
model. Some pundits even question the desirability of competition – which 
can engender overexposure to risk – in banking. 
Nevertheless, before the new set-up fully unfolds, it is still timely to 
consider in depth the errors that led to the Great Crisis, which is where this 
report proves especially valuable. In particular, it undertakes the specific 
task of comparing the set of banks aiming to maximise shareholder value – 
shareholder value banks – to the set of banks aiming to maximise value for 
a larger and more diversified group of subjects representing varied 
interests – stakeholder value (in primis, cooperative) banks. By and large, INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | iii 
 
the former set is comprised of commercial and investment banks – 
primarily, if not exclusively, profit-focused – established as plc, while 
stakeholder value banks encompass cooperative banking and other banks 
having similar features and for which profit maximisation is neither the 
exclusive nor, generally, the primary aim. 
Indeed, the narrow emphasis on short-term profit by commercial 
banks and the numerous transformations, via demutualisation, of 
stakeholder value banks into shareholder value banks were two main 
factors in the genesis of problems that expanded to generate the Great 
Crisis. As stressed in this report, preserving a multiplicity of aims within 
banking – a sort of biodiversity of banks – is a paramount objective. The 
best proof of this is that instability and the need for government support in 
response to the crisis was much less widespread for stakeholder value 
banks than for shareholder value banks. 
There are three main aspects to this problem. First, a change in the 
banking business model subordinated banks to financial markets. Second, 
this change was accompanied by extensive waves of demutualisation and 
widespread mistrust of stakeholder value banks. Third, the perception that 
credit risk could be unbundled led to disregarding – or, at least, 
underestimating – the degree to which breaking complex financial 
relationships into segmented contracts would weaken the 
ability/willingness of banks to evaluate and manage the overall dimension 
of that risk. Prevailing economic theory and bank regulation contributed to 
the entrenchment of this erroneous approach. 
In my view, the report provides two promising suggestions for 
reshaping the banking establishment, particularly, but not only, in Europe. 
First, the bank model best suited to taking on the intermediation function 
depends on the circumstances. Thus, the coexistence of various bank 
models is bound to benefit overall economic efficiency and stability. 
Accordingly, authorities must be aware that any regulation – e.g. levelling 
the playing field – should not damage the biodiversity of banking. Second, 
a bank’s ownership/governance tends to shape its business model. 
Stakeholder value banks will naturally focus on traditional retail 
business/relationship lending, while shareholder value banks will 
normally find their preferred habitat in the realm of arm’s length banking 
and more sophisticated financial deals. It is more difficult to evaluate the 
new risks – such as those emanating from the complex financial contracts 
playing a major role in the recent crisis – than the traditional ones, and iv | FOREWORD 
 
authorities should factor this into regulation, especially now that a 
significant increase in minimum bank capitalisation is being deliberated 
within the framework of Basel 3. In this respect, there seems to be a case for 
less incremental capital for stakeholder value banks, as the 
retail/relationship business model they adopt appears less prone to the 
risks which are now urging increased capitalisation. 
On the whole, the report is essential reading for specialists, 
practitioners and regulators. It is hoped that its message will be understood 
and contribute to more sound and useful banking. 
 
Giovanni Ferri 
University of Bari, Italy 
Founding member of the think tank for the study of cooperative credit 
established in 2008 by the European Association of Cooperative Banks 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
he objective of the theoretical and empirical research in this study 
has been to examine the role of cooperative banks in Europe as a 
contribution to be derived from diversity in the European banking 
sector. In addition to analysing the nature of the cooperative bank model 
and its implications, empirical analysis has been conducted of cooperative 
banks in seven countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain) mainly with respect to the performance of such 
banks, their stability characteristics, their role in terms of competition, and 
the contribution these institutions make to regional development. 
The context is that European banking is a mix of many different types 
of banks: public, state, cooperative, mutual and private banks. A particular 
distinction is made between Stakeholder Value (STV) banks (of which 
cooperative banks are a major component) and Shareholder Value (SHV) 
banks. The distinction is ultimately about the banks’ bottom line objectives 
and the extent to which profit maximisation is the central focus of business 
models. As with savings banks, cooperative banks can be categorised as 
‘dual-bottom line’ institutions.  
Cooperative banks have long been an integral and well-established 
part of the financial system in many European countries. They are an 
important part of the diversity and plurality in European banking and have 
their own characteristic business models, ownership and governance 
structures. A particular feature of European cooperative banking is that 
there is no single universal model that, in all its detail, is common to every 
cooperative bank. This means that there is no completely homogeneous set 
of cooperative banks across Europe. Whilst there is diversity in many 
dimensions (both within some countries and, most especially, between 
countries), there are also several key common features of cooperative 
banks. There is a rich diversity in precise business models, structure and 
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governance. The European cooperative banking sector can, therefore, be 
characterised as Commonality with Diversity.  
Cooperative banks have evolved from their origins in the second half 
of the 19th century, and many have evolved over time into full-service 
universal banks or have entered into activities that do not correspond to 
their traditional core business. In several cases, these institutions appear to 
be almost indistinguishable from their commercial bank competitors, being 
active in non-retail activities and expanding across domestic frontiers. 
Although its rationale is different from when cooperative banks were first 
established as a response to various forms of market failure, the 
cooperative bank model remains a strong and viable business model.  
Indeed, empirical evidence in this study suggests that no radical 
differences exist between cooperative banks and their peers in terms of 
performance and efficiency. More important, there are economic, systemic 
and welfare benefits to be derived from a successful cooperative sector in 
the banking systems in Europe. A financial system populated by a diversity 
of ownership and governance structures, and alternative business models, 
is likely to be more competitive, systemically less risky and conducive to 
more regional growth than one populated by a single model. 
A central conclusion of the analysis is that it is systemically beneficial 
to have STV banks in general, and cooperatives in particular, in a financial 
system. In many respects it is the mix of different types of institutions that 
is important (the biodiversity argument) as much (if not more so) than the 
merits of any particular ownership structure or business model. 
This has important public policy implications. The debate particularly 
emphasises the expected role of different types of financial institutions to 
finance the real economy, to contribute to systemic stability and to promote 
inclusion. This raises the role of dual-bottom line or STV institutions to 
fulfil other equally important objectives than mere shareholder value 
creation. This suggests that financial performance and economic efficiency 
are neither the only nor the ultimate standard of assessment. These are 
indisputably important but they are not sufficient to assess the 
contributions of STV institutions to the economy. Allowing for new 
standards of assessment that take into consideration the variety of 
objectives of STV institutions would emphasise the value of diversity in the 
European banking sector. Beyond such assessment, the functional 
implications of diversity (such as regulation, financial stability and 
liquidity creation…) merit further investigation.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The value of biodiversity is more than the sum of its parts.  
Bryan G. Norton 
 
1.1  Motivations 
Cooperative banks have long been a part of the financial systems of some of 
the most advanced economies. The movement spread throughout most of 
continental Europe in the second half of the 19th century, where banks 
confined their activities to urban areas and served only the affluent. An 
emerging class of workers, shopkeepers and farmers with no or little 
collateral had limited access to credit. Charitable sources and public funds 
remained insufficient. Credit obtained from money lenders was often 
available only at exorbitant interest rates.1 By and large, the birth of credit 
cooperatives in Europe was a response to the challenge of providing 
affordable loans to this emerging class.  
Historically, the central idea of a cooperative credit institution was 
simple: the financially excluded had to be self-reliant. Credit was to be 
financed internally, i.e. by the group’s collective savings. If external funds 
were needed, they were to be borrowed on the group’s joint liability. 
Although government support was available in some notable cases, most 
institutions were set up as private enterprises. Last, in order to align the 
institution’s objectives with its members’ interests, the governance was 
built on democratic principles, i.e. one member, one vote.  
                                                      
1 The practice of charging excessive interest rates was an ordinary characteristic of the era. 
According to some early reports, annual rates in excess of 30% were not uncommon in 
Germany (Guinnane, 2001, p. 368). In Italy, “for small loans the usurers exacted 1,200% 
payable in advance, besides commissions, with possible dinner and wine for the lender and 
the broker” (Herrick and Ingalls, 1916, p. 347).  2 | INTRODUCTION 
 
Over time, the cooperative movement evolved along with the needs 
of its clientele. The idea of joint liability of members on the cooperative’s 
debt was gradually dropped. Members’ collective screening and 
monitoring efforts became less prevalent as the banks developed to serve 
larger demographic and socio-economic groups. The local institutions 
became more integrated to develop their own central institutions to pool 
and manage the group’s excess liquidity, to provide centralised services 
and to effectively enhance access to capital. Despite these developments, 
however, mutual ownership still remains a key common characteristic of 
all cooperatives today. 
The fact that the financial crisis that started in 2007 has hit many 
financial systems very hard, especially those that seem to be particularly 
modern, underlines the importance of the overarching questions that 
motivate this study. Do cooperatives still serve an economic and a social 
role? And, what lessons can be learnt from the crisis about the future, in 
which academics and politicians are calling for a return to more traditional 
approaches to banking and finance?2 
Examining the economics, the merits and drawbacks of cooperative 
banks is not an easy task, for a number of reasons. One is that cooperative 
banks, while still remaining committed to their roots and principles, largely 
differ from what these institutions were in the past. Today, they are a very 
heterogeneous group of financial institutions that expanded beyond 
traditional businesses.  
Another reason is that the standards for such an assessment are not 
straightforward. Clearly, they need to be assessed in terms of pure 
economic performance, since economic performance determines their 
ability to survive as financial institutions over the longer term. However, 
economic or financial performance cannot be the only standard of 
assessment, since economic or financial success is not an end in itself for 
any organisation.3 This consideration is all the more relevant for 
                                                      
2 For a sample of calls for a return to more traditional banking, see De Grauwe (2008), Group 
of Thirty (2009) report chaired by Paul Volcker and Jacob Frenkel, and the de Larosière 
(2009) report.  
3 The financial objectives of organisations are merely the means for realising the ultimate 
objectives of people, and these are non-financial in nature (see Simon, 1952). It was mainly the 
research summarised in this book for which Herbert Simon received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 1978. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 3 
 
organisations that have been created for other purposes than that of being 
successful in financial terms, as is the case of cooperative banks. Other 
relevant standards include the broader economic and social effects that 
their operations have on others, especially their member-customers. 
Therefore, assessing them on the basis of these effects may be worth 
considering. However, such an assessment is extremely difficult to perform 
because it would require having precise information concerning the banks’ 
economic and social involvement in the regions where they operate and the 
value derived by other beneficiaries from their operations. Moreover, in 
methodological terms it would raise the counterfactual problem of 
comparing real situations in which cooperative banks exist with 
hypothetical situations in which they do not exist (or vice-versa) under 
circumstances that are identical in all other respects.  
1.2  Objectives, main propositions and structure  
This study aims to explore two overarching questions: What are the 
benefits of institutional diversity in general? What are the benefits of 
cooperative banks to a country or an integrated economic and political 
region such as the EU in particular?  
We cannot pretend to have a conclusive answer to these overarching 
questions, particularly following one of the most profound financial crises 
in which several widely held perceptions about the superiority of certain 
forms of ownership and business models of banks are almost continuously 
being questioned and revised. Today, it may be useful to bring a new 
assessment to the value of institutional diversity as opposed to conformity 
which was the trend over the last two decade. Nevertheless, our aim is to 
contribute to the debate by presenting and discussing a number of 
arguments that are relevant and also sufficiently well supported by 
economic research.  
To lay the groundwork for what follows, chapters 2 and 3 consider 
the nature, economics and key developments of cooperative banks in 
Europe. The theoretical arguments supporting cooperatives, their economic 
performance and role are analysed and discussed in chapter 4. The 
questions that are addressed include:  
1)  What are the theoretical arguments supporting cooperatives as a type 
of stakeholder bank? 4 | INTRODUCTION 
 
2)  How profitable and efficient are cooperative banks as ‘producers’ of 
financial services as compared to other banks in particular 
commercial banks? 
3)  Do the cost structures, profitability and earnings stability of 
cooperative banks differ from those of other banks and, if so, is it true 
that, possibly due to their specific design and mission, legal status or 
ownership structure, they have higher costs and lower profitability 
than commercial banks? And how does their performance differ 
among countries?  
4)  How do they contribute to competition in the market, to regional 
development, to economic growth and to stability?  
The answers to these questions are highly relevant to the policy 
debate on the changing role of financial systems triggered by the new 
global financial crisis. The debate particularly emphasises the expected role 
of different types of financial institutions to finance the economy and the 
adequacy of dual-bottom line or STV financial institutions to fulfil other 
equally important objectives than mere shareholder value creation.  
This suggests that financial performance and economic efficiency are 
not the only nor the ultimate standard of assessing financial institutions, 
and even if it were the case that the performance of a number of dual-
bottom line institutions were – to a certain extent – poorer than that of 
other banks that focus primarily on creating value for their shareholders, 
there might be other reasons why it would be beneficial for a country or a 
region to have dual-bottom line or stakeholder institutions. Therefore, 
understanding and examining the merits of another type4 of such 
institutions (i.e. cooperative banks) need further analysis to allow a better 
understanding of their role in the economies where they operate. 
Although it is very difficult to conduct a final and uncontroversial 
assessment of cooperative banks on the basis of the effects that their 
existence, operation and development have and can have, it is important to 
discuss the relevant evidence. What are these effects? How strong are they? 
H o w  c a n  t h e y  b e  a s s e s s e d  i n  p r i n c i p l e ?  A n d ,  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o  t h e y  
depend on the different institutional set-ups that cooperative banks have 
adopted in the course of the last few decades in different countries? We 
                                                      
4 See Ayadi et al. (2009) on Investigating Diversity in the Banking Sector: The performance and 
role of savings banks. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 5 
 
believe that, incomplete as they may be, theoretical and empirical 
arguments that we summarise and analyse in this study support the view 
that, generally speaking, it is economically and socially beneficial to have 
dual-bottom line financial institutions. It is the mix of different types of 
institutions that is as important (if not more so) than the merits of any 
particular ownership structure or business model. The final chapter offers 
key conclusions and suggests new perspectives for further research. 
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2.  THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF 
COOPERATIVE BANKS 
his chapter reviews the basic economics and the nature of 
cooperative banks and how they compare with joint stock banks. 
Cooperative banks are a sub-set of what we may term Stakeholder 
Value (STV) banks. We begin with a review of the nature of companies in 
general and a discussion of the distinction between Shareholder Value 
(SHV) and Stakeholder Value banks, and where cooperativebanks fit 
within this distinction. The nature of ‘value added’ by financial firms is 
then analysed, and the differences in this regard between cooperative and 
SHV banks. Then, a review of the key characteristics of cooperative banks 
will emphasise the institutions risk profile, the role of capital, and the role 
of network central institutions. This is followed by a brief assessment of 
corporate governance for cooperatives.  
2.1  The nature of a company 
A useful starting point in any analysis of cooperative banks is that they are 
private economic firms, i.e. organisations which use resources to add value 
in the creation of goods and services. In this regard, a cooperative is one 
amongst many types of economic firms: sole proprietors, closed companies, 
partnerships, SHV companies, state-owned agencies, etc.  
Different types of firms often compete with each other in the same 
markets. Cooperatives are, therefore, one of many forms for organising 
economic activity. Each type of firm has its own strengths and weaknesses, 
which is why different organisational forms are able to coexist, sometimes 
in direct competition with each other. Although different types of firms 
perform the same economic role, there are several key differences between 
them. 
T INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 7 
 
More formally, any firm is a set of contracts among the various 
factors of production, agents and ‘stakeholders’ within the organisation. 
Clearly, within this paradigm there are many alternative ways in which 
these sets of contracts can be structured and the cooperative model is 
simply one amongst many possible corporate forms.  
The cooperative corporate form has been prevalent, and has a long 
history in financial services although the cooperative model is not exclusive 
to banking or financial services generally. Cooperative institutions have 
often dominated agriculture, housing finance, and life assurance markets. 
In many ways, the cooperative model may be particularly suited to the 
provision of financial services, and especially those relating to longer term 
contractual relationships such as mortgages and life assurance. This may be 
due in part to the possibility that cooperative banks are able to address any 
inherent agency problems more efficiently. Kay (1991) suggests that “the 
special value of mutuality rests on its capacity to establish and sustain 
relationship contract structures.” As a result, they also have a comparative 
advantage in establishing trust (Kay, 2006) which is particularly important 
where there is asymmetric information between the firm and the customer, 
and in the case of longer-term contracts. 
2.2  Stakeholder v. Shareholder banks 
European banking is a mix of many different types of banks: public, state, 
cooperative, mutual and private banks. European banking is a 
heterogeneous industry with respect to issues such as ownership 
structures,5 governance arrangements, capital structure and business 
objectives. A particular distinction is made between Stakeholder Value banks 
and Shareholder Value banks. We conceptualise SHV banks as those whose 
primary (and almost exclusive) business focus is maximising shareholder 
interests, while STV banks in general (and cooperative banks in particular) 
have a broader focus on the interests of a wider group of stakeholders 
(notably customer-members6 in the case of cooperative banks, the regional 
economy and the society in the case of savings and public banks). 
The distinction is ultimately about the banks’ bottom line business 
objectives. While the differences are in practice complex, the SHV model is 
                                                      
5 Institutional diversity is explicitly protected by the EU treaty under Art. 295.  
6 See Annex 1 for the definition of member.  8 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
based on the notion that banks (and any firm) exist primarily to maximise 
shareholder value and hence the rate of return on equity. Shareholders are 
the owners of the bank and the ultimate risk-takers. In this model the 
management of the firm is supposed to act almost exclusively in the 
interests of the shareholders through maximising the value of the business 
as reflected in the rate of return on equity and the market capitalisation 
value.  
In contrast, in the STV model there are many stakeholders in a 
company and most especially the members in the case of cooperatives. In 
the STV approach, while profitability is one of the objectives of the bank, it 
is not exclusive or even the primary objective. It is more an issue of 
balancing different interests of the various stakeholders in the company. In 
practice, this means that an STV bank will not pursue profit maximisation 
to the same degree, or with the same intensity, as will SHV banks 
(Llewellyn, 2005). The position is described well in Christen et al. (2004) 
and in Ayadi et al. (2009) as “dual bottom line” institutions indicating that 
STV banks (including cooperatives) need to generate profit in order to 
survive and expand, but that profit is not the sole or even primary bottom 
line objective. Equally, Groeneveld and de Vries (2009) from a cooperative 
perspective mentioned, “…cooperative banks claim that they do not aim to 
maximise short-term profits while healthy profitability is an important 
necessary condition for cooperative banks to safeguard their continuity, to 
finance growth and credit, and to provide a buffer for inclement times… 
profit is not a goal in itself.” 
2.3  The nature of value creation in banks  
If any firm is to survive it must create economic value (Davis and Kay, 
1990). All firms exist to create added value by providing goods and/or 
services for which consumers are prepared to pay a price in excess of the 
costs of production. When considering the nature of value added in 
cooperative banks (and how they differ from SHV banks), three issues 
immediately arise: the precise nature of the value added, how the value 
added is created, and how it is distributed between different stakeholders 
in the firm.  
For our purposes (and simplifying what are often complex 
multiproduct institutions) a bank can be viewed as providing financial 
intermediation services by taking deposits (and capital) from one set of 
stakeholders and customers and making loans to another set (though, in INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 9 
 
practice, they may be the same stakeholders when, for instance, a customer 
is both a depositor and a borrower). A simple representation of the banking 
firm (Figure 2.3.1) serves to illustrate the analysis to follow. If all other 
interest rates are given, deposit-taking institutions face an exogenous 
upward sloping supply curve of deposits (SD), indicating that the supply of 
deposits made available rises as its own deposit interest rate rises. For a 
given supply curve of deposits, the institution’s endogenous supply of 
loans (SL) is also a rising function of the loan interest rate. In equilibrium 
the volume of deposits and loans is OT and the institution pays a deposit 
rate of i0 and charges a loan rate of i1. Clearly, this is a simplification of the 
business operation of a bank and thus ignores important questions about 
the pricing of different assets and deposits, different risk premia charged, 
and decisions about the structure of the loan and asset portfolio. It also 
ignores off-balance-sheet and non-interest business. While important in 
practice, these complications need not be incorporated for the purposes at 
hand. 
In Figure 2.3.1 the cost per unit of intermediation is represented by 
the interest rate differential i0i1. Anything that increases this cost (and 
forces a bank to widen the margin) reduces the competitiveness of the 
bank. This is because either alternative mechanisms become relatively 
cheaper or more efficient, or that the costs of the intermediation services of 
banks are deemed to be too high. 
If an SHV and a cooperative bank have the same efficiency, access to 
the same production technology, the same cost of capital, and operate in a 
competitive market environment, they will have the same intermediation 
m a r g i n  a n d  c o u l d ,  i f  t h e y  c h o o s e ,  g e n e r a t e  t h e  s a m e  p r o f i t / s u r p l u s .  
However, if for any reason (such as lower costs, greater efficiency, lower 
cost of capital, etc.) any bank is able to operate with supply curves S’L and 
S’D in Figure 2.3.1, it has a potential competitive advantage in the market 
place enabling it to pay a higher rate of interest on deposits and/or charge 
a lower rate of interest on loans. 
In this representation of the bank, there are key differences between 
SHV and cooperative banks and two in particular: (1) the potential 
intermediation margin is likely to be different, and (2) how the added value 
is distributed between stakeholders.  
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Figure 2.3.1 Simple representation of banking activities 
 
 
 
With respect to (1), the intermediation margin is potentially smaller 
in the case of cooperative banks as they are not required to service 
externally-held capital, i.e. profits are not needed to pay dividends on 
shareholder capital. Instead, any net surplus is normally taken into reserves 
which, as argued below, are not owned by current members of the 
cooperative bank and cannot be appropriated by them. However, and 
again reflecting the diversity of the cooperative model, it is not uncommon 
for cooperative banks to pay ‘dividends’.7 
On the one hand, it might be claimed that in practice the costs of a 
cooperative bank may be higher than with an SHV bank by virtue of it not 
being subject to the discipline of the capital market and the market in 
corporate control (the take-over market). In principle, this could 
compromise the efficiency of a cooperative bank. On the other hand, if a 
cooperative bank operates in a competitive market environment, 
competitive pressures are likely to offset these potentially negative 
influences on efficiency. In many ways, competitive pressures are likely to 
                                                      
7 In several cases, cooperative banks serve interest on membership shares.   
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be more important than capital market discipline and corporate governance 
arrangements in disciplining cooperative banks. The empirical evidence 
regarding efficiency and competition is discussed in a later chapter. 
There is also the issue of how value added is distributed differently 
between the two models of the bank. In the case of an SHV bank, net added 
value is appropriated by external shareholders in the form of either 
dividends (if profits are distributed) or (if profits are taken into reserves) a 
higher share price which can be liquidated by shareholders selling their 
shares. On the other hand, value added in a cooperative bank may be 
distributed to customers ex ante in the pricing of deposits and loans and/or 
the quality of the services. As put by Jarvin (2006) and Drake and Llewellyn 
(2001), value added in a cooperative bank is incorporated in products and 
services rather than in profits for external shareholders: this may also be 
reflected in service quality to members and customers. 
Thus the value added by two identical SHV and cooperative banks 
(other than with respect to ownership and capital) may be the same but its 
distribution is different: ex ante in prices and service quality with the 
cooperative bank versus ex post through dividends with the SHV bank. In 
effect, the potential margin advantage of cooperative banks gives choice 
over objectives and how this advantage is utilised and distributed. 
However, this still leaves open the question of whether in practice the two 
types of banks are likely to operate in a similar manner.  
2.4  The cooperative banking model in Europe 
Across Europe, cooperative banks are private institutions and, as one of 
many different types of banks, compete with institutions which have 
different ownership, governance and capital structures and different 
business models.  
2.4.1  Definition of cooperative banks 
The International Cooperative Alliance defines a cooperative bank as 
follows: 
An autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise 
(ICA, 2007). 
The nature of a cooperative is often described by its internal statutes, 
by-laws or articles of association. National laws on cooperatives also exist, 12 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
providing the general principles of operation and the protection of 
members and third parties from the activities of these institutions. 
However, there are clear differences in the manner and extent to which 
cooperatives are treated in different countries. In some countries, such as 
Germany, cooperatives are recognised as a distinct form of company 
vehicle and specific laws exist to determine the fundamental nature and 
general operational principles. In others, such as Belgium, France, Italy, 
Switzerland and the UK, they do not have specific codes but are regulated 
by applicable chapters of broader laws, such as the Civil Code or 
Commercial Code. Yet in others, such as Denmark and Norway, despite 
their significant presence, no specific law is applicable to cooperatives.8  
The differing national treatment of cooperatives has been seen as an 
obstacle to the development of the cooperative movement. In its resolution 
in 2001, the United Nations (UN) encouraged governments to facilitate the 
development of cooperatives on an equal footing with other forms of 
enterprises in order to utilise and develop fully the potential and 
contribution of cooperatives for the attainment of social development 
goals.9 In its part, the EU introduced the European Cooperative Society 
(SCE) in 2003 (which came into force in 2006) in order to facilitate the cross-
border activities of cooperatives within the Union, assisting them in their 
evolution to become an integral part of the internal market.10 The rules 
were based on common principles of cooperatives operating in many 
countries, while at the same time taking account of different elements in 
some member states. Despite its existence for over three years, the SCE 
structure has not been fully taken up. See the discussion in Box 1 for a brief 
assessment of the Directive. 
                                                      
8 See International Labour Organization’s (ILO, 2007) report for a short discussion of 
worldwide legislation of cooperatives.  
9 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the 88th plenary meeting of the United 
Nations (UN) on 19 December 2001 (A/RES/56/114).  
10 The SCE was implemented in the EU with two codes: Council Regulation (EC) N° 
1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society, which setup 
the main principles of the company status, and the Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 
2003, which supplemented the statute with regard to the involvement of employees; see also 
O.J. N° L207 of 18 August 2003. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 13 
 
2.4.2  Key characteristics of cooperative banks  
As will be documented in detail in the following chapter, there is no single 
universal model that, in all its detail, is common to every single cooperative 
bank in Europe. There is diversity in many dimensions both within some 
countries and, most especially, between countries.11  
 Reflecting this diversity, there is no intention to impose a ‘straight-
jacket’ definition. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is not possible to 
identify unifying features. Without imposing such a straight jacket, the 
following key common characteristics are identified which encapsulate the 
essence of the basic cooperative banking model: 
1. Maximising the rate of return on capital is not the exclusive or even 
dominant business objective of cooperative banks. The essence of the 
cooperative model is that there is no myopic focus on maximising short 
term shareholder value. The typical cooperative bank seeks to maximise the 
benefit/surplus of its members, who typically maintain long-term 
relationship with their bank. The interests of members rather than external 
shareholders are at the centre of cooperative banks’ business strategies. 
However, as with all banks (irrespective of their capital structure), 
cooperative banks do need to earn a minimum rate of return on capital in 
order to grow their business.  
2. Cooperative banks are essentially owned by their members who 
are private citizens and individual entrepreneurs. In most cases, ownership 
is at the local or regional level.12 Although a cooperative bank may have 
customers who are not members, a key feature of cooperatives is that, in 
general, there is no formal separation of owner-customers and non-owner- 
customers. 
                                                      
11 Groeneveld and de Vries (2009) note that “the form, appearance, organisation and 
operation in cooperative banking groups differ across countries and over time”. 
12 As put in a recent Oliver Wyman report: “The member ownership concept is not only 
central to the cooperative model, but is also a unique aspect that is hard to replicate outside 
cooperative structures. Vital to the establishment of cooperative banks, it remains today 
their common defining feature as well as a source of differentiation versus non-cooperative 
competition” (Oliver Wyman, 2008). The report also notes in the context of networks that 
despite the significant differences in the organisation, all networks share one common 
feature – member ownership. The local banks are effectively owned and controlled by their 
local customers through the membership concept. 14 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
3. Members of a cooperative bank have significance not only by 
virtue of being owners but also because they are an integral part of the 
governance structure, although the precise arrangements vary 
considerably. Governance arrangements are based essentially on the 
principle of one member, one vote rather than in proportion to the size of 
ownership stakes.  
4. In general ownership stakes in cooperative banks are not 
marketable. Members cannot sell their ownership stakes in an open 
secondary market, although in some cases they can sell them back to the 
bank. Exit is however possible through the redeemability of members’ 
shares. In other cases, members may trade membership certificates in a 
closed market available only to members. Because of this and of the usual 
absence of a stock exchange listing, there is no market in corporate control 
in that it is virtually impossible for hostile bids for ownership to take place: 
a cooperative bank cannot be bought by new owners.13  
5. Whilst there are exceptions, the almost exclusive source of capital 
for a cooperative bank is retained profits.14 These profits are retained within 
the bank and are added to reserves (capital) and dividends are generally 
not paid although members may sometimes be able to vote for a limited 
distribution of profits. The capital base of a cooperative bank (i.e. its net 
asset value) does not belong to the current cohort of members.15 Capital is 
essentially an intergenerational endowment held by the cooperative in 
perpetuity for the benefit of current and future members.  
6. Cooperative banks are often part of a network with an integrated 
structure with extensive vertical and horizontal cooperation.16 These 
institutions centralise the provision of certain services and production 
processes, especially where benefits of economies of scale are significant. 
The services and processes provided range from back office and 
                                                      
13 As noted in Oliver Wyman (2008): “This ownership structure makes it effectively 
impossible for a cooperative bank to be subject to a hostile take-over.” 
14 In many cases there are no external shareholders/owners who are not themselves 
members of the cooperative. Cooperative banks have only limited access to external capital 
independent of their members. However, some cooperative banks have been able to issue 
new forms of hybrid Tier 1 (risk-bearing) capital as allowed by their regulator, although 
new Basel rules may change this. 
15 As future generations are counted amongst the stakeholders.   
16 Prime examples include Rabobank, BCPE, OP-Pohjola, Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 15 
 
representation services to others such as centralised product development, 
liquidity and risk management services, and the role as a supervisor.  
7. Cooperative banks have a common vocation towards banking 
relationships with SMEs and households, which is fostered by close 
proximity to customers as a result of the cooperative ethos. 
There are also some exceptions to these common features which will 
be examined in the next chapter of this study. In brief, some cooperatives in 
Europe have non-cooperative subsidiaries (which in some cases are listed 
on a stock exchange such as in Italy or France) and may also operate with 
different business models when conducting business outside their home 
country, such as in Austria. 
This all means that there is no completely homogeneous set of 
cooperative banking institutions across Europe. Because of this, it is not 
feasible to define a simple and unequivocal description that applies to all 
versions of the model and which encapsulates without challenge all the 
detailed versions of the basic business model. In particular, Banche 
Popolari in Italy are listed on a stock exchange which means that some of 
the arguments that apply to cooperative banks in general may not always 
apply in this case. This also applies to some extent with Crédit Agricole. 
2.4.3  Risk characteristics of cooperative banks  
With notable exceptions, cooperative banks tend to be lower risk 
institutions.17 They tend to engage in less risky activity (see, for instance, 
Cihak and Hesse, 2007).18 Moreover, by virtue of their local ethos and 
proximity to their member-customers, cooperative banks have traditionally 
engaged in relationship banking and hence facilitated access to finance to 
SMEs, craftsmen, farmers, etc., i.e. those entrepreneurs who may not in 
practice have access to loans from other banks (De Bruyn and Ferri, 2005).  
                                                      
17 As put by Oliver Wyman (2008): “Working to more risk-averse, longer time horizon 
investment objectives than shareholder driven institutions, cooperatives currently represent 
a relatively safe haven for investors…Furthermore, risk management may be enhanced by 
virtue of the proximity of the banks to their borrowers and the local information the bank 
may have due to its proximity to borrowers.” 
18 The idea that cooperative financial institutions are, on the whole, more likely to be 
characterised by relatively low risk business structures is also supported by the relevant 
property rights literature (see Fama and Jensen, 1983). 16 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
There are several reasons why cooperative banks tend to have less 
incentive to take excessive risk. First, they are not under pressure to 
maximise profits which, at times, may induce SHV banks into a higher risk 
profile. Second, cooperative banks are under less short-termist pressure 
and are more inclined to adopt a longer-term horizon in their business 
decisions and lending policies. Third, it is less easy for some cooperative 
banks to raise external capital, i.e. independent of their members. Fourth, 
the fact that cooperative banks are owned by their members makes them 
less prone to the asset substitutability problem and hence less inclined to 
risk taking (see Drake and Llewellyn, 2001). Finally, a particular feature of a 
cooperative bank is the strong local presence and the proximity, which 
allows them to have a better understanding of the needs and the risk 
profiles of their customers and ultimately to mitigate acute asymmetric 
information.  
In addition, excessive risk taking is mitigated in the case of 
cooperatives because of the inherent absence of traditional agency 
problems that exist in the case of SHV banks. It might also be argued that 
the presence of external shareholders in SHV financial institutions can add 
a further dimension to the agency problem by virtue of the potential 
conflict between the owners (equity shareholders) and 
depositors/customers. For example, equity shareholders may prefer a 
higher risk profile for the institution than would depositors due to the 
former’s limited liability. This implies that shareholders can benefit from 
potentially significant ‘upside gains’ while being exposed to only limited 
downside potential. In contrast, depositors do not share this upside 
potential and would implicitly be subject to greater risk given the limited 
scope of deposit insurance. Clearly, in cooperative banks this particular 
aspect of the agency problem is absent as owners and customers (and 
depositors) are largely one and the same.  
2.4.4  The role of capital and its management  
A cooperative bank has no (or very limited) externally-held risk capital. 
Indeed, its capital is mainly built up from accumulated profits.  
By the nature of its constitution, the net economic value (i.e. net of 
debts and the nominal value of members’ shares which is the amount they 
contributed through deposits) provides an intergenerational endowment 
without final owners (see Fonteyne, 2007). In other words, the capital or net 
worth of the bank is not owned by the current cohort of members, but INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 17 
 
rather by the cooperative itself. Net economic value has no legal owners 
other than the cooperative itself.19 In this sense, the managers of a 
cooperative bank are to be viewed, in effect, as custodians of an 
intergenerational transfer, which could in principle create governance 
issues and the potential for opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
In addition, the capital base of a cooperative bank (i.e. its net asset 
value) cannot be appropriated by the current cohort of members as future 
generations are counted amongst the potential stakeholders.20 In most 
cases, members have an ownership claim only on the notional value of 
their paid-up membership, plus any limited distributions of profits the 
bank might make.  
2.4.5  The role of network central institutions  
Another feature of cooperative banks in many European countries is the 
level of network cooperation that exists between local or regional and 
higher level (centrals or apex) institutions.21  
NCIs have grown out of various needs over time. One need, which 
has become increasingly important in recent years, has been the necessity 
to centralise certain transactions in order to benefit from economies of scale. 
In today’s cooperative banking model, most local banks have left certain 
functions to such network institutions that act as centralised service 
providers. These services include IT support, data processing, training, 
accounting, marketing, product development, and representation. Apart 
from limiting replicable costs, centralised institutions have also arisen out 
of a need to effectively reduce the “brand name externality problem” 
(Guinnane, 1997). 
                                                      
19 As put by Fonteyne (2007), “net economic value is in essence an owner-less 
intergenerational endowment that is available for use by current members, under the 
implicit or explicit understanding that they will grow it further and pass it on to the next 
generation of members.” 
20 Unlike in the UK where the current cohort of members was able to appropriate the value 
of capital in the event of demutualisation of UK building societies (see Box 2).  
21 As put by Fonteyne (2007): “networks have evolved into large, complex, financial 
conglomerates, some of which are now among the largest banking groups in Europe”. The 
increasing reliance on Network Central Institutions (NCIs) in some ways balances the 
‘bottom-up’ ownership of members by imposing a ‘top-down’ authority (Di Salvo, 2002; 
Desrochers and Fischer, 2005).  18 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
There are several strategic and managerial advantages for 
cooperative banks forming networks between themselves which is the 
reason why cooperative banks in many countries formed themselves into 
networks at an early stage in their development. Although the nature, 
degree of integration, and the role of these institutions vary, the most 
important advantages include: 
•  Economies of scale (and scope), especially with respect to a range of 
back office and administration functions. Through this route, 
relatively small banks are able to secure collective economies of scale 
that each is too small to generate internally. In this sense the network 
provides a range of collective services. Although it might be thought 
that this is analogous to outsourcing, the key difference is that the 
contracts are held within the network and member banks maintain 
ownership and to some extent control, which is not the case when 
outsourcing is conducted with third parties. 
•  In some cases (notably in the Netherlands), an NCI may perform the 
role of an internal central bank, intermediating liquidity within the 
network. 
•  To the extent that they qualify as “institutional protection schemes” 
under the Capital Requirements Directive (2006/48/EC), mutual 
support schemes provided by NCIs allow the associated banks to 
assign a zero weight for intranetwork exposures.22  
•  Mutual support systems also serve to secure the certainty of 
repayment for creditors and depositors, thereby enhancing the banks’ 
funding opportunities. 
•  There may also be a management consultancy role performed by an 
NCI where best practice within the network can be disseminated. 
•  Member banks may also gain through the reputation and profile of 
the NCIs, including an increase in customer confidence in banks 
which are known to be part of a credible network. 
                                                      
22 Among other things, the protection scheme has to satisfy the provisions put forth in 
Article 80 Paragraph 8 of the Capital Requirements Directive (2006/48/EC). A key requisite 
is the system’s capacity to ensure the liquidity and solvency to avoid bankruptcy, with the 
disposal of funds that are readily available for that purpose.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 19 
 
•  There may be an important role in providing collective services such 
as product development, treasury management, and risk 
management. In this sense, NCIs can meet the collective needs of the 
network banks more efficiently than can the member banks 
themselves. 
•  An NCI may also have subsidiaries providing services for the benefit 
of both member banks and their customers, which may not be 
feasible for individual member banks to directly provide themselves. 
The NCIs may also represent a risk if they threaten the cooperative identity 
of the system. This could be the case, for example, if the central institute 
pursues objectives that are at odds with the cooperative principles and 
prioritisation of the members’ benefits. An excessive amount of 
centralisation may also worsen the cooperative banks’ ability to respond to 
customer needs. 
The net advantages will, however, depend upon the nature of the 
network, the specific role of NCIs and whether the local banks can continue 
fulfilling their roles as cooperative institutions. These aspects vary among 
countries as do the specific relationships between member banks and NCIs. 
The role of NCIs is discussed further in the country sections in the next 
chapter.  It is demonstrated there that not all cooperative banking networks 
have a strong degree of centralisation and practice varies considerably 
between countries and, in some cases, even within countries. 
Although centralisation of some activities generates benefits to local 
banks, the driving force for the development of the NCIs was the need to 
manage liquidity and access to capital markets. By default, most local 
banks are small, which implies that their risks are relatively concentrated. 
Although this is less of a problem in today’s world where almost all 
cooperatives have a relatively diversified client base, remaining local and 
being small constrains external financing and introduces potential liquidity 
problems. Notwithstanding these issues, the principle of mutuality restricts 
a cooperative’s ability to raise capital or issue debt. Treasury functions, i.e. 
management of excess liquidity, are usually managed by the central 
organisation. Local cooperatives with excess liquidity thus deposit excess 
funds with their central organisation, which may then redeploy them to 
other cooperatives which are short of funds. This serves as an intragroup 
interbank market.  
Today, NCIs serve these needs by providing a range of services. In 
most models, wholesale activities, such as the issuance of debt and (in 20 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
some) the issuance of stocks, are handled by network institutions, such as 
national or regional centrals. The extent of integration differs from one 
cooperative to another. This again reflects the general theme of 
‘commonalities with diversity’ introduced earlier in the chapter. In general 
terms, the Italian and Spanish models are often accepted as less centralised 
than the Austrian, German, Dutch, Finnish and, to some extent, French 
cases.  
A key factor helping to distinguish well-integrated networks from 
weaker associations is the extent of mutual support available. In essence, 
the mutual support schemes make available network resources to ensure 
the liquidity and solvency of the participating institutions. In this manner, 
t h e  s u p p o r t  i s  b e y o n d  t h e  c o v e r a g e  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  c o m p u l s o r y  a n d  
supplementary deposit insurance schemes and bond issuance mechanisms 
that are in place. Table 2.4.1 summarises the key elements of these systems.  
Table 2.4.1 Extent of mutual support in European cooperative banks 
  TYPE OF SUPPORT  LEGAL SCOPE  TYPE OF 
FUNDING 
 
Cross-
guarantees 
Joint-
liability 
Legally-
binding 
Obligatory 
participation 
Paid-up 
funds 
Call-up 
funds 
Raiffeisen (AT)  √  (1)  √  √  (1) 
Volksbanken (AT)  √     (2)  √  √ 
BVR (DE)  √     √  √  
Cajas Rurales (ES)  √       √  
OP-Pohjola (FI)  √  √  √  √   √ 
Banque Populaire (FR)  √     √  √  
Crédit Agricole (FR)  √   √  √  √  √ 
Crédit Mutuel (FR)  √   (1)  √  √  √ 
BCC (IT)  √       √  
Rabobank (NL)  √  √  √  √   √ 
Sources: Annual reports, legal documents and statutes of local banks and central institutions, national 
laws, DBRS (2007), and Fitch (2007, 2008). 
Notes: Italian Banche Popolari are not included as they do not have cross-guarantee schemes beyond the 
compulsory insurance schemes.  
(1) Available at the regional level but not for the group as a whole. 
(2) Full de facto participation. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 21 
 
Some form of mutual support exists among all the cooperatives 
covered in this study except for the Italian Banche Popolari (not included in 
the table). The types of support range from cross-guarantees23 to systems 
with  joint-liability, available only among the Finnish and Dutch 
cooperatives.24 As for the legal scope of the schemes, in some cases the 
support is legally-binding, implying that it can be deployed automatically in 
the event of trouble, without any specific authorisations or reservation by 
members. Participation in the systems may also be obligatory. In some 
systems, such as in Austria and Spain as well as for the Italian credit 
cooperatives (BCC), participation is voluntary even though there may be de 
facto full participation, as is the case in the Austrian Volksbanken.  
A key factor is the type of funding available for support. In many 
cases, the associations build paid-up funds through contributions of 
members. The paid-up funds can be supplemented by a provision to allow 
for call-up (or ex-post) funds, which is the case for Austrian Volksbanken 
and French Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel. In other cases, such as the 
joint-liability schemes of Finnish and Dutch cooperatives,25 there are no 
paid-up funds since the group’s pooled capital and reserves serve as the 
basis for support, just like in a consolidated banking group.  
One question that arises is to what extent a higher degree of 
integration, achieved through extensive mutual support or centralisation of 
other functions, complicates the existing agency problems. Traditionally, 
                                                      
23 A cross-guarantee is a commitment or obligation by participating entities to provide 
liquidity to a troubled entity. In principle, such a system could serve as a liability protection 
mechanism by providing support to institutions in difficulty. It should be noted, however, 
that support is often limited by participating institutions’ capacity to contribute, which 
could be insufficient to meet all the claims. Other complicating factors include the legal 
scope of the system, which could be crucial in determining the timeliness of support, and 
exceptions that may rule out support for difficulties arising from fraudulent or criminal 
transactions. See DBRS (2007) for more details.  
24 More precisely, associations with joint-liability allow creditors to make direct claims 
against the group if the amount owed by the troubled entity is not forthcoming. In effect, 
joint-liability automatically implies a significant degree of pooling among the participating 
entities.  
25 For Austrian Raiffeisen, the customers of local banks are protected by a joint-liability 
system at the regional level. At the national level, a cross-guarantee scheme is in effect, 
which provides liquidity to troubled provincial associations. For this reason, it is more 
appropriate to consider the Austrian Raiffeisen’s mutual support system as a cross-
guarantee scheme rather than one that provides joint-liability for all institutions.  22 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
the owners of a cooperative, i.e. its members-customers, take the role of 
principals while the managers of the local and central institutions take the 
role of agents. This can be seen as the classical agency problem that exists 
between the owners and the management. While the members benefit from 
the maximisation of low cost products, the managers prefer high wages 
and low effort. The cooperatives have introduced a variety of governance 
mechanisms to reinforce bottom-up ownership, including a democratic 
voting structure whereby members choose representatives of local 
institutions who then choose representatives in central organisations; 
distribution of benefits to members; election of directors of central 
institutions by local banks; and so forth.  
Highly integrated systems introduce an opposing problem. The 
central institutions have stronger incentives than local institutions to 
safeguard the mutual resources, i.e. the shared brand-name, pooled reserve 
fund, etc. This is the so called appropriability hazard problem, whereby 
counterparts may act opportunistically to obtain the rents generated by the 
alliance (Descrochers and Fischer, 2005). One common response to reduce 
these risks is to give the central institutions an appropriate level of 
authority and control. In many cases, the individual banks (either local or 
regional, depending on the coverage) have to submit regular prudential 
reports to their central institutions. Other measures include the 
standardisation of risk-management practices, obligatory audits and other 
preventive measures. In response to a call on the use of funds, the central 
institutions also have the right to engage in additional actions, such as 
restructuring of the bank’s debt, governance structure and pushing for 
merger with other network institutions.  
The increasing role of central institutions has led to the emergence of 
a ‘circular authority’ in highly integrated cooperative banks. As shown in 
Figure 2.4.1, member-customers exercise their power by voting and 
claiming their rights to residual earnings by obtaining the cooperative 
dividends on their nominal shares. At a higher level of relationship, the 
local institutions have authority on the central institutions, often limited to 
the election of non-executive boards by local directors in the general 
assembly meetings. These two layers of decision-making represent the 
‘bottom-up’ authority that is typical of most cooperative financial 
institutions. In integrated structures, central institutions maintain control 
over the local institutions through formal monitoring, reporting, auditing, 
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resources. This represents the ‘top-down’ authority, which effectively 
diminishes the autonomy of local banks.  
Partly attesting to the growing importance of top-down authority in 
cooperative bank networks, national regulators have gradually delegated 
the supervision of local institutions (all of which are separately licensed 
credit institutions) to the central institutions. In terms of supervision, this is 
equivalent to treating the entire network as a consolidated group. In the 
case of the Netherlands, for example, the country’s central bank (De 
Nederlandsche Bank) is the supervisory agency for banks but has explicitly 
delegated the supervisory authority over cooperative banks to Rabobank 
Nederland. Naturally, this form of supervision is more readily available in 
highly integrated models, i.e. in models where the centralised institutions 
have more authority on the system as a whole, such as the Finnish, Dutch 
and, in some instances, the French models.  
Figure 2.4.1 Circular authority in integrated cooperative banks 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Note: Intermediary organs, such as regional central institutions and representative 
boards, have been omitted from the figure to simplify presentation.  
 
Governance of cooperative banks  
Agency issues (potential conflicts of interest between managers and owners 
of firms) arise in any organisation in which there is a separation of 
decision- and risk-taking functions (in the case of cooperatives between the 
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management and the members; in the case of SHV companies between 
management and shareholders). This arises particularly when important 
decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A potential moral hazard arises as 
managers may be induced to behave in their own interests rather than 
those of shareholders.  
The central idea is that owners of firms (whether shareholders or 
members of a cooperative) in practice delegate to management the job of 
running the firm and operating it in the owners’ interests. In particular, 
management is supposed to pursue policies that maximise the benefit of 
owners. In turn, the shareholders/owners monitor and control 
management to prevent them from exploiting their advantageous position.  
A key element in this debate typically centres on the differences in 
ownership structure and the often alleged greater scope for managers of 
cooperative banks to engage in rent-seeking or expense-preference 
behaviour. It is typically asserted that agency costs are potentially more 
prevalent in cooperatives than in SHV institutions because the owners 
(investors and borrowers) of the former have less influence on managers 
than do their equity shareholding counterparts in SHV banks. This is partly 
because they are larger in number, have smaller ownership stakes, and are 
more dispersed. However, this view can be questioned, and the empirical 
evidence does not support the proposition that cooperative banks 
systematically have higher costs.  
Indeed, it can be argued that cooperative institutions are in some 
respects better able to address some agency problems than are their SHV 
counterparts. Four issues are considered: (1) the unique nature of the 
members’ claim; (2) the exit option is potentially more powerful; (3) the 
absence of the capital market as a source of capital; and (4) absence of 
shareholder/creditor conflicts. 
1. Unique nature of members’ claims 
This advantage relates to the unique nature of the members’ claims in 
cooperative banks: specifically, that they are in principle redeemable on 
demand.26 
                                                      
26 Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that: “The decision of the claim holder to withdraw 
resources is a form of partial take-over or liquidation which deprives management of 
control over assets. This control right can be exercised independently by each claim holder. 
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2. Exit potentially more powerful 
The property rights literature suggests that the usual emphasis given to the 
d i r e c t  i m p a c t  o f  o w n e r s  o n  m a n a g e ment by highlighting the nature of 
voting rights, attendance at annual general meetings, presence of owner-
members on the board of directors, etc., may be misplaced in the case of 
cooperatives. In practice, potential member withdrawals, which imply a 
partial liquidation in a cooperative bank, should generate a strong incentive 
to supply financial services on competitive terms and to provide high 
quality service (especially in a highly competitive market environment). In 
cooperative banks, owners can exercise the easy and costless option of exit. 
This is a powerful discipline mechanism and is in some senses a more 
direct threat to managers since, as was emphasised in an earlier section, 
when a depositor withdraws funds the capacity of the cooperative bank is 
immediately reduced, whereas the sale of an equity stake in an SHV bank 
does not immediately influence the capacity of the firm though the share 
price might fall. Thus, if equity stakeholders in SHV banks sell their 
ownership stakes on the stock market, this does not remove assets from the 
control of the management of the banks.  
3. Absence of capital market option 
An obvious control mechanism in financial cooperatives is that they 
traditionally do not have access to external equity finance which makes 
them more reliant on retained profits for growth. The capital structure of 
cooperative banks is such that the almost exclusive source of capital is 
retained profits. This implies that business mistakes exerting the effect of 
destroying capital cannot be offset by external injections of capital. This 
tends to make cooperative banks more risk-averse. 
4. Absence of shareholder/creditor conflicts 
A further agency problem relates to the potential conflict between the 
holders of debt contracts and the holders of equity. Specifically, the nature 
of the debt contract dictates that if a risky (ex ante) investment produces 
                                                                                                                                       
It does not require a proxy fight, a tender offer, or any other concerted take-over bid. In 
contrast, customer decisions in open non-financial corporations and the repricing of the 
corporation’s securities in the capital market provide signals about the performance of its 
decision agents. Without further action, however, either internal or from the market for 
take-overs, the judgment of customers and of the capital market leave the assets of the open 
non-financial corporation under the control of the managers” (p. 318). 26 | THE ECONOMICS AND NATURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
high (ex post) returns well above the face value of the debt, equity holders 
will capture the gains while debt holders receive only their fixed 
contractual payments. If, however, the investment fails, then, due to their 
limited liability, equity holders will face only limited downside risk while 
debt holders will face the same downside risk without any compensating 
upside potential. Thus, as shareholders have all the upside potential of risk 
behaviour but only a limited downside loss, they may have greater 
incentives to encourage the firm to take more risk than do debt holders in 
the firm. 
It follows that equity holders in an SHV bank may have an incentive 
to see the firm investing in high-risk projects even though they may be 
value-decreasing for the firm and this tendency may be exacerbated if 
equity investors have highly diversified portfolio holdings. This effect, 
generally referred to as the ‘asset substitution effect’, is an agency cost of 
debt financing in SHVs and is frequently neglected in the SHV versus STV 
debate. It could be argued that the presence of external shareholders in 
SHV financial institutions can add a further dimension to the agency 
problem by virtue of the potential conflict between the owners (equity 
shareholders) and depositors/customers. Clearly, in cooperative banks this 
particular aspect of the agency problem is absent as owners and customers 
are generally one and the same. 
Comparisons are often made in the literature between the governance 
models of different types of company ownership structures. A general 
perspective is that agency costs (associated with principal-agent issues) 
exist in all forms of company structure and they are handled differently in 
different types of companies. Because there are imperfections in all forms 
of governance arrangements, it is invalid to compare the actual 
arrangements in one model with a perfect theoretical version of a different 
model.  
In sum, this chapter sheds light on the economics and nature of 
cooperative banks in general. It emphasises the common characteristics of 
these banks including governance, risk, capital and the key role of central 
institutions. The next chapter delves more deeply into the cooperative 
banking sector’s developments in seven European countries.     
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3.  KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE 
BANKS IN EUROPE 
redit cooperatives based on the principle of mutual “self-help” 
(“Selbsthilfe”) and the corresponding principles first took hold in 
Germany. The movement gradually grew in importance in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries and eventually spread to other countries in 
Europe, first to neighbouring Austria, Italy, and France, and then to others, 
such as the Netherlands, Spain and Finland. In a number of countries, 
cooperative banks largely disappeared following the demutualisation 
wave, e.g. the UK.27 And of course, there are also countries where they 
never existed or at least played only a minor role. In this evolving context, 
this chapter offers a brief overview on key developments of cooperative 
banks in Europe and concludes with an overall assessment of cooperative 
banks’ evolving business models.  
3.1  Germany 
Cooperative banks in Germany date back to the middle of the 19th century. 
That was a time when banking was not yet well developed and the vast 
majority of the rural and urban population did not have access to financial 
services, and the rapid industrialisation and population growth made life 
very hard for a large part of the people.  
Cooperative banks emerged at two locations. In the area of the 
Westerwald, a very poor mountainous region in the Rhineland, a local 
public administrator, Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen, was struck by the 
misery he saw around him and he then laid the foundations for what was 
                                                      
27 See Annex 2 for more details.  
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to become the first rural cooperatives in the world and a model copied and 
adapted worldwide. Many of these rural cooperatives are still today called 
Raiffeisenbanken in order to honour the founder and to emphasise their 
specific character.  
These cooperatives strictly followed three fundamental principles: 
they were self-help institutions, relied on solidarity, and were self-
administering small financial intermediaries.  
Self-help implied that local people contributed the savings that were 
the basis for lending to members of the same community. Local people 
were also involved in monitoring borrowers, a role that was made easy by 
the fact that typically the members of a cooperative were from the same 
village or small town and knew each other very well. What may have 
induced the members to take this monitoring role very seriously was that 
for about 50 years the members of a given cooperative were jointly liable 
for all external debts that the cooperatives might incur in the course of its 
operations.  
Solidarity shaped the way in which loans were granted, eventual 
repayment problems were resolved, and profits were distributed or 
retained in the cooperative. The most remarkable aspects of solidarity 
consist in the strict rules that (1) one member of a cooperative had, and still 
today has, only one vote in the assembly of members, (2) that membership 
cannot be sold but shares can only be redeemed at their nominal value plus 
retained earnings, and (3) that by law and statute cooperative banks do not 
have the objective to make as large a profit as possible but rather to serve 
the economic interests of their members and clients.  
Self-administration shows that local cooperative banks were legally 
independent organisations having a special legal status since around 1900 
that sanctioned their organisational and operating rules.  
The second important group of cooperatives was founded only a few 
years later in what is now eastern Germany. These cooperatives, which 
adopted the common name Volksbanken (people’s banks), mainly operated 
in urban areas: their typical members were craftsmen and petty traders. 
The founder of this group of cooperative banks was Hermann Schulze, a 
former mayor of the small town of Delitzsch, who later called himself 
Schulze-Delitzsch.  
The cooperative movement developed very fast after 1850. Towards 
the end of the 19th century, there were several thousand credit cooperatives 
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central financial institutions were created at the regional level. In 1889, a 
special law on cooperatives was issued that provided a firm legal basis for 
their organisational design and operating principles. Given their 
importance, it is not surprising that several German states, notably Prussia, 
made attempts to place cooperative banks under public control. However, 
by and large these attempts failed and the two cooperative systems 
remained intact – and largely separate until they finally merged in 1972. At 
the same time, there was also an important change in the rules of operation: 
cooperative banks were allowed to also conduct business with clients who 
are not at the same time members. This so-called non-member business has 
gained considerable importance in recent years, somewhat obscuring the 
traditional nature of cooperative banks.  
Today, the cooperative banks constitute the third pillar of the so-
called ‘three-pillar system’ that is a characteristic feature of German 
banking. They compete with savings banks and private commercial banks 
that have large branch networks. Among the three principal groups or 
‘pillars’ (to which one would have to add a fourth group of “other 
institutions”), the cooperatives are the smallest group, though not by a 
wide margin. Table 3.1.1 provides data on numbers of institutions (only 
banks) and total assets for the three groups in absolute terms and in 
percentages.28  
Table 3.1.1 Overview of the German banking system; numbers of banks in the three 
main ‘pillars’ 
  Com. Banks  S-Group  Coop. Group 
Institutions (banks)  278  441  1,159 
Institutions (%)  14  23  60 
Total assets  2,192  22,531  938 
Total assets (%)  29  34  13 
Note: All figures are as of end 2009. 
Source: Bundesbank. 
                                                      
28 The percentages do not add up to 100 because they do not cover the entire banking sector. 
There is also the fourth group of “other institutions”, which comprises special institutions 
like state development banks, mortgage banks and building societies. While, ideally, these 
banks should be included among the three pillars, an adjustment of this kind is difficult and 
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The German cooperative banking group is a network or system of 
related institutions, most of which are, however, mainly not connected 
through a top-down hierarchy. Much like the savings bank group, they are 
what is called a “Verbund” in German. The basis of this system was, and in 
many respects still is today, the locus of the ultimate power within the 
system, the legally independent local cooperative banks. Through a long 
process of intragroup mergers, their number has shrunk from some 7,000 in 
1970 to 1,159 at the end of 2009; correspondingly, the average size of 
cooperative banks has increased dramatically, as Figure 3.1.1 shows. 
Figure 3.1.1 Composition of the cooperative banking group over time 
 
Note: Left scale: branches in thousands and members in millions; right scale: 
number of institutions (banks) in thousands and total assets (TA) per bank in 100 
millions. 
 Source: BVR. 
In addition to the local cooperative banks, the network includes 
central financial institutions and associations. Until about 20 years ago, the 
financial side of the Verbund featured a second layer of so-called regional 
central banks and, on top, one central financial institution called Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsbank (or DG-Bank). However, over the years, the second 
layer became obsolete, was thinned out and finally disappeared almost 
completely. Today, the financial structure consists only of local cooperative 
banks and two central institutions. The larger one of them is Deutsche 
Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank or DZ BANK, Frankfurt, which serves as the 
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one is WGZ-Bank, Düsseldorf. Both cooperative central banks also operate 
as commercial banks with DZ BANK, which is Germany’s fifth largest 
bank. Several recent initiatives to merge these two institutions have failed, 
but one can assume that a merger will finally come about.  
As far as associations are concerned, one has to distinguish between 
regional associations and a central or top-level association called 
Bundesverband der Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. (BVR), which 
now resides in Berlin.  
To complete the picture of the Verbund, one also needs to mention 
that there are a number of other financial and non-financial institutions and 
organisations besides those already mentioned. Most important among the 
group-affiliated financial institutions are the Cooperative Housing Bank 
(Bausparkasse Schwäbisch-Hall, Germany’s largest building society) and 
the insurance giant R+V-Versicherung (the sixth largest insurance firm in 
Germany) and the groups’ own guarantee organisation 
(Sicherungseinrichtung), which not only offers extensive deposit insurance, 
but also assures the existence of cooperative banks. A particularly 
noteworthy part of a regional association is its so-called Auditing 
Associations (genossenschaftlicher Prüfungsverband). Finally, the Verbund 
includes several training institutions, bookkeeping and computing centres, 
and special financial institutions for leasing, factoring and mortgage 
lending. 
All in all, the Verbund currently encompasses some 1,200 separate 
institutions and employs around 180,000 people. Thus, it is about half as 
large as the German savings bank group. There are evidently strong 
similarities between cooperative banks and savings banks. They are both 
organised in networks of affiliated, but decentralised organisations which 
are not set up as hierarchies; they are both conglomerates of financial 
institutions that are not meant to maximise their respective profits but 
rather to pursue a wider set of objectives. Being profitable is of course 
important for them, since profitability is an indispensible prerequisite for 
economic survival and the ability to compete with others and to grow as 
institutions. But besides profit, and over the longer run even above profit is 
the objective to serve others, their members and non-member clients in the 
case of cooperative banks, and the regional economy and society in the case 
of the savings banks. This is what could be defined as a dual-bottom line 
financial institution. Thus they are both stakeholder banks as defined in 
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have survived for a very long time and especially during the last decades 
have been able to prosper (and at times even outperformed their 
commercial and purely shareholder value-oriented) peers may appear 
surprising to outside observers and suggest that there may be great merit to 
their organisational design and business orientation.  
The local cooperative banks, most of which are called Volksbanken or 
Raiffeisenbanken, are cooperatives in the legal sense of the term. According 
to Art. 1 of the German law on cooperatives, the defining feature of a 
cooperative is that it has members who hold the shares, that members have 
one vote irrespective of how many shares (“Genossenschaftsanteile”) they 
may have, and that the supreme objective of a cooperative is to support the 
economic activities of their members.  
As its legal owners, the members of a local cooperative have voting 
rights in the general assembly, the right to receive a part of the surplus 
which is to be distributed, and the right to redeem the shares that they have 
once subscribed. Their formal obligation consists in making their financial 
contribution by buying a share with a given nominal value when they 
become members. According to the by-laws of many, though not all, 
cooperatives, their members are also guarantors in the sense that they are 
obliged to make financial contributions of a limited size in the case that 
their cooperative bank becomes insolvent (“Nachschusspflicht”). However, 
since the establishment of the institutional protection scheme mentioned 
above, in the 1930s, this eventuality has never occurred, and therefore the 
guarantee obligation de facto no longer plays a role today.  
The legal structure of a cooperative resembles that of a joint stock 
company, but also differs in important respects. The supreme body is the 
assembly of members. It elects the members of the supervisory board, 
which in turn has the role of making important decisions, most importantly 
that of appointing the members of the cooperative bank management, and 
it decides on the use of profits.29 However, annual meeting attendance is 
notoriously very weak. Therefore, there is, in the case of most large German 
cooperative banks, a board of representatives which has the mandate to 
perform most of the functions that were originally assigned to the general 
assembly of members. Each cooperative bank has a supervisory board and 
                                                      
29 The dividends are moderate, in most cases reflecting a return on (equity) capital of 5% to 
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a management board: the management board, which must have at least 
two members, is responsible for running the bank on a daily basis and for 
representing it towards third parties.  
The fact that each member of a cooperative has only one vote and is 
not allowed to sell his shares to other people at a freely determined market 
price but can only redeem them at their nominal value; that since the 
beginning of the 20th century members have not been liable for all 
obligations of the cooperative, as they had been in the early years; and that 
the guarantee obligation lost its former role after 1930 – may limit the 
financial incentives for members to get involved in the affairs of a 
cooperative or to monitor its management. In particular, there is no 
financial motive for them to induce the management to increase the value 
of the cooperative. Correspondingly, the incentives of management to 
increase this value are also weak. Moreover, there is no threat of a hostile 
take-over, but of course managers have to fear that they might lose their 
jobs. These special features of cooperative banks have both positive and 
negative consequences. The positive aspect of weak incentives for 
organisation-oriented value creation is that a cooperative bank’s 
management can really concentrate on supporting the members and is not 
encouraged to increase the value of the cooperative by exploiting the strong 
position it may have vis-à-vis its member-customers. However, at the same 
time, management may be inclined to make less than their best effort in 
running the bank and enjoy the proverbial quiet life. And they might even 
indulge in self-serving practices. While this lack of management control has 
led to the downfall of many cooperative banks in developing countries in 
the past 50 years, such problems have been very rare or even non-existent 
in Germany.  
But what exactly are the forces that mitigate the inherent governance 
problem? One such force is the competition to which cooperative banks are 
nowadays exposed to in Germany. Lenient management might make staff 
and customers simply leave the organisation, a threat which management 
has to take into account. In addition, the German cooperative banking 
system has developed an institutional device which can be assumed to play 
an important and positive role in this context. It is the regular and very 
comprehensive audit that is regularly performed by the regional Audit 
Associations. Their auditors not only have to look at the banks’ accounts 
but also assess how careful and competent the banks’ management is. Since 
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later becoming managers of cooperative banks, they definitely have a 
strong incentive to fulfil this demanding task as diligently as possible.  
The Audit Associations perform their function not only on behalf of 
their respective regional associations of cooperative banks, but also on that 
of the institutional protection scheme, which is closely related to the 
Federal Association BVR. This protection scheme is also part of the de facto 
governance system, since its assessment determines the financial situation 
of a local bank and, to some extent, also the degree of independence of its 
management. The contributions of individual banks to the protection 
scheme depend on the riskiness of a local bank, as it is determined by the 
auditors. Riskier banks do not only have to pay more, their managers even 
have to fear being dismissed if they incur too much risk and if the auditors 
become aware of this fact.  
As far as their organisational design is concerned, cooperative banks 
can be regarded as a specific mixture of elements of a club, which has 
members and not owners, a foundation, to which members have made 
contributions which they can scarcely recover at their full value, and of a 
corporation that has a structured hierarchy of administrative or governing 
bodies. When all cooperative banks were still very small and operated 
mainly in places where there was not much competition and a general lack 
of access to financial services, this design was clearly supportive of their 
role to help their member-customers. Whether it is still a suitable design 
today is an open question. However, the way German cooperatives 
performed in recent years and how they fared in the ongoing financial 
crisis – topics that will be addressed later – suggests that their institutional 
design may still today be more suitable than critics might be inclined to 
think. Moreover, in thinking of a comparison between cooperative and 
commercial banks, one should not overlook that the current crisis has 
revealed considerable weakness in the governance of a number of large 
Anglo-Saxon commercial banks.  
As licensed banks, the German cooperative banks have to conform to 
the general banking regulation and are subject to normal banking 
supervision, which is exercised by the Federal Financial Services Authority 
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they have to have the same level of equity and to follow the same structural 
and prudential rules as other banks.30  
We now take a brief look at DZ BANK, the larger of the two second-
tier financial institutions in the network. It is organised as a joint stock 
corporation. The overwhelming majority of its shares are held by the first-
tier cooperatives. It has total assets of roughly €389 billion as of the end of 
2009 and a staff of around 25,000, which makes it one of the largest banks in 
Germany. DZ BANK offers a wide range of financial services to affiliated 
local cooperative banks as well as other customers in Germany and abroad, 
and holds the majority of the equity shares in a number of the other 
financial service firms that belong to the cooperative banking group and 
several foreign subsidiaries.  
DZ BANK and the institutions in which it holds a majority share 
provide a broad spectrum of services to their own customers and to the 
local cooperatives, and it offers those services to the customers of the local 
cooperative banks which they themselves are too small to provide 
efficiently. This division of roles seems to function well, leaving the 
primary cooperatives enough room for their own development.  
Even though the German cooperative banks have a special mandate 
to provide financial services that are relevant and valuable for their clients 
and despite not being primarily profit-oriented, they seem, as a group, 
successful in economic and financial terms. This is most evident when the 
years between 1970 and 2000 are considered and becomes even more 
pronounced in the years after the beginning of the new millennium. The 
early years after 2000 were difficult for all banks, but in particular for the 
big private commercial banks and the second-tier institutions of the two 
banking networks, while the primary cooperative and savings banks were 
much less affected. To illustrate this proposition, we take a brief look at 
various indicators. The following chapter will look at more detailed 
comparative financial performance analysis.  
                                                      
30 One difference is that the requirement of an absolute minimum equity is lower for small 
cooperative banks and that, in principle, the limited guarantee obligations which some 
cooperatives may still have are counted in the determination of their relative equity 
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Figure 3.1.2 shows the market shares of the major German banking 
groups in terms of loans to non-banks and deposits from non-banks for the 
last 40 years,31 but does not include the respective second-tier institutions. 
The upper panel shows the market shares of the entire groups of 
commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks regarding loans to 
non-banks, while the lower panel shows market shares for deposits from 
non-banks.32  
Figure 3.1.2 Market shares of the three banking groups, deposits and loans to non-
banks33 
 
 
  
                                                      
31 Since not all banks are covered, the percentages in Figure 3.1.2 do not add up to 100%. 
32 If second-tier institutions were included in the upper panel, the savings bank group 
would stand out as the clear market leader as far as loans to non-banks are concerned, since 
the Landesbanken provide a sizable volume of lending especially to large firms belonging to 
the so-called Mittelstand. As far as deposits from non-banks are concerned, excluding 
second-tier institutions would hardly affect the overall picture.  
33 The data source of this figure as well as for those that follow is Deutsche Bundesbank, 
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A brief look at the structure of the aggregated balance sheet of the 
primary cooperative banks and their long-term development is provided in 
Figure 3.1.3. By far the largest asset class are loans to non-banks, which 
consistently comprise more than 60% of the assets, while the largest item on 
the liabilities side are deposits from non-banks with more than 70% on 
average over the years. This balance sheet structure differs greatly from 
that of commercial banks and indicates that the cooperative banks – much 
like the German primary savings banks – have retained the traditional 
function of banks as financial intermediaries, namely that of transforming 
client deposits into loans to businesses and households. All in all, these 
figures clearly reveal the cooperative banks’ special and indeed quite 
conservative business model. Moreover, they demonstrate that cooperative 
banks have consistently raised more funds as deposits than they lent out to 
their creditor clients. That there is a sizable surplus of deposits over loans 
can be considered as a valuable contribution to the stability of the German 
banking system. 
Figure 3.1.3 Development of cooperative banks’ balance sheet structure over time.  
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It is well-known that the German banking market is highly 
competitive as a whole, probably more so than those of all other large 
countries in Europe.34 One reason for this is that banking concentration is 
extremely low by international standards. One way of measuring banking 
concentration is using the so-called C5 ratio, which indicates the market 
share of the largest five institutions. Germany’s C5 ratio stood at 37.8 in 
2002 and since then has not changed dramatically. The other method is the 
use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index, a number between 10,000 and 0 
with lower values indicating a lower level of concentration. According to 
the European Central Bank (ECB), the HH-Index for Germany stood at 183 
in 2007, and this may be taken as an indication and possible even as a cause 
of a high level of competition.  
However, measuring the intensity of competition only with 
indicators of concentration may be misleading, since these measures apply 
for an entire national economy, while competition in retail banking takes 
place in local markets. The standard measurements of concentration for the 
case of German banking treat the primary cooperative and savings banks as 
individual banks. Formally, this is correct, since they are legally 
independent entities. However, in an analysis of competition, this may be 
misleading because they also belong to their respective networks and this 
feature is probably an important competitive strength. If one treated each 
one of these two groups as one big bank, the concentration figures would 
be more or less in line with those of other European countries.  
Moreover, retail competition is essentially local, and all local 
cooperative and savings banks operate under their respective regional 
principle and therefore hardly compete with each other within their 
respective groups. Thus, on a local level, there are not hundreds of banks 
competing with each other, but rather one or at best very few cooperative 
banks and a few savings banks and possibly a few branches of the big 
commercial banks. Nevertheless, the level of competition is extremely high 
in Germany, as one can see from other competition indicators. One of these, 
the so-called Lerner Index, measures competition directly by identifying 
the extent to which actual prices charged in a market diverge from those 
that could be expected if perfect competition obtained (see chapter 4). 
                                                      
34 See the next chapter as well as European Commission (2006) and Fischer and Pfeil (2004) 
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However, applying this ‘direct’ measure of competition to narrowly 
defined local markets for retail banking services in Germany yields the 
same result as the ‘indirect’ measurement based on national concentration 
indicators: competition in German banking is fierce. The reason for this is 
that cooperative and savings banks are, by their design, strictly tied to their 
local markets. This means they are confined to their markets and compete 
with others within these markets. They would find it extremely difficult to 
move out of these local markets like large private banks can do easily and 
have done frequently in the past. Thus the design of the two ‘federated 
groups’ and the regional principle that applies to these groups are the main 
reason for the highly intense competition.  
There is also strong indirect evidence for the high level of competition 
in German banking. One indicator is that the prices for financial services in 
Germany are very low by international standards,35 a fact that is clearly 
beneficial to the clients of the banks. The high level of competition and the 
low level of prices are reflected in the fact that by international standards 
the profitability of German banks is low.36 It would be wrong to regard this 
as a consequence of high costs or low productivity, since the costs of 
German banks are not higher, and their productivity is not lower than 
those in comparable other countries, as recent research has clearly shown.37 
The difference in profitability can therefore only be the consequence of low 
earnings caused by low prices and indirectly by strong competition, a fact 
for which the design of the cooperative and savings banking groups bear 
the main responsibility.  
One aspect of banking competition is merger activity. By their 
institutional design and legal status, cooperative banks as well as savings 
banks cannot be acquired by commercial banks. Thus mergers across the 
dividing lines between the three pillars of the German banking system are 
virtually impossible. But this does not suggest that mergers do not occur. In 
fact, the opposite is true. The number of banks in Germany has declined 
substantially over the past 20 years. In 1990 there were still 4,719 banks in 
Germany, and at the end of 2007, only 2,300 banks were left. This decline is 
almost exclusively due to mergers and consolidations within the groups of 
                                                      
35 See European Commission (2009).  
36 Confirmed in European Commission (2006). 
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cooperative banks and savings banks, as Figure 3.1.1 above demonstrates 
for the case of cooperative banks. Smaller and economically weaker 
institutions have been absorbed by others from their group, thus raising the 
average size of the individual banks. And since the costs of really small 
banks tend to be higher than those of larger banks, within-group 
consolidation has improved the efficiency of these two banking groups and 
this, together with the benefits of having their respective networks, seems 
to have enabled them to withstand the competitive pressure from the large 
commercial banks.  
A reflection of the causes of the high level of competition in local 
German banking markets is the extent to which clients have access to 
banking services. In contrast to the situation in some other countries, the 
access to financial services does not seem to be a problem in Germany, and 
this is again due to the existence of savings banks and cooperative banks 
and their local presence in almost all parts of the country. If they were not 
present, access would be a problem, because under increasing pressure to 
achieve high rates of return, the big private banks have thinned out their 
branch networks in remote areas of the country.  
Like almost any other bank, the German cooperative bank as a group 
has been affected by the financial crisis, and, again like all other banks, they 
have reasons to fear more difficulties in the aftermath of the crisis and their 
spread to the real economy. However, on a large scale, the consequences 
have so far been less serious than in the case of many other banks and 
banking groups. Continuing a tradition that goes back to 1934, when the 
group’s protection scheme was introduced, not a single German 
cooperative bank went bankrupt, and none of the institutions in the 
network have ever had to apply for government support.  
The clearly positive aspect refers t o  t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  l o c a l  
cooperative banks. Most of them have so far not suffered from the crisis. 
One reason has been their relatively high capital levels, as evidenced by 
Table 3.1.2.  
Table 3.1.2 Tier 1 capital ratios in the German banking sector 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
All banks  7.5%  7.5%  7.7%  7.8%  9.3% 
Cooperative banks  8.3%  9.1%  9.1%  9.4%  10.5% 
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The German cooperative banks’ down-to-earth approach to banking 
has left them least exposed to the financial crisis. They did not hold assets 
that were considered ‘toxic’ and therefore had no need to take write-
d o w n s .  M o s t  o f  t h e m  w e r e  e v e n  a b l e  t o  r a i s e  m o r e  d e p o s i t s  f r o m  t h e i r  
former clients and attract firms as new clients for their lending operations. 
The second-largest Volksbank, the one in Frankfurt, even reported that 
2008 was the best year in its history. However, prospects may be less 
benign since with their heavy involvement in retail and SME lending, they 
now have to fear that in 2010 credit losses might increase as a result of 
rising numbers of corporate and private bankruptcies. However, there are 
reasons to believe that private bankruptcies will not go up very much, since 
employment hardly shrank during the crisis so far, and mid-sized firms 
now seem better equipped with equity cushions to weather the storm than 
in the last crisis in the early years of this decade.  
Clearly less benign is the situation of the largest German cooperative 
bank, the “bank of doctors and pharmacists” (Ärzte und Apothekerbank, 
Düsseldorf). It did have a sizable portfolio of ‘toxic’ assets, had to report 
heavy losses, and had to be supported by the group’s own guarantee 
system in a substantial way.  
 Equally, the profitability of DZ BANK, the central institution in the 
cooperative network, has suffered from the crisis. DZ BANK has been very 
active in investment banking, especially in capital markets, complementing 
its role and mandate as an interface between the capital markets and the 
local cooperative banks. The central institution and its subsidiaries had a 
security portfolio that was seriously affected by the turmoil in the financial 
markets, especially following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
crisis of the Icelandic banks. As a consequence, the bank took substantial 
impairment charges in 2008, which contributed to the reported loss of 
around €1 billion in that year. However, the year-end results for 2009 show 
a return to profitability. One consequence of this experience is that DZ 
BANK has taken steps to reorient its business model more consistently with 
its main role, namely, supporting local cooperatives, expanding its core 
business lines and disengaging from non-network activities.  
In spite of these two cases within the cooperative network, one can 
clearly say that among German banks, the cooperative group as a whole 
has so far not been a loser, but rather a winner, in relative terms, of the 
crisis. Whether this will have a long-lasting positive effect is open to 
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emphasis on retail banking than in the past, and this might imply lower 
margins for the cooperative banks, who have traditionally focused on this 
line of business.  
3.2  Austria  
The origins and history of Austrian cooperative banks largely resemble 
those of their German peers, at least until about 20 years ago. The first 
savings and credit cooperatives were founded in Austria shortly after 1850. 
Cooperatives operating mainly in rural areas were called 
Raiffeisengenossenschaften (Raiffeisen cooperatives), and most of those 
with an urban focus are still called Volksbanken (people’s banks). The 
motive for creating them was to alleviate the serious problems of credit 
access for poor peasants and urban craftsmen and petty traders and, more 
generally, to mitigate the hardship these people experienced at that time for 
largely the same economic and social reasons as their German peers. The 
idealistic philosophical orientation of the cooperative movement was 
widely accepted in Austria, as almost everywhere in Europe, and thus 
cooperative banking spread rapidly during the last decades of the 19th 
century.  
In the first half of the last century, associations of local cooperatives 
were formed at the regional and the federal level, and in parallel, regional 
and central financial institutions were created, that in their early years 
mainly served to manage the liquidity of the respective system. Like in 
Germany, there were two different cooperative banking systems. However, 
in contrast to the situation in Germany, they have not merged and still exist 
side by side. While the predominantly rural cooperatives have kept the 
name of the founding father Raiffeisen in the names of most banks in that 
system, the remembrance of the founder of the urban cooperative 
movement is still today visible in the official name of the association of 
people banks. It is called “Österreichischer Genossenschaftsverband 
(Schulze-Delitzsch)”.  
The general feature of the Austrian cooperative banks corresponds to 
the standard concept of a cooperative. The fundamental principle of self-
help implies that local people contribute the savings which are lent out to 
other local people, and in the past, local people were also involved in 
monitoring the economic behaviour – and sometimes also the general 
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The second fundamental principle is that of solidarity. Its main 
implication can be seen in the mission of cooperative banks. Their 
overarching objective was, and to some extent still is, not to make as much 
profit for the institution and its owners as possible, but rather to support 
their members to better achieve their own economic success. As long as 
members can be regarded as owners in an economic sense, this may not 
appear like a big difference; but the difference is important, as we will 
discuss at greater length in what follows. The difference between owners 
and members, and thus the role of solidarity, shows up in the rules of 
voting and the restrictions concerning the possibility to sell equity shares in 
a cooperative.  
The principle of self-administration manifests itself in the fact that 
local cooperative banks are still today legally independent organisations. 
They have a special legal status based on a law that sanctions their 
operating principles and rules and, most important, their right to self-
administration. Formerly, when all local cooperatives were still very small, 
it was also required that all those who held an office in a cooperative bank 
had to be members of that same cooperative. Today, this requirement has 
lost its importance, and one should also not overestimate its importance for 
the early years. It was an advice of Raiffeisen himself that the founders of a 
local cooperative should try to enlist some educated local people to take an 
active interest in the cooperative in order to stabilise especially newly 
founded cooperative banks. In fact, in a number of cases socially minded 
educated local people – like Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch – were 
themselves initiators and founders of cooperatives. Thus there has always 
been an element of welfare activity supplementing the principles of self-
help and self-administration  
Today, the two systems of cooperative banks constitute very 
important elements of the Austrian banking system, and they have an 
outreach to almost all towns and very many villages all over the country. It 
has been a special feature of the Austrian banking system that for a long 
time after the Second World War the major part of it consisted of 
government-owned or state-affiliated banks and cooperative banks. For all 
of them, the dominant objective was not to maximise profit but rather to 
support their member-clients or the economy of their respective region. 
During the past 20 years, the Austrian (central) state has largely withdrawn 
from the banking sector. However, still today the systems of the savings 
banks and the two cooperative banks which both in some sense adhere to 
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banking sector. Taken together, they hold 50% of all banking assets and 
comprise 78% of all credit institutions.38  
Table 3.2.1 provides data on numbers of banking institutions and 
total assets for the four most important Austrian banking groups in 
absolute terms and in percentages.39 Table 3.2.1 does not differentiate 
between the local or primary cooperative and savings banks and their 
respective central institutions. It provides data for these groups as a whole 
but excludes foreign branches and subsidiaries. Even this rough overview 
shows that the two cooperative banking groups are important players in 
the banking market.  
Table 3.2.1 The Austrian banking system 
 
Com. 
Banks 
Saving 
Banks 
Raiffeisen 
Sector 
Volksbanken 
Sector 
Institutions (banks)  50   55   549   68  
Institutions (mkt. share %)  6   6   64   8  
Total assets (€ million)  290.541   171.655   275.645    813.49  
Total assets (mkt. share %)  27   16   26   8  
Note: All figures are averages of the first three quarters of 2009. 
 
Taken together, the cooperative banks are slightly larger than the 
group of commercial banks and about twice as large as the savings bank 
group in terms of deposits from non-banks and of loans to non-banks if one 
looks only at business with Austrian clients, that is, disregarding their 
extensive activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Figure 3.2.1 provides the 
relevant data for the years 1995 to 2009.40  
                                                      
38 Here, as for most of the following Figures and Tables, the source is Österreichische 
Nationalbank (ÖNB). 
39 The percentages do not add up to 100 because there are some banks that do not belong to 
these groups. 
40 Since data for the entire year of 2009 are not yet available, those used in Figure 3.2.1 for 
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Figure 3.2.1 Deposits from, and loans to non-banks (in € million), 1995 to 2009 
 
 
 
The ranking according to size of operations has changed abruptly 
several times when certain large institutions changed from one group to 
another, e.g. when Bank Austria (now Unicredit Bank Austria) left the 
savings bank group and joined that of the commercial banks and was later 
taken over by the German Bank HVB and, together with HVB, finally by 
the Italian Unicredit Bank. However, in the course of the current crisis this 
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The two cooperative banking groups differ in size. The Raiffeisen 
Banking Group is considerably larger than that of the Volksbanken, 
irrespective of how size is measured, as one can see from Figure 3.2.2, 
which also shows deposits from non-banks and loans to non-banks.  
Figure 3.2.2 Deposits and loans of the two cooperative banking groups 
(in € million) 
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The cooperative institutions’ structures also differ. The Raiffeisen 
group is a three-layer system comprising 541 (Q3 2009) primary (local) 
cooperative banks, eight regional central banks called 
Raiffeisenlandesbanken and one large central financial institution called 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank  (RZB). The Raiffeisenlandesbanken make up the 
organisation’s second tier. They perform clearing functions and render 
other services to the local banks in their respective regions. RZB was 
founded in 1927 and has adopted its current name in 1989. In addition, the 
group includes a large number of other financial and non-financial 
companies in Austria and in Central and Eastern Europe. The nature and 
the role of the other institutions within the Raiffeisen group which operate 
as specialised financial service providers in Austria largely resemble those 
of the affiliates of DZ BANK in Germany, and in most cases RZB holds the 
majority equity share in them. The foreign branches and subsidiaries of the 
group, most of which are among the largest banks in their respective host 
countries, are grouped together in “Raiffeisen International” (RI), a legally 
separate corporation that was formerly fully owned by RZB. In 2005, RI 
was transformed into a publicly held corporation with shares listed on the 
Vienna Stock Exchange.  
RZB provides services to the affiliated regional banks in the system 
and is also a large and important commercial bank in its own right. 
Correspondingly, the regional central banks of the group provide services 
to the local cooperatives.  
In parallel to the three-layer structure of the financial institutions, 
there is a system of several regional associations and one federal 
association of cooperative banks. Besides having the other functions that 
one would expect from an association, they are responsible for providing 
consultancy services to the local cooperative banks and auditing them in an 
equally comprehensive sense as in the German case discussed above. 
The system of the people’s banks is considerably smaller than that of 
the Raiffeisen banks and also has a simpler structure. It only has two layers 
of financial institutions. Besides some 60 primary Volksbanken, which are 
in most cases also locally or rather regionally focused, there is one large 
central financial institution called Österreichische Volksbanken AG 
(ÖVAG). ÖVAG fully or partially owns the usual set of ancillary financial 
and non-financial entities of the Volksbanken-Gruppe such as several 
insurance companies, housing finance banks, computing and bookkeeping 
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Volksbanken-Guppe has in the past two decades created and acquired a 
large number of subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe held together 
by a fully owned subsidiary of ÖVAG. Currently, the group has fully 
owned or almost fully owned banking subsidiaries in nine CEE countries, 
which together operate some 600 banking outlets.  
Formerly, ÖVAG was restricted to the function of being a cooperative 
central bank. That changed in 1991 when ÖVAG started to also operate as a 
commercial bank. In this capacity, it serves all kinds of private and 
institutional clients and also maintains its own branch network in Vienna. 
ÖVAG is a listed corporation, even though the fraction of the shares that 
are widely distributed is very small.  
All in all, the Austrian part of the Raiffeisen-Gruppe comprises 541 
institutions and employs approximately 24,000 people as of year-end 2009, 
and the corresponding figures for the Volksbanken-Gruppe  are 
approximately 80 institutions and 6,800 employees.  
It is instructive to compare the structures of the two Austrian 
cooperative banking systems with those of Germany, Spain, and Italy and 
also with that of the Austrian savings bank system. All of these groups or 
systems can be considered as “federated systems” (“Verbundsysteme”). In 
Austria, the relative weight of the central financial institutions in all three 
Verbundsysteme is larger than in the other countries. One important reason 
for this peculiarity is certainly the importance of the Central and Eastern 
European business for the Austrian cooperative and savings banks. 
Extensive foreign activity requires concentration of decision-making 
powers, which fosters efficiency and flexibility. The role of the respective 
associations and the local banks may serve as a counterweight to this 
tendency towards more centralisation, especially if the local banks directly 
or indirectly, with the regional banks as intermediaries, hold the majority 
of the shares in their respective central institutions, which is the case for the 
two Austrian cooperative banking groups.  
The ownership structures in the Austrian cooperative banking sector 
are quite complex. In both cooperative systems, one finds traditional 
elements of cooperatives and features of corporations. This is why some 
authors call them hybrid systems.41 Hybridisation is present at all levels of 
the systems.  
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The local or primary institutions are cooperatives as their names 
suggest. That is, they are member-owned; there is a certain correspondence 
between members and customers; as a rule, for which there are, however, 
some exceptions, one person has one vote at members’ general meetings; 
and members’ shares cannot be traded freely but only redeemed at their 
book value or transferred to other members provided the management 
agrees with this transfer. However, there is now also the option, provided 
by a 1986 amendment to the Austrian banking law of 1979, to split up a 
cooperative into one part that plays the role of an owner of a bank – and is 
still a cooperative in the legal sense of the word – and another part in the 
legal form of a corporation which runs the day to day operations and is 
owned by the cooperative.42 So far, in contrast to the savings banks, many 
of which have used this option, only one local cooperative bank in the 
Raiffeisen Banking Group has split up in the way the law permits.  
While the regional institutions, which still exist in the Raiffeisen 
system, have formerly all been cooperatives themselves, with local 
cooperatives as their members, four out of eight have in recent years 
converted to joint stock corporations. Their shares are, however, still 
mainly held by primary cooperatives.  
At the top of both systems, the situation is even more complex. RZB 
has always been a joint stock corporation, but its shares are not listed. The 
overwhelming majority of its shares are held by the regional cooperative 
banks and thus indirectly by the local cooperatives. However, in contrast to 
RZB, its subsidiary Raiffeisen International AG is listed and indeed is one 
of the largest corporations traded on the Vienna Stock Exchange. Three-
quarters of the shares are still held by RZB; the rest is widely distributed 
among institutional investors and small shareholders.  
The top level institution of the Volksbanken-Gruppe (ÖVAG) is also a 
joint stock corporation. Slightly more than half of its shares are held by an 
organisation that is linked to the associations of people’s banks and thus 
can to a certain extent be regarded as representing the interests of the 
primary cooperatives and their members. However, it is questionable 
whether it is possible to know what the interests of primary cooperatives 
                                                      
42 This division between an owning and an operating entity is also found widely among 
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and their members really are and to transmit these interests within such a 
complicated system.  
Of the remaining shares in ÖVAG 25% are held by Germany’s DZ 
BANK, 10% by the insurance company Victoria, with which ÖVAG has a 
strategic alliance, a lesser percentage by the French cooperative banking 
group Banques Populaires, and only a few percent by retail investors.  
As already mentioned above, ÖVAG has created Volksbanken 
International (VBI) as the legal entity (holding) which manages its 
extensive network of subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. ÖVAG 
has retained the majority (51%) of the VBI shares, while 24.5% are held by 
each of the international partner organisations, DZ BANK/WGZ Bank and 
Banque Centrale des Banques Populaires.  
As in Germany and indeed almost all federated banking systems in 
any country, the division of roles between the local and the central financial 
institutions in the two Austrian cooperative banking networks has long 
been a bone of contention.43 Given the importance of the cooperative banks’ 
activity in Central and Eastern Europe, strengthening the central 
institutions may make sense from a purely efficiency-oriented perspective. 
Nevertheless, it entails the danger of undermining the coherence of the 
entire system. Even though most members and certainly most of their 
spokespersons can be assumed to acknowledge that the expansion towards 
Central and Eastern Europe makes sense from a profitability perspective 
and may simply have been necessary for the economic survival of the 
cooperative systems, some others seem to fear that this new strategic focus 
might marginalise the local cooperatives, i.e. that part of the system which 
once was its nucleus. Over the medium term, one cannot doubt that the 
move to the East was indeed timely and successful. Moreover, it needs to 
be emphasised that in the case of the Austrian cooperative banks the 
centralist tendencies are less pronounced than in the case of the Austrian 
savings banks. In particular, in contrast to the savings bank group, the 
Raiffeisen Banking Group has decided not to become a financial group as 
defined in Art. 30/2a of the Austrian banking law, which would have 
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allowed them to be treated as one financial institution under some 
important regulatory aspects.44  
Regulation and supervision of cooperative banks of all levels do not 
differ from those applicable to all other banks in Austria. They have to 
observe all relevant prudential rules and are subject to normal taxation 
rules for companies and standard labour law provisions. In former times, it 
may have been that in regard to their objectives and their institutional 
structures, cooperative banks enjoyed certain privileges, for instance, in the 
relevant definitions of capital requirements for small cooperatives. 
However, since a decade or two, this is no longer the case, and therefore 
slight political pressure may have contributed to reducing the role of the 
genuine cooperative element in the existing cooperative banking systems, 
and instead strengthened those elements that cooperatives share with 
conventional corporations.  
With regard to the financial situation, even though the Austrian 
cooperative banks have a special mandate to provide financial services that 
are relevant and valuable for their clients, and despite not being primarily 
profit-oriented, they are, as a group, successful in economic and financial 
terms. To illustrate and support this proposition, we take a brief look at 
various indicators of structure and performance.  
Information about the aggregated balance sheet of the primary 
cooperative banks and their long-term development is provided in Figure 
3.2.3. Two classes of assets and liabilities stand out as particularly 
important: deposits from non-banks and loans to non-banks and interbank 
lending and borrowing. In both systems, business with non-customers has 
declined somewhat in the course of time, while interbank business has 
gained in importance. The latter is largely borrowing and lending within 
the respective groups. Thus the change reflects the increasing importance 
of the respective central financial institution. However, compared with 
commercial banks, the role of the traditional deposit and lending business 
with customers is still higher, indicating that the Austrian primary 
cooperative banks have largely retained the traditional function of banks as 
financial intermediaries, namely that of transforming customer deposits 
into loans to businesses and households. All in all, these figures suggest 
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that most of the primary cooperatives pursue a special and indeed quite 
conservative business model.  
Figure 3.2.3 Development of primary cooperative banks’ balance sheet structure  
 
Note: Asset structure is shown in the upper panel; liability structure in the lower panel. 
Information concerning efficiency and profitability of the two 
Austrian cooperative banking systems is provided in the next chapter of 
this study. This analysis, as well as a conventional ratio analysis show that 
before the beginning of the current crisis, the entire group of cooperative 
banks performed as well, if not better, than the savings banks group and 
the commercial banks (taken as a group). However, there are two groups of 
cooperative banks in Austria. Differentiating between them shows that 
since the turn of the century, the Raiffeisen banks consistently 
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Like the German banking market, that of Austria is highly 
competitive as a whole, probably more so than those of most other 
countries in Europe. As in Germany, one reason for this high level of 
competition is that banking concentration is extremely low by international 
standards. In addition, almost all Austrian banks have greatly expanded 
their branch networks since 1980. Austria can be regarded as being 
‘overbanked’. Therefore, the opportunities to expand operations in the 
country have for a long time been limited. This fact explains to a large 
extent why private commercial banks, savings banks and both networks of 
cooperative banks have expanded so much in the neighbouring countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe that the operations in these countries are 
now about as important as the operations in the home country.  
A factor that contributes to the high level of competition in Austrian 
banking is that the local savings banks and the two cooperative systems – 
and to some extent also commercial and other banks – largely address the 
same customer groups, especially households and small enterprises. Thus it 
is not surprising that by international standards the return on equity is low, 
at least as long as one concentrates on domestic operations.45  
One aspect of banking competition is merger activity. By their 
institutional design and legal status, cooperative banks as well as savings 
banks cannot be acquired by commercial banks. Thus mergers across the 
dividing lines between the different networks are rare. In particular, 
cooperative and savings banks are shielded from acquisitions by 
commercial banks. All that can happen, and has indeed happened in 
several cases involving large banks, is that a bank leaves the networks of 
cooperative and savings banks, or that the cooperative and savings banks 
acquire former commercial banks and integrate them into the operations of 
their central institutions.  
However, the fact that cooperative and savings banks (in the strict 
legal sense) cannot be acquired by commercial banks and cannot merge 
with commercial banks does not suggest that mergers do not occur. In fact, 
the opposite is true. The number of banks in Austria has declined 
substantially during the past 20 years, and this decline is almost exclusively 
                                                      
45 However, in light of the seemingly high level of competition in the local retail market, the 
level of banking fees in Austria seems to remain above the EU average, as a recent study has 
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due to mergers and consolidations within the groups of cooperative banks 
and savings banks. As a consequence, the average size of cooperative and 
savings banks has increased considerably, and since the costs of very small 
banks tend to be higher than those of larger banks, within-group 
consolidation has improved the efficiency of these three banking groups, 
and this, together with the benefits of having their respective networks, 
seems to have enabled them to withstand the competitive pressure from 
the commercial banks.  
The high level of competition in local banking markets is not only a 
reason for relatively low profitability and the ‘invasion’ into the more 
promising markets of neighbouring countries. It also has another effect that 
can clearly be assessed as positive. Like in Germany and in contrast to 
several other countries, access to financial services does not seem to be a 
problem in Austria. This benefit of non-exclusion is certainly due to the 
strong role that cooperative and savings banks play in Austria. If they did 
not exist, access would probably also pose a problem, because private 
banks are under pressure to achieve high rates of return, and they might 
try to achieve this by thinning out their branch networks in remote areas of 
the country.  
The role of cooperatives in providing access is evident from the 
regional distribution of branches. According to the statistics published by 
the Austrian Central Bank in 2008, around a third of the branches of 
commercial banks are located in Vienna, where Raiffeisen and Volksbanken 
have devoted only 3% and 8% of their branches, respectively. In turn, the 
cooperative banks have located themselves in less densely populated areas, 
including almost a third of their branches in Lower Austria, surrounding 
Vienna, where the commercial banks maintain a lower presence of 11% of 
their branches.  
Almost all banks in Europe and elswhere are affected by the financial 
crisis, though for different reasons and to different degrees. This also 
applies to Austrian cooperative banks, and in this respect the situation in 
Austria is quite similar to that of the German cooperative banks.  
Because of their rather conventional business model, the local 
cooperative banks in Austria have hardly been affected by the financial 
crisis in the narrow sense. It seems they did not hold high-risk assets that 
would have to be written down, and in recent years their lending 
operations have been quite conservative, which corresponds to their 
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massive and risky consumer lending and did not grant excessively risky 
real estate loans. However, since a considerable part of their loans are to 
businesses, the general deterioration of economic conditions in 2009 and 
possibly 2010 will also take its toll on the primary cooperatives. Default 
rates may rise, and business is likely to slow down.  
The situation for the central financial institutions is much more 
serious. The major part of their bottom line comes from the operations in 
Central and Eastern Europe. There, all Austrian banking groups have been 
very active since the early 1990s, and for a long time this business was also 
very successful. However, banking in these countries is much more risky 
than domestic banking, in particular if foreign banks are very active in 
consumer lending. And indeed, many of those CEE country banks that are 
owned by Austrian banks and banking groups have greatly expanded 
consumer lending and housing finance in the recent past. This applies 
almost equally to the foreign operations of the savings bank group and its 
central institution Erste Bank Gruppe, of RZB and its exchange listed 
subsidiary Raiffeisen International and of ÖVAG. In contrast to the 
expectations widely held in 2008, the indirect impact of the crisis in most 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe was already very strong in 2009 
and is likely to remain so at least for the year 2010. Default rates have 
soared, especially for consumer and housing loans. As a consequence, 
many foreign banks operating in Central and Eastern Europe have incurred 
heavy losses, and these in turn directly affect the bottom lines of their 
owners located in Austria and other Western countries. As far as risk and 
profitability is concerned, banking in Central and Eastern Europe is 
different from the largely conservative domestic banking operations 
practised by all three Austrian federated banking systems: in good times, it 
can be very profitable, and in bad times it can cause severe losses. Bankers 
in Western countries may have underestimated this problem.  
Moreover, given that the central financial institutions of all three 
Austrian systems are active participants in international capital markets, 
one can assume that they are directly affected by the crisis in a similar way 
as the German DZ BANK is, that is, from holding and having to write 
down ‘toxic’ assets.  
There is one more factor which at least appears to be an additional 
cause of risk, even though it is in fact only an indicator of risk. It is the stock 
market valuation of relevant banking institutions. Figure 3.2.4 shows how 
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three Austrian banking networks have developed during the crisis so far. 
Even though the stock prices plummeted almost in parallel, there is a slight 
difference. The decline of Raiffeisen International appears to be relatively 
more pronounced. This sensitivity is likely due to the fact that it only 
comprises assets in Central and Eastern Europe, while Erste Bank AG and 
ÖVAG are, in financial terms, portfolios of national and foreign activities 
and assets. However, one should also see that, according to recently 
published preliminary results for 2009, both Raiffeisen International and 
Erste Bank Group report sizable profits in spite of the crisis. 
Figure 3.2.4 Stock prices of Austrian banks involved in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
 
 
Particularly strong is the effect of the crisis in the case of ÖVAG, the 
central financial institution of the people’s bank group. Like many other 
Austrian banks, ÖVAG had to resort to government support during the 
crisis by accepting an equity injection of €1 billion and guarantees for 
bonds it had to issue in order to regain its financial equilibrium.  
Finally, the crisis may in addition strengthen the tendencies of 
centralisation within the networks and their direct and indirect dependence 
on capital markets – summarised in the label of hybridisation – and may 
ultimately challenge the traditional decentralised character of cooperative 
banking. But whether the centralist tendencies might not ultimately 
endanger the coherence of the federated systems is impossible for outside 
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3.3  Italy46 
The establishment of cooperative credit institutions in Italy is largely 
attributed to Luigi Luzzatti, who later served in various cabinets and for a 
short time as Italy’s prime minister. Largely influenced by the teachings of 
Schulze-Delitzsch during his visit to Germany, he founded Banca Popolare 
di Milano in the mid-1860s, using his own savings as initial capital.47 The 
Banche Popolari (BPs) spread quickly and grew in importance, with the 
Milanese bank becoming one of the ten largest banks in Italy at the time, 
(Polsi, 1996).  
The first Raiffeisen-type rural credit society was founded later in the 
century, in 1883, near Padoua, by Leone Wollemborg, a disciple of Luzzatti. 
Much like the Raiffeisen institutions, the Banche di Credito Cooperativo 
(BCCs) were smaller in size than other banks and were based mostly in 
rural areas.48 A more distinguishing feature of the BCCs, which no longer 
holds, was the strict requirement to retain all profits in a reserve fund, with 
no distribution of dividends to members at any point. The fund was owned 
entirely by the cooperative itself and would serve as an intergenerational 
endowment. In case of a default, the reserve was to be placed in a trust and 
would be made available to any bank in the vicinity to be reorganised as a 
BCC (Herrick and Ingalls, 1916, p. 355).  
As in other countries, the cooperative banking model proved 
successful rather quickly, allowing these institutions to gradually increase 
their market shares during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. By the 
beginning of the First World War, the two systems served more than 
700,000 members (Herrick and Ingalls, 1916).  
The postwar period led to a brief period of contraction due to an 
acute financial crisis coinciding with the end of the war and the Great 
                                                      
46 This subsection benefited greatly from discussions with Riccardo De Bonis and Giacomo 
Ricotti at the Bank of Italy.  
47 Despite being based on the same broad principles, Luzzatti’s institutions were set up as 
limited liability institutions from the start. This allowed them to have a larger clientele base 
than their predecessors in Germany. Another difference with the German Volksbanken 
model was the maintenance of members’ rights on the capital reserves. This distinguishing 
aspect has not changed over time and has laid the groundwork for BPs’ stock exchange 
listings several decades later. 
48 The BCC were at first set as unlimited liability institutions and therefore lacked the 
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Depression. The government’s response was the 1936 Banking Law,49 
which put forth clear functional and geographical restrictions on the 
activities of banks, prohibiting long-term loans (provided only by the 
publicly-owned credit institutions) and geographic expansions.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the authorities repealed 
some of these restrictions, by allowing cooperative and savings banks to 
expand their activities to provide long-term credit to start-ups and small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Faced with a devastated economy, 
which was especially gruesome in the credit-strapped countryside, policy-
makers were concerned that only these locally-based banks could 
effectively prevent the so-called ‘capital drain’ from rural and poorer 
regions to richer areas (Goglio, 2007).50  
Following the recovery of the cooperative banking sector in the 1950s, 
the market share of Italian cooperative banks remained relatively stable for 
most part of the second half of the 20th century. Until 1990, the market share 
of BPs and BCCs remained between 10-15% and 5% of total bank assets, 
respectively.  
The 1990s heralded a new era of deregulation and privatisation in 
Italy. All of the savings banks, i.e. the “Cassa di Risparmio”, were 
transformed and assigned joint-stock status.51 The 1993 Consolidated Law 
on Banking52 was put forth to implement the EU’s Second Banking 
                                                      
49 Decree No. 375 of 12 March 1936. 
50 Several empirical studies have confirmed that the existence of local banks did enhance 
development prospects in underprivileged regions in postwar Italy. Ferri and Messori (2000) 
show that close bank-firm relations have been beneficial for the allocation of credit in the 
north-eastern and central (NEC) parts of the country. According to the findings of the 
authors’ study, local banks in the NEC areas had significantly lower exposure to bad and 
doubtful loans. Moreover, bank-firm relations in the NEC area do not seem to suffer from 
the “information capture” emphasised by Sharpe (1990). Guiso et al. (2004) examine whether 
local financial development was an important indicator of the creation of new businesses in 
different regions. The authors take advantage of the fact that the 1936 law made the banks’ 
branch structure unresponsive to changes for over half a century, allowing them to 
disregard the potential endogeneity between financial and economic development. The 
study’s findings show that an individual’s odds of starting a new business are significantly 
higher in financially developed regions and that the heavy presence of cooperative banks in 
the region in 1936 makes this event more likely. 
51 For more details on the motives and an early assessment of the privatisation of Italian 
savings banks, see De Bonis (1998).  
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Directive (89/646/EEC). These changes drove a consolidation wave which 
picked up in the second half of the 1990s. A large number of cooperative 
banks merged with or were acquired by other cooperative banks, which led 
to a contraction in their total numbers, especially in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (see Figure 3.3.1). In particular, consolidation activity has led to a 
particularly pronounced reduction in the number of banks for the BCC 
group in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Despite these structural 
developments, the concentration of the Italian banking sector remained 
unchanged when compared to other EU-15 countries.53  
Figure 3.3.1 Consolidation in Italian cooperative banking sector 
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Source: Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCC) and 
Associazione Nazionale fra le Banche Popolari (BP). 
Note: The figures include joint-stock companies that are part of a group headed by a BP. 
 
Despite the reduction in the number of banks, the BP and BCC 
groups have consistently expanded their market shares at local level. By the 
end of 2007, the Italian cooperative banking sector represented one-third of 
private loans and deposits and nearly a quarter of total assets (see Table 
3.3.1). BPs have been much larger, not only in terms of their aggregate 
market share but also the activities of an average bank. UBI (Unione di 
Banche Italiane S.c.p.A.) – the largest of all BP banking groups – was the 
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fourth largest bank in Italy, with total assets of over €120 billion by the end 
of 2008. In turn, the largest of all BCCs, BCC di Roma, ranked 65th among 
all the Italian banks, with total assets of over €6 billion. In the same period, 
assets held at an average BP amounted to over €4 billion, which was 
roughly ten times the amount of assets of an average BCC (approximately 
€350 million). 
Table 3.3.1 Market shares of Italian cooperative banks 
  Assets  Private loans  Private deposits 
  BCC BP  Total  BCC BP  Total  BCC BP  Total 
2007  5.1% 17.8%  22.9% 8.6% 22.5%  31.1% 6.8% 24.6%  31.4% 
2002  4.9% 17.4%  22.3% 7.5% 20.9%  28.5% 5.4% 16.5%  21.8% 
1997  4.5% 14.7%  19.2% 6.4% 17.5%  23.9% 3.9% 13.2%  17.1% 
Source: Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCC) and Associazione 
Nazionale fra le Banche Popolari (BP). 
The differences in size may be explained by the geographic areas 
served by the two banks. Sticking close to their roots, BCCs tend to be more 
active in rural areas while BPs are more present in towns and cities. Table 
3.3.2 confirms that the BCCs maintain a significant presence in less 
populated municipalities. In particular, approximately one-third of all the 
BCC branches are located in very small municipalities, i.e. those with less 
than 5,000 inhabitants. In comparison, the BPs are in more densely 
populated municipalities. Despite these differences within the category, the 
figures show that the cooperative banks – and to some extent the former 
savings banks that have kept their identity – have a stronger foothold in 
less populated municipalities, which helps them achieve greater proximity 
and provide better access in these areas.    
Table 3.3.2 Distribution of branches by municipal population in Italy, 2008 
 
< 5,000 
inhabitants 
5,000 – 25,000 
inhabitants 
> 25,000 
inhabitants 
Total 
  % of group branch network 
BCCs  32% 42% 26%  100% 
BPs  17% 36% 47%  100% 
Savings banks*  18% 34% 48%  100% 
Other banks  13% 30% 57%  100% 
Source: Banca d’Italia and Istat. 
Notes: Figures may not add up to one due to rounding.  
* The banks identified as savings banks in the table are those that have kept their name as a 
“Cassa di Risparmio” after being converted to a joint-stock corporation.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 61 
 
Table 3.3.3 Lending to Italian firms by loan size, 2008 
 
< €5 million*  €5 million – 
25 million 
> €25 million  Total 
  % of group’s total loans to firms 
BCCs  70%  23%    7%  100% 
BPs** (not listed)  48% 27% 25%  100% 
BPs** (listed)  38% 26% 36%  100% 
Other banks#  30% 23% 48%  100% 
Source: Tarantola (2009) and Banca d’Italia. 
Notes: Figures may not add up to one due to rounding.  
* Loans below €75,000 are not included due to detection limits of Banca d’Italia.  
** Figures for BPs include joint-stock companies belonging to a group headed by a BP.  
# Figures for other banks comprise all joint-stock banks, i.e. commercial banks and former 
savings banks, including their foreign branches.  
 
The two cooperative banking brands also differ in their lending 
activity. As shown in Table 3.3.3, the cooperative banks in general continue 
to enhance small- and medium-size enterprises’ (SMEs) access to finance. 
Indeed, small loans, i.e. those that are worth less than €5 million, are central 
for the lending activity of both BCCs and BPs that are not listed. For BCCs, 
however, these loans comprise well over two-thirds (70%) of the total loans 
to firms. For BPs, the share of small loans range between approximately 
half and one-third of the credit portfolios, depending on whether the bank 
issues publicly tradable shares. However, even when the listed BPs are 
considered, the cooperative banks clearly focus more on smaller business 
loans.  
In terms of the network structure, local BPs operate in a highly 
independent manner. The apex organisation, Associazione Nazionale fra le 
Banche Popolari (Assopopolari), provides research, analysis and advice to 
the local banks. Certain network institutions exist to cover certain common 
functions, such as the payment system, managed by Istituto Centrale delle 
Banche Popolari (ICBP). Other key aspects of integration, such as cross-
selling of products, centralisation of credit approval, risk management and 
liquidity management, are absent. The high degree of autonomy could be a 
natural extension of a need to respond better to their members’ wants and 
needs. It could also be a mere political outcome of the power play wherein 
local banks are not willing to yield their independence. 
BCCs also operate in a decentralised manner (Di Salvo, 2002). Most of 
the centralised functions are available on a voluntary basis, effectively 62 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
providing more autonomy to local banks. Member banks are grouped into 
separate regional federations, which provide technical assistance and 
undertake internal auditing of their members. The functions of these 
regional bodies are overseen by a national association, Federcasse, which is 
also in charge of the BCCs’ strategic planning functions. Other network 
functions include risk and liquidity management, administration of a 
group-wise deposit guarantee fund and a fund for the reserves of troubled 
banks.54  
Taking a step toward a more integrated structure, BCC has recently 
introduced a mutual support system to enhance its use of intranetwork 
resources. Introduced in 2008 and pending approval of the Bank of Italy, 
the Institutional Guarantee Fund (Fondo di Garanzia Instituzionale – FGI) 
will provide additional guarantees for participating institutions, beyond 
the compulsory deposit insurance. The aim of the fund is to use network 
resources to safeguard the liquidity and solvency of the member banks. 
Participation will be voluntary while support will require authorisation by 
the fund.55  
The legal treatment of the Italian cooperative model is determined by 
the 1993 Consolidated Law on Banking. The text sets clear differences in the 
operational and governance aspects of the two institutions. Effectively, the 
law attempts to keep BCCs as close as possible to their original model of 
credit cooperatives, operating as small local banks in mostly rural areas for 
the primary benefit of its members. In line with these perceived roles, BCCs 
benefit from a fiscal exemption on retained profits that are allocated to 
reserves.56 In turn, they are prohibited from issuing tradable shares and 
                                                      
54 More specifically, the key network institutions include Gestioni Crediti, which 
administers non-performing loans; Iccrea, which takes on the central banking functions, 
such as managing excess liquidity, securities transactions and administering the group-wide 
deposit guarantee fund; and Banca Sviluppo, which is in charge of acquiring and managing 
local cooperatives that are in difficulty, holding reserves of troubled entities during 
transformations and dissolutions. 
55 As of 8 March 2010, the scheme is pending approval of Banca d’Italia to be considered as 
an “institutional protection scheme” under the Capital Requirement Directive 
(2006/48/EC), thereby giving the local institutions the ability to zero-weight intranetwork 
exposures.  
56 More specifically, BCCs benefit from the following tax advantages: (i) retained profits 
allocated to legal reserves are not taxed; and (ii) the amounts distributed to members in the 
form of interest cost relief on borrowed funds (i.e. the so-called ‘ristorni’) are deductible 
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have to allocate at least 70% of their profits as reserves. There is an upper 
limit for individual participation, set at €50,000 per member. In addition, 
there are clear restrictions on bank operations. Assets that qualify for a zero 
risk-weighting under the Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 
2006/48/EC) need to account for at least half of the risk-weighted assets. In 
addition, loans shall be granted primarily to members. Expansions into 
non-contiguous regions are possible only if the cooperatives have a 
sufficient number of members in the area.  
The same law treats BPs in a more flexible manner and holds them 
closer to the commercial model, effectively allowing them to grow and 
expand the scope and geographic coverage of their operations. 57 In 
particular, BPs may issue tradable shares, although the shareholder 
participation is limited at 0.5% of the share capital. 58 Shareholders that are 
not members may receive dividends but cannot participate in the general 
assembly and thus have no voting power. The banks are required to retain 
a minimum of only 10% of profits as reserves and there are no fiscal 
advantages. Lastly, there are no restrictions on regional expansions, asset 
allocation or credit issuance. 
Under the 1993 law, the two types of institutions may either continue 
to operate as cooperative societies with limited liability, i.e. società 
cooperativa per azioni a responsabilità limitata, or convert into joint-stock 
companies, i.e. società per azioni. Transformations and mergers require the 
pre-approval of the members and the Bank of Italy, which is to act “in the 
interest of creditors” with the aim of reinforcing stability, strengthening the 
bank’s capital base and “rationalizing the system” (Articles 31 and 36).59 
                                                                                                                                       
from taxable income. These advantages were referred by the Italian Supreme Court first to 
the European Commission in January 2006. Upon receiving no response, the Supreme Court 
referred the case (Case-80/08) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in February 2008, 
which is still pending.  
57 In the words of Bongini and Ferri (2008), BPs are conceived as “cooperatives with a 
limited propensity to mutuality” (p. 2). 
58 Among the cooperative banking groups led by a BP, seven were listed on stock exchanges. 
UBI, the largest BP group, is listed internationally.  
59 In practice, consolidation operations involving cooperatives are either impossible (as in 
the case of a hostile take-over) or face significant obstacles, which may make them unlikely 
to be mutually beneficial for all involved institutions. For example, a consolidation 
procedure between two cooperatives is often challenging because of differences in the legal 
treatment of cooperatives and by-laws. As another example, an operation involving a 
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There are differences in the way that these operations may be conducted. 
For the BCCs, the transformations are more involved due to the existence of 
the ‘intergenerational endowment’, i.e. the reserves built up over years by 
retaining profits to which the current members have no rights. Conversions 
can only occur by transferring the reserves to a fund (“Fondo Sviluppo”) in 
support of cooperative institutions, such as other BPs. Moreover, BCCs may 
be merged with banks of a different nature, but only if this results in the 
formation of a BP or a joint-stock bank. These differences are once again 
put forth to maintain the distinctions between the two cooperative models.  
Some of the transformations that have occurred in Italy, especially 
those in the last years of 1990s and early 2000s, have been in the context of 
an ailing cooperative bank – in most cases, a BCC – that changed its status 
to be acquired by a larger BP or a group headed by a BP. More recently, the 
transformations have also occurred as part of a growth- and rationalisation-
oriented strategy to merge several cooperative and joint-stock banks, 
leading to the creation of large groups headed by BPs. As a consequence of 
these changes, the market shares of the resulting BP groups have grown 
considerably. By the end of 2007, there were 16 cooperative groups led by a 
BP, representing nearly one-third of the total assets of all BPs.60  
                                                                                                                                       
commercial and cooperative bank also necessitates a transformation to ensure that the 
cooperative features that restrict ownership and voting rights are not applicable for the 
commercial partners.  
60 The divergence from the traditional cooperative business model in Italy was a concern of 
several experts, as the governance model of listed BPs may challenge members’ ability to 
contest control (Gutiérrez, 2008; Tarantola, 2009). These issues were the subject of an 
extensive and prolonged political debate and several legislative initiatives in Italy. In 2002, a 
complaint (No. 2002/4715) was addressed to the European Commission on behalf of the 
National Association of Cooperative Bank Shareholders (ASNAPOP), questioning the 
consistency of various principles for listed BPs with the EU Treaty. The contested provisions 
included the approval of members; the ‘one member, one vote’ system; the limit on the 
number of listed shares that can be held; etc. The complainants alleged that these principles 
infringed with the Treaty rules on the freedom of establishment and the movement of 
capital. After an extensive examination, the Commission decided to terminate the 
proceedings in 2006, concluding that the listed BPs are considered both de jure and de facto 
cooperative societies and that “the content of the petition [did] not appear to show any 
breach of Community law” (European Parliament, Notice to Members, document no. 
PE329.239/rev.  VI,  25 November 2008). The Commission also noted that the European 
Cooperative Company (SCE) included the possibility for cooperatives to raise capital from 
the market without modifying their nature, which was entirely in line with what the Italian 
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The different treatment that BCCs and BPs receive has led to distinct 
levels of capital. As shown in Table 3.3.4, BCCs have significantly greater 
capital ratios than all other banks. The greater amount of capital 
accumulated by the BCCs may be due to the greater level of profits 
allocated as reserves, fiscal advantages, a more prudential approach or a 
combination of all of these factors. The greater capital levels of BPs that are 
not listed is most likely due to the allocation of profits as reserves (albeit a 
smaller proportion than the BCCs). The non-listed BPs also tend to be 
smaller in size, which also contributes to the higher capital levels.  Listed 
BPs, on the other hand, are virtually indistinguishable from their 
commercial peers in terms of their capital ratios. The figures also show that 
the total capital ratios tend to be less divergent since the instruments that 
qualify as Tier 1 and Tier 3 capital, i.e. hybrid debt capital and 
subordinated debt are more commonly utilised for commercial banks and 
listed BPs.  
Table 3.3.4 Key capital ratios of Italian banks, as of June 2008 
  Tier 1 ratio  Total capital ratio 
BCCs 14.1%  14.8% 
BPs (listed)*  7.1%  10.1% 
BPs (not listed)*  9.6%  12.5% 
Other banks**  6.9%  10.1% 
Source: Tarantola (2009). 
Note: * Figures for BPs include groups headed by a BP. 
** Figures for other banks comprise all joint-stock banks, i.e. commercial banks and former 
savings banks, including foreign branches. 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-08 has had a modest initial impact on the 
country’s banking sector in general and on cooperative banks in particular. 
This was mostly due to banks’ lower exposures to toxic assets and greater 
reliance on own-resources. Although the operating conditions for the sector 
have deteriorated throughout the year of 2009, the impact has been 
relatively moderate. According to Moody’s (2009) outlook of the Italian 
banking sector, a key problem in the near future will be the worsening 
credit conditions, with an expected jump in non-performing loans. This 
could be particularly problematic for cooperative banks, particularly 
smaller cooperatives, which traditionally have a more risky loan portfolio.  
In summing up, the cooperative banking sector has represented a 
growing proportion of banking activity in Italy and the trend is likely to 66 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
continue in the years to come. The two cooperative networks have been 
instrumental in enhancing access in remote areas as well as providing loans 
to households and SMEs, although there are some notable distinctions 
between the different governance models. The divergence of some 
cooperatives from their traditional model, particularly for BPs, has raised 
concerns on governance. However, the more radical reforms have been 
ruled out.61  
Going forward, one of the key challenges that Italian cooperative 
banking will face is whether the sector can maintain its identity while 
adapting to the changing environment. Both the BPs and BCCs have a 
relatively loosely integrated system, with limited intranetwork liquidity 
and risk management facilities. Some of the BPs have coped with this 
challenge by forming groups, which have addressed some of the liquidity 
and capital needs as well as enhancing efficiency. Although the financial 
crisis of 2007-8 has had a relatively limited impact on the sector as a whole, 
pressures emanating from the economic downturn may lead to a worsened 
environment. Thus, countering individual risks and increasing external 
funding capacities while maintaining the cooperative identity remain key 
challenges for the sector. Reinforcing the intranetwork mutual support 
systems could help mitigate some of these problems, but that has to be 
achieved without endangering the traditional functions of these banks.  
3.4  France 
The first cooperative in France, Banque Populaire (BP), sprouted early on in 
the south-east region in 1870s, mostly due to the influence of Luzzatti in 
Italy and Schulze-Delitzsch in Germany. Despite its position as the only 
mutual institution in the country for some time, BP remained within its 
regional borders until later in the 20th century. Two Raiffeisen rural credit 
cooperatives were founded in the later parts of the century. Crédit Mutuel 
                                                      
61 Several proposals have been brought on the table in mid-2000s, including harmonising the 
banks’ legal treatment, pushing for governance reforms, including shareholder participation 
and so forth. A particularly divisive issue was whether the cooperative banks should face 
mandatory conversion to the joint-stock status, just like the savings banks more than a 
decade ago. The Italian experience on the mandatory conversion of savings banks shows 
that forced conversions do not always reach their anticipated results (for more, see De Bonis 
(1998) and Ayadi et al. (2009)). The call for a radical reform of the cooperative banking 
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(CM) developed in the last years of the 19th century (the first local branch, 
“Caisse Locale”, was set up in 1882) in the Alsace-Lorraine region, closely 
influenced by the development of Raiffeisen in neighbouring Germany, 
focusing on serving the financing needs of households. Crédit Agricole 
(CA) was also founded in 1890s (the first mutual agricultural credit 
institution was established in the Jura region in 1885) primarily to provide 
credits to the agriculture sector. Then, a series of laws created the legal 
framework for local banks (in 1894) and for regional banks (in 1899).  
The cooperative banks multiplied early on, especially during the 
1920s amidst a declining private sector due to increased state intervention. 
Immediately following the Second World War, a series of laws required the 
nation’s banking sector to specialise, either pursuing strict investment 
activities by issuing stocks and other debt and investing in long-term assets 
or becoming deposit banks. Major commercial banks were nationalised 
immediately following the war. The entire sector, including the cooperative 
banks, came under indirect state control, assigned with the task of 
collecting deposits that could only be used to buy government bonds, 
effectively channelling the funds into public spending for rebuilding and 
modernising the country and its infrastructure. In 1947, the law relating to 
the statute of cooperatives laid down the foundations of French 
cooperatives. 
The reforms in late 1950s and 1960s attempted to reduce these 
restrictions. However, the state’s ownership and restrictions remained 
intact until the Banking Law of 1984.62 The new law eliminated the division 
between investment and deposit-taking activities, placing all banks under 
the same set of rules. A succession of amendments in the 1990s and 2000s, 
including the amended French Monetary and Financial code, further led to 
the deregulation of the banking system as a whole, setting into motion the 
privatisation and consolidation of the sector, which continues until now.63  
The cooperative banks have grown further in importance over the 
past two decades, primarily due to their growing scope of activities and 
geographic footprint through mergers and acquisitions. CA has become 
one of the largest banks both domestically and globally, extending its 
                                                      
62 Banking Law no. 84-46 of 24 January 1984. 
63 The 1984 Banking Law also classified Caisse d’Epargne, a savings institution, as a mutual 
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franchise well beyond the traditional banking products to include 
wholesale banking, asset management and insurance services. Acquisitions 
such as Crédit Lyonnais in 2003 have contributed to this development. The 
group is now the leading provider of financing to the French economy and 
accounts for 30% of SME financing in the country.  
As for CM, the acquisition of CIC (Crédit Industriel et Commercial) in 
1998 has gradually led to an expansion of the group’s market share, not 
only in consumer credits and SME loans but also in savings products and 
property and casualty insurance business.  
The BP group has also expanded its domain of activities through 
several notable acquisitions over the past decade. The group first took 
control of Natexis, an investment bank and a global leader in factoring, in 
1999; acquired another cooperative credit institution, Crédit Cooperatif and 
Crédit Mututel Maritime, in 2003; took a majority stake in Coface, a global 
leader in trade credit insurance, in 2004; and acquired a partial stake in the 
Austrian Volksbank International AG (VBI), which has extensive activities 
in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2006, the BP group created Natixis, an 
investment bank, as a joint subsidiary with the public savings bank, Caisse 
d’Epargne, before their merger under a common cooperative statute.  
As shown in Figure 3.4.1, the growth of French cooperative banking 
has been rather persistent over the past few years. A significant shift is 
observed between the years 2004-06, where the consolidation of recently 
acquired entities have led to a jump in total assets and number of branches. 
In line with this growth, assets-to-branch ratio has also increased, reflecting 
the diversification and concentration of services in existing branches.  
Figure 3.4.1 Growth of cooperative banking in France 
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As a consequence of their development and growth strategies, the 
French cooperative banking sector has become more predominant than in 
most other countries in Europe. By the end of 2008, the three cooperative 
banks came to represent over half of loans and deposits of all credit 
institutions in the country. Table 3.4.1 shows that the relative growth is 
largely attributable to CA’s 2003 acquisition of Crédit Lyonnais (LCL), 
which represented by the end of 2008 around one-fifth of the group’s total 
loans and deposits. The CM group has also grown in importance, especially 
in its share in the credit market and loans to SMEs, thanks to the growing 
synergies with the CIC network over the years. The BP group has 
maintained a more or less constant market share; however, the group’s 
share is expected to increase significantly in 2010 and onwards once full 
consolidation with Caisse d’Epargne moves forward.  
Table 3.4.1 Market shares of French cooperative banks 
  Assets  Private loans  Private deposits 
  BP CA CM  Total  BP CA CM  Total  BP CA CM  Total 
1998  5.5% 12.6%  7.8% 25.9%  7.5% 19.4%  8.7% 35.6%  6.4% 25.7%  10.9% 42.9% 
2003  5.9% 21.9%  8.9% 36.7%  8.6% 28.9%  10.5%  48.1%  8.3% 30.6%  11.2% 50.1% 
2008  5.6% 24.7%  8.1% 38.3%  8.2% 31.3%  13.2%  52.7%  7.6% 36.4%  11.8% 55.7% 
Sources: Banque Populaire, Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel. 
Note: Figures correspond to consolidated groups. 
 
One immediate threat to continued growth, much like in other 
developed economies, is the impact of the financial crisis that started in the 
summer of 2007. Losses and write-downs of banks in France have been 
significant, but remained relatively modest when compared to the hardest 
hit economies such as the US, the UK, Germany and Switzerland (Xiao, 
2009). For the three cooperative groups, the most significant losses 
originated from CA’s investment banking arm, Calyon,64 and BP and 
                                                      
64 The total losses and write-downs for Calyon in 2007-08 were around €6 billion, which 
represents a significant portion of the losses and impairments for the CA group as a whole, 
which stood at €8.5 billion for the same period (Moody’s, 2009). In response, CA launched a 
rights issue of €5.8 billion in May 2008. As part of the agreement, the investment arm was 
restructured to be more closely integrated to the group. In February 2010, Calyon rebranded 
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Caisse d’Epargne’s investment and financial services arm, Natixis.65 At the 
request of the regulatory authorities to raise additional capital, most banks 
in France opted for external funding. All three French cooperative banks 
accepted public funds at the height of the crisis in October 2008 from the 
newly formed public bank recapitalisation vehicle, Société de Prise de 
Participations de l’État (SPPE).66  
All banks have taken steps to pay their SPPE debt by late 2009 and 
early 2010.67 Moreover, the situation presented an opportunity to continue 
growing. In the midst of the crisis in 2008, CM bought Citibank’s retail arm 
in Germany (now known as Targobank) and took majority stakes in 
Cofidis, which specialises in consumer credit products. In turn, BP took full 
possession of HSBC France’s regional subsidiaries and branches. The group 
also finalised the merger talks with Caisse d’Epargne in the beginning of 
2009 and approved by French competition authorities in June of that year.68 
The new entity, Groupe Banque Populaire et Caisse d’Epargne (BPCE), is 
poised to become one of the largest retail banks in France, potentially 
reaching the branch network size of CA (see Table 3.4.3 below). CA and 
Société Générale merged their asset management operations in the 
                                                      
65 By the end of 2008, the net losses of Natixis were €2.8 billion, which represent a significant 
portion of the group’s total losses and impairments. According to Moody’s (2009), the 
investment arm’s losses represented over one-third of the total losses and impairments to 
Banque Populaire and the Groupe Caisse d’Epargne.  
66 With €40 billion at its disposal, SPPE was set up to provide support through various 
capital instruments. In addition to the injection to Dexia along with other governments, the 
agency offered €10.5 billion of subordinated debt to six banks. The support allotments that 
were made available to each bank were dependent on the institutions’ sizes, i.e. their total 
assets and market shares. Under the plan, CA received €3 billion, CM €1.2 billion and BP 
€950 million in the form of subordinated debt, calculated in line with the size of the banks’ 
balance sheets and market shares in customer loans and deposits. The agency has also been 
instrumental in 2009 in the merger between Caisse d’Epargne and BP with an additional €5 
billion, which was made available as a second tranche. CA and CM did not receive any 
second tranche funding. 
67 CA and CM have fully repaid their SPPE debt in October 2009. The newly created Groupe 
Banque Populaire and the Groupe Caisse d’Epargne (BPCE) successfully issued €1 billion of 
deeply subordinated debt to pay back its first tranche debt in March 2010. 
68 The merger of two banks has been a recurring idea since the creation of Natixis in 2006. 
The merger in 2009 was motivated by the state to consolidate the accumulation of losses in 
Natixis. Under the agreement, the new group (BPCE) has full control over Natixis with a 
stake of over 70% while the French government remains a shareholder of the investment 
bank, with its 20% stake in convertible bonds.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 71 
 
beginning of 2009, giving CA a majority ownership in the new entity, 
Amundi. The CA Group also created an online-only bank, BforBank, in 
October 2009, offering savings and term deposits, life insurance, mutual 
funds as well as e-brokerage services, further strengthening the group’s 
retail activities.  
Looking at their capital levels, the three cooperative banks appear 
more or less comparable with their commercial peers (Table 3.4.2). CM has 
consistently had a higher capital level, in terms of Tier 1 ratio. In turn, CA’s 
capital ratios have remained around those of all other banks. The figures 
also show a spike in capital levels due to the financial crisis in 2008-09, 
most notably in CM. BP’s figures show a worsening in 2008, only to be 
followed by a significant jump in 2009, partly due to the impact of the SPPE 
programme. 
One question that comes to mind is if and how the cooperative banks 
have retained their main characteristic, providing credit to the households 
and SMEs. Several indicators show that the three banks can be 
distinguished from their commercial peers in this aspect.  
In terms of branch accessibility, the cooperative banks continue to 
provide access in relatively remote areas. Table 3.4.3 highlights the spatial 
allocation of branches for the major banking groups in France. CA, which 
has the largest network after the French postal savings bank (La Banque 
Postale), has allocated about one-third of its branches in sparsely populated 
– mostly rural – areas, i.e. departments with less than 75 inhabitants per 
square kilometre. BP is also highly present in these less densely populated 
areas, devoting nearly a quarter of its branches. Likewise, the focus of CM 
remains in departments with less than 150 inhabitants per square 
kilometre.69 In turn, the commercial banks are significantly more present in 
more urbanised regions, devoting two-thirds of their branches in 
departments with more than 150 inhabitants per square kilometre, but 
maintain a smaller footprint in sparsely populated areas.70  
                                                      
69 The figures also show that BP’s merger with Caisse d’Epargne will probably further 
enhance the bank’s reach in isolated areas. 
70 It should be highlighted that the figures do not include basic banking service terminals, 
often available within shops and supermarkets, which provide supplementary access in 
remote rural areas. As of 2008, there were 800 ‘points bleus’ within the CM network and 
8,000 ‘points verts’ within the CA network.  72 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
Table 3.4.2 Tier 1 capital ratios in French banking sector 
  2005  2006 2007  2008  2009(p) 
All banks  8.0% 8.3% 8.0% 9.7%  10.2% 
CA  7.9% 8.2% 8.1% 8.6% 9.5% 
CM  10.2% 10.0%  9.6%  9.8% 11.8% 
BP*  8.5%  10.5% 9.4% 7.7% 9.1% 
Source: Bankscope, Banque Populaire, Crédit Agricole, and Crédit Mutuel. 
Note: (p) Preliminary year-end figures extracted in June 2010. 
*Figures include BP group prior to the merger with Caisse d’Epargne in 2009. 
 
Table 3.4.3 Distribution of branches by population density in France, 2008 
 
Departments 
with 
< 75 
inhab./km² 
Departments 
with 
75 – 150 
inhab./km² 
Departments 
with 
> 150 
inhab./km² 
Number of 
branches in 
mainland 
France 
  % of total branches for the group 
Banque Populaire  23% 26% 51%  3,269 
Crédit Agricole  29% 27% 44%  7,903 
Crédit Mutuel  18% 31% 51%  4,902 
Caisse d’Epargne  27% 25% 48%  4,447 
La Banque Postale  35% 28% 37%  11,497 
Commercial banks*  15% 19% 66%  6,787 
Source: Banque de France and Eurostat. 
Notes: France has a population density of around 100 inhabitants per km².  
* Includes all banks other than the three cooperatives included in this study, the state-owned 
postal bank (La Poste) and Caisse d’Epargne.  
Table 3.4.4 Distribution of loans of French credit institutions, by sector 
  Cooperative banks*  Commercial banks 
 1999  2008  1999  2008 
Non-financial corporations  28% 27% 47% 41% 
Individual entrepreneurs  20% 12%  5%  4% 
Households  44% 51% 27% 34% 
Non-residents  0% 1%  16%  16% 
Other sectors  8% 9% 5% 5% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Commission Bancaire, Banque de France. 
Notes: All figures represent banking activities of credit institutions. 
* In addition to the three banks included in the study for France, Caisse d’Epargne is also 
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Despite the growing spectrum of services, there is evidence that 
cooperative banks also continue to serve the basic needs of their clients. 
Indeed, the figures in Table 3.4.4 show that the cooperative banks continue 
to divert almost two-thirds of their loans to individual entrepreneurs 
(mostly small-sized enterprises) and households. In comparison, for 
commercial banks loans to these two sectors represent only one-third of the 
overall credits. The figures also show that the cooperative banks have 
increased their lending to households over the past few years, 
predominantly in the form of mortgage products, while reducing the share 
of their total credit to individual entrepreneurs. This recent trend could be 
an indication of a growing financing gap as banks shift their activities to 
the mortgage market, or may be purely demand-driven.   
The governance of cooperative banks continues to be member-centric, 
with the ‘one member, one vote’ principal applicable to the members of all 
three institutions. The listed shares are non-voting. Members buy shares 
(“part sociale”), which entitles them to an annual dividend determined by 
banks’ statutes and legal ceilings. Cooperative banks have a legal obligation 
to allocate a part of their profits as reserves.71  
Network collaboration is an emerging characteristic of cooperative 
banks, particularly prominent in the French model (Di Salvo, 2002). 
Both CA and CM incorporate a three-tier structure, with local, 
regional and national layers. BP has a two-layer structure instead (national 
and regional). As is increasingly the case for well-integrated cooperative 
banks, Central Network Institutions may exercise a top-down authority 
which opposes the bottom-up ownership of members. Indeed, the local (or 
in BP’s case regional) institutions in all three organisations have delegated 
a great variety of functions to centrals, including treasury and risk 
management, mutual support,72 investment activities, debt issuance, group 
representation and back office functions such as IT support, which gives 
them significant power over the local institutions.  
                                                      
71 For BP, the group-wide minimum rate is set as 10% of profits and members have no rights 
on these net assets. The reserves are treated exactly as equity in CA and CM, i.e. 
distributable to members and stockholders in the event of a default.  
72 Under the French Monetary and Financial code, the central organs of the cooperative 
institutions are required to guarantee the liquidity and solvency of the entities within their 
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CA’s network structure is comprised of over 2,500 local banks 
(“caisses locales”), 39 regional banks (“caisses regionales”) and the central 
body (Crédit Agricole S.A.). CA’s ownership structure may be 
distinguished from other cooperative groups in that the central and the 13 
regional banks are listed on the stock exchange. In terms of ownership, the 
regional banks have a majority ownership of the national body while at the 
same time providing financing for the local banks.73 In terms of mutual 
support, CA group has a legally-binding cross-guarantee system that calls 
for the use of the group’s resources to serve the debt of regional 
institutions.  
CM’s network structure is organised according to a three-level 
bottom-up approach. The local institutions provide banking services, 
collecting deposits and granting loans.  All of these local banks are owned 
by their members. The regional institutions, “Fédérations” or “Caisses 
Fédérales”, engage in training for the local administrators, business 
development and, to a lesser extent, representation and control of local 
institutions. Some of these regional centrals have formed alliances among 
themselves and are in the gradual process of consolidating around the 
largest federation, Caisse Fédéral de Crédit Mutuel Centre Est Europe 
(CMCEE).74 Finally, group-level integration is attained by a number of 
national institutions (“Confédérations”), which issue debt, engage in risk 
                                                      
73 The ownership structure of CA has changed twice in recent years. In 1988, Caisse 
Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA), which served as the group’s state-owned central, was 
converted into a joint-stock company when the government sold almost all its stake to the 
regional banks. At the same time, a merger of regional institutions shrank the number of 
regional banks from 94 in 1990 to 39 in 2009. In 2001, CNCA once again changed its status 
and converted to a joint-stock company, Crédit Agricole S.A. (CASA), and was subsequently 
listed in the Paris stock exchange. A majority of the capital (70%) was held by the regional 
centrals (caisses régionales) while the remaining part was floated to the public, with a small 
part distributed as employee benefits. Following the acquisition of Crédit Lyonnais in 2003, 
the regional banks’ stake dropped to 55%.  
74 With its headquarters in Strasbourg, CMCEE and its alliance of four federations (the so-
called ‘CM5’) joins local banks in the Paris region and the eastern and the north-western 
regions of France. The alliance represents nearly two-thirds of the group’s total activities. 
The rest of the group comprises of two other alliances, Crédit Mutuel Arkea and Crédit 
Mutuel Nord Europe. The remainder of the federations act independently at the regional 
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management, manage liquidity and provide mutual support for the 
group.75  
Unlike the other two cooperative institutions, BP’s network 
collaboration is comprised of two levels, with no local layer. Although the 
details have changed since the merger with Caisse d’Epargne, the main 
structure of the group remains intact. The (premerger) regional layer is 
formed of 20 Banques Populaires, i.e. 18 regional banks, CASDEN Banque 
Populaire (serving the employees of the national education system), and 
Crédit Coopératif (serving principally non-profit organisations).76 The 
group’s national central institution, previously known as Banque fédérale 
des banques populaires (BFBP), is wholly owned by the regional 
institutions.77 Apart from the centralised functions of treasury and risk 
management, wholesale, investment and international activities, the 
national central institution also serves a legally-binding mutual support 
system.  
To sum up, the French cooperative banks represent an important part 
of the country’s banking sector, fulfilling the role of enhancing access in 
remote regions and providing credit to households and SMEs. As a 
consequence of recent mergers, this trend is likely to continue in the years 
to come. Despite differences in their governance structures, all three 
institutions are relatively centralised with an extensive amount of 
intranetwork cooperation, especially in liquidity management and mutual 
support. Going forward, one of the challenges for the sector is the 
endurance of the key cooperative ideologies in the face of an increasingly 
integrated model. The complexities of the organisational models of the 
French cooperative banks and governance mechanisms that have 
                                                      
75 More specifically, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel issues debt and acts as the holding 
company for the specialised subsidiaries; Confédération Nationale du Crédit Mutuel acts as 
the group’s central organisation for development and representation purposes; and, lastly, 
Caisse Centrale du Crédit Mutuel manages the liquidity and provides mutual support for 
the entire group. A group-wide mutual support system is available as voluntary cross-
guarantees between the regional federations. The CM5 alliance has a legally-binding 
support system for local banks within the alliance (Fitch, 2008). 
76 With the merger, the regional banks will increase in number with the addition of 17 
regional Caisses d’Epargne (CE). 
77 After the merger, BFBP was dissolved and replaced by the central organ of Banques 
populaires et des Caisses d’épargne (BPCE).  76 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
developed over the years attest both to these difficulties and the manner in 
which the institutions are coping with these challenges.  
3.5  The Netherlands  
Cooperative banks in the Netherlands were first formed towards the end of 
the 19th century when the first farmers’ credit banks were established and 
modelled on the newly founded cooperative banks in Germany and 
influenced by the vision of Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen.78 They were 
formed in agricultural communities because there were very few banks in 
rural areas and farmers had little access to credit. Such banks had five main 
principles: unlimited liability of members; management by unpaid 
volunteers; the non-distribution of profits which were used to build up 
capital; a limited geographical operating area, and local autonomy even 
though they might be part of a cooperative central bank. The ultimate 
objective was to improve the lifestyle and economic well-being of the rural 
population, rather than profit maximisation. Being locally based 
institutions, they had significant information advantages in their local 
markets, and their local member focus meant that the appropriate 
monitoring of borrowers was undertaken so as to minimise risks and loan 
default rates.  
The concept of a cooperative central bank to serve local cooperative 
banks was established very early in the evolution of cooperative banking in 
the Netherlands. In 1898 two such banks were established. These central 
institutions were partly designed to overcome the lack of economies of 
scale of member banks (Groeneveld and Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2009). From an 
early stage the two central banks offered banking services (including 
liquidity management) to their member banks, and by the 1920s were also 
involved in the supervision of their member banks. The evolution of the 
membership of the member banks and the number of banks in the two 
networks is summarised in Table 3.5.1. By 1950, the number of member 
banks had grown to over 1,300. 
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Table 3.5.1 Evolution of the structure of cooperative banks in the Netherlands    
  1900 1930 1950 1970 
Member banks in the network  67  1,286  1,314  1,228 
Members of local banks (x 1,000)  4  228  289  631 
 
Rabobank itself was formed in 1972 with the merger of the two 
original cooperative central banks. 
From its early beginnings as an essentially agriculture sector bank, 
Rabobank has developed into a full-range financial services provider, and 
began to expand into urban areas. The expansion of the bank (its asset base, 
deposits, funds under management, and the range of activities) has been 
substantial, as summarised in Table 3.5.2 below. At the same time, and 
largely because of mergers between member banks, the number of 
individual cooperative banks and members of the network has declined 
substantially, in each and every year from 1997, when there were 481, to 
2008, when there were 153. At the same time, the number of branches 
declined from 1,823 to 1,112. Total assets rose from €122 billion in 1994 to 
over €600 billion by 2008 and loans to the private sector rose from €80 
billion to nearly €410 billion. Over the same period, the Tier 1 equity capital 
ratio rose from 9.4% to 12.8%, and the rate of return on equity from 8.6% to 
9.7%. Net profits rose from less than €1 billion to nearly €3 billion.  
Rabobank has a market share of 30% in mortgages, 43% in the retail 
savings market (both have risen since 2004), and almost 40% of the SME 
banking market. In the food and agricultural sector its market share is over 
85%.  
In the late 1990s, Rabobank planned to diversify into international 
investment banking, which some argued was not fully consistent with 
being a member-based bank governed by cooperative principles. This 
strategy was, however, short-lived. Leaving aside the weak profitability of 
this business, one possible reason for this reversal in 1999 was that “the 
culture of investment banking fitted badly with Rabobank’s company 
culture and being deeply rooted in domestic retail banking” (Vogelaar, 
2009). 
Although Rabobank is predominantly a retail bank, it has developed 
significant wholesale business on both sides of the balance sheet. After the 
mid-1990s, the lending activities of Rabobank Nederland could be funded 
almost exclusively from retail savings deposits. However, as the demand 
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bank began funding operations in wholesale markets (Boonstra, 2009). 
Furthermore, around 25% of the bank’s income is generated by Rabobank 
International.  
Table 3.5.2 Evolution of Rabobank’s selected profile 
  1994 1997  2000  2003 2006 2008 
  % of total market 
Total assets  23.6% 27.1% 29.8% 27.4% 30.1% 27.4% 
Private loans  22.8% 26.1% 22.6% 24.0% 30.5% 34.0% 
Customer deposits  na 31.8% 36.4% 34.9% 35.5% 35.5% 
  Structural indicators (absolute values) 
Employees (in FTEs)  34,452 40,927 49,711 50,849 50,573 60,568 
Member banks  595 481  397  328 188 153 
Members (x 1,000)  615 525  550  1,360 1,641 1,707 
Clients (x 1,000)  3,500 6,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,500 
Source: Rabobank annual reports. 
 
Rabobank (and its member banks) is a fully cooperative bank which, 
in the 1990s, expressly rejected the option of converting to publicly listed 
status on the stock market and becoming a SHV bank. This policy was 
reaffirmed in 1999 after a period of extensive consultation and 
consideration of the conversion option in the period 1995-98. 
The Rabobank Group has a three-fold structure: local member banks, 
Rabobank Nederland (the network’s central bank) and the various 
subsidiaries of Rabobank Nederland. The Rabobank network is an apex 
cooperative bank model with a powerful central bank (Rabobank 
Nederland) serving the member banks in a wide range of ways, as 
described below. Rabobank is fully owned by the 153 local member banks 
which are individual legal entities with their own balance sheet 
responsibilities. Within this network structure there are two levels of 
membership: the local member banks are members of Rabobank 
Nederland, and each of the member banks has members in their locality. 
Both the member banks and Rabobank Nederland are fully cooperative in 
nature. 
Although all the local member banks (which are licensed as credit 
institutions) and Rabobank itself are cooperative banks, most of the latter’s 
subsidiaries are not and are established as private or public limited 
companies under Dutch law. In all cases, Rabobank is either the sole or 
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inFigure 3.5.1, which shows members of the local member banks which in 
turn are members of Rabobank Nederland and which in turn has 
subsidiaries to offer services to member banks and their members and 
customers. 
Figure 3.5.1 Structure of the Rabobank Group 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Van Dooren and Van Ijperenburg (2009). 
Although all the member banks are legally independent entities, the 
network’s Cross Guarantee Scheme means that all member banks are liable 
for the obligations of all other members and the Group itself. Banks are able 
to draw on the scheme in the event of a shortfall rather than a liquidity 
imbalance which is handled through the central bank acting as the member 
banks’ banker. There is, therefore, full mutual support. In addition, there is 
a mutual insurance scheme to cover certain operating risks that might 
affect member banks. 
The network that is the Rabobank Group functions so that 
cooperative banks in the Netherlands have a local focus (being 
geographically close to their members and customers) coupled with 
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national facilities both for the member banks themselves and their 
customers and members. The range of services that Rabobank Nederland 
offers to the member banks also means that comparatively small member 
banks are able to secure economies of scale and offer a range of services 
that they themselves are too small to generate internally. In this last respect, 
one of the roles of Rabobank Nederland is to provide services to customers 
whose requirements exceed what can realistically be provided by their local 
cooperative bank. 
Each member bank is a separate cooperative bank in its own right 
and is legally independent: they are not to be regarded as branches of 
Rabobank Nederland. Member banks are joint owners of Rabobank 
Nederland. The bank itself describes the structure as follows: “Rabobank 
Nederland is a daughter of many parents” but also “the parent of many 
subsidiaries”. The two-way relationship between the central bank and the 
local member banks means that Rabobank is an integrated group of 
separate cooperative banks.  
Rabobank Nederland performs several roles for the benefit of both 
the member banks and their customers, and the customers of Rabobank 
itself: 
•  It acts as a central bank to member banks and helps to intermediate 
their liquidity requirements and equalising surpluses and deficits in 
the flow of deposits and loans of member banks. This is effectively an 
internal interbank market. 
•  It is a bank in its own right conducting both wholesale and retail and 
both domestic and international business including for high net 
worth individuals.  
•  It is an important service provider to the member banks. This 
includes the important role of product development, treasury 
management, and risk management including centralised credit 
approval and scoring. 
•  It has a central supervisory role over the member banks, which is 
delegated to it by De Nederlandsche Bank, the supervisor of banks – 
including Rabobank – in the Netherlands. 
•  It acts as a holding company for a range of subsidiaries which 
provide services to member banks and customers both of Rabobank 
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•  It is an outsourcing partner of member banks for a range of services 
such as marketing, back office administration and internal auditing. It 
also acts as an internal advisory service. 
This combination of roles is almost unique in the world and most 
especially the combined roles of bank, central bank and supervisory 
agency. 
The central bank has an important treasury operation. Local member 
banks are not allowed to operate in wholesale financial markets and must 
transfer any surplus funds to the Central Treasury. However, the Central 
Treasury does have access to domestic and international wholesale markets 
both as a source of funds and for investment. 
An integral part of the network model is that Rabobank Nederland 
acts as the supervisory agency of the local member banks on the basis of 
delegated authority from De Nederlandsche Bank. As the supervisor, 
Rabobank Nederland has the power and authority to set rules for member 
banks not the least because of the Cross Guarantee Scheme. There is, 
therefore, a two-way relationship between the central institution and the 
local banks: the member banks own and influence Rabobank Nederland 
which in turn has supervisory and regulatory powers over the member 
banks. Furthermore, member banks cannot increase or decrease their 
operations (branches) without Rabobank Nederland approval. 
Members have no entitlement to the equity of their local bank, which 
also applies to member banks and Rabobank capital. Member banks are 
shareholders in the equity of Rabobank Nederland but cannot appropriate 
it to themselves. As expressed by the bank itself: “…no-one can lay claim to 
the Group’s equity…The Rabobank Group does not belong to anyone; the 
bank owns itself” (De Boer et al., 2009). No dividends are paid to member 
banks.  
Local member banks have no access to external equity capital 
independent of its own members. For the group as a whole, the dominant 
source of equity capital is retained profits, and a minimum of 75% of profits 
must be retained as reserves contributing to Tier 1 capital. No distributions 
can be made to members, though a small proportion of profits can be used 
for social activities. 
By far the dominant source of capital is the retained profits of the 
bank. However, two new sources of permanent equity capital (Capital 
Securities and Member Certificates) were introduced in 1999 as the banks 
were expanding at a faster rate than could be sustained by equity capital. 82 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
Capital Securities are comparable to bonds though have no fixed term and 
give a dividend but only providing Rabobank Group makes a profit: they 
are a form of hybrid Tier 1 capital. 
In the early 2000s, Member Certificates were also offered exclusively to 
members of member banks. These proved to be attractive as they pay a 
return of around 1.5 pp above the ten-year government bond yield 
providing that the bank makes a profit. They form part of the bank’s equity 
capital. They have no fixed term but can be transferred to other members in 
a limited internal market. The two new forms of capital accounted for 36% 
of the €30.4 billion of equity capital at the end of 2008, which implies that 
over one-third of the bank’s capital is in the form that carries dividend 
payments, although, unlike with dividends in SHV companies, the 
dividend is not related to the magnitude of the bank’s profits. 
With respect to the local member banks, it is possible to be a customer 
without being a member. Any retail customer is eligible to become a 
member provided they are resident within the bank’s geographical area 
and are not an employee of the bank. Following a concerted strategy to 
increase membership, the number of members rose from 550,000 in 2000 to 
1.7 million in 2008 and the proportion of the sum of customers and 
members who were members increased from 6% in 2000 to nearly 20% by 
2008. As of 1998, members have no formal obligations or duties and their 
liability is limited to their membership stake: they have rights but not 
obligations. 
There are several specific advantages to being a member of a local 
member bank of the Rabobank Group: 
•  members have voting rights, 
•  they can be elected to the Board and Supervisory Board of their bank, 
•  they are able to attend and vote at General Meetings, 
•  they are entitled to a series of member discounts on some products 
and services (e.g. health care insurance), 
•  they can call for a General Assembly meeting provided such a call 
receives the support of 10% of members. 
As a result of the increase in membership, the proportion of total 
loans to members increased from 14.3% in 1994 to 25.6% in 2008. 
Governance structures exist at two levels in any network cooperative: 
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In the Rabobank model, all local cooperative bank members have a 
Supervisory Board. Since 2004 member banks can choose between two 
alternative governance models: the Partnership Model and the Executive 
Model, although there is a trend towards the latter. Under the Partnership 
Model, the Board of the local bank is made up of people elected (on the 
basis of one member, one vote) by members from their ranks and a 
professional managing director appointed by the Supervisory Board. All 
important strategic decisions are taken by the General Meeting in which all 
members have voting rights. The General Meeting appoints members of the 
Supervisory Board. 
In the Executive Model, each bank has a Board of Management 
operating under the oversight of the Supervisory Board. None of the board 
members are elected by the members. However, in this model the bank is 
required to institute a Members’ Counsel which is made up of members. 
This is designed to embed member influence and control. This body 
assumes the bulk of the powers of the General Meeting. 
The governance structure of Rabobank Nederland is summarised in 
Figure 3.5.2. There are four key elements: (1) an Executive Board (which 
reports to the Supervisory Board, the Central Delegates Assembly, and the 
General Meeting of Rabobank Nederland); (2) the Supervisory Board 
(which supervises the Executive Board and the general affairs of Rabobank 
Nederland and its subsidiaries and appoints members of the Executive 
Board); (3) the Central Delegates Assembly (CDA); and (4) the General 
Meeting of Rabobank Nederland. Member banks are organised 
geographically into 12 regions, each with between 12 and 20 member 
Banks.  84 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
Figure 3.5.2 The governance structure of Rabobank  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Van Dooren and Van Ijperenburg (2009). 
 
Member banks send delegates to the Regional Delegate Assemblies 
(RDA) and each RDA has a board which in turn forms the Central Delegate 
Assembly, which is regarded as the ‘Rabobank Parliament’ and is 
effectively the pre-eminent consultative body for the member banks. The 
CDA meets four times each year and formulates overall group strategy for 
Rabobank Nederland and general binding rules and recommendations for 
all member banks. It also establishes the principles to guide the Executive 
and Supervisory Boards. In many ways, the CDA is the most important 
institution within the Rabobank Group. As expressed by van Dooren and 
van IJperenburg (2009): “Through the representation of the local 
management and supervisory bodies in the Regional Delegate Assemblies, 
the member-customers of the individual banks are represented in the 
Central Delegates Assemblies.” 
Local Bank  Local Bank  Local Bank 
CDA 
General Meeting 
RDA  RDA 
Executive Board  Supervisory Board 
appoints 
appoints INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 85 
 
Voting at the Annual General Meeting of Rabobank Nederland is 
based on “Shareholder Ratios”, which are calculated on the basis of a 
formula that includes balance sheet totals, member banks’ core capital 
positions, and member banks’ commercial results. This ratio is recalculated 
every three years to reflect the changing position of individual member 
banks. The General Meeting appoints members of the Supervisory Board, 
adopts or amends any changes to the Articles of Association of Rabobank 
Nederland, adopts the annual accounts and allocates dividends and 
appropriation of profits, and adopts regulations regarding the organisation 
and procedures for the RDAs and CDAs. 
Along with cooperative banks across Europe, performance was 
inevitably affected by the banking crisis. However, the impact on the 
cooperative banking sector has not been as severe, not least because of 
Rabobank’s strong capital position (Table 3.5.3). It was the only large bank 
in the Netherlands that did not need government support during the crisis. 
Nevertheless, profits declined by 17% in 2009 due to the severity of the 
recession, mainly as a consequence of a drop in demand for household 
loans.  
Table 3.5.3 Tier 1 capital ratios in Dutch banking sector 
 2004  2006  2008 
Rabobank  11.4%  10.7%  12.7% 
All banks  9.6%  9.1%  9.7% 
Sources: ECB and Rabobank. 
 
The collateral damage that the bank did incur was due to it having 
indirect positions in the US sub-prime mortgage market via its investment 
in structured instruments such as Retail Mortgage Backed Securities and 
Collateralised Debt Obligations. Even so, the bank was able to eliminate its 
exposure fairly quickly. Furthermore, the results of the member banks were 
sufficient to offset these losses. 
All in all, the cooperative banking sector in the Netherlands has 
shown consistent growth while maintaining its traditional cooperative 
values and business philosophy, despite early attempts to convert to 
shareholder banking and to expand into international investment banking. 
Being highly integrated, its governance structure is almost unique in the 
world, as it combines the roles of bank, central bank and supervisory 
agency. Amidst market turbulences, the sector remained resilient over time 86 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
a n d  r e s i s t e d  t h e  c r i s i s  w i t h  n o  p u b l i c  s u p p o r t .  L o o k i n g  f o r w a r d ,  
cooperative banking is expected to continue gaining market shares while 
ensuring financial access to the real economy in the years to come. 
3.6  Spain  
Inspired by the Raiffeisen model of cooperatives in Germany, the first 
credit cooperative was created in Madrid in 1865. The creation of the first 
rural credit cooperatives came later, in the early 20th century. The 
movement, which was initiated by the rise of Catholic unions, took hold 
quickly in the following years, with the total number of credit cooperatives 
reaching a total of 1,000 in 1936. Most of these institutions disappeared 
during and following the Spanish Civil War. It was not until the 1960s that 
the credit cooperatives grew, with the creation of credit unions for 
professionals, i.e. cajas populares y profesionales. By 1977, the total number 
of credit cooperatives, including both rural and popular credit 
cooperatives, reached a total of 200 registered entities.  
Following the legal reforms implementing the EU’s Banking 
Directives in the 1980s, Spanish credit cooperatives were gradually treated 
as any other credit institution for regulatory and supervisory purposes 
under the Law No. 13/1989 on Credit Cooperatives. The only difference 
applicable to credit cooperatives is the treatment of profits, which remains 
their key characteristic. Under the law, one-fifth of all profits are used to 
build a reserve fund, i.e. Fondo de Reserva Obligatorio, while an additional 
10% is allocated into a social fund for the promotion of education and other 
social activities, i.e. Fondo de Educación y Promoción.  
In 1989, Grupo Caja Rural was created with the participation of 
some of the rural credit cooperatives. This group centralises some of the 
replicable services for its members, including information technologies, 
data systems, and insurance and investment services. In order to make 
these services effective, Grupo Caja Rural operates through a centralised 
financial institution, Banco Cooperativo Español. This central body offers 
centralised financial services such as specialised financial services, 
centralised information technology services and insurance services.  
As of March 2010, there were 76 rural credit cooperatives and four 
popular and professional cooperatives. All of these institutions belong to 
the National Union of Credit Cooperatives (UNACC), which acts as a 
representative organisation for the entire group. The organisational 
structure of the group is shown in Figure 3.6.1.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 87 
 
Figure 3.6.1 Organisation of the Spanish cooperative system 
 
Source: UNACC. 
The Spanish banking system has witnessed a broad transformation 
over the last three decades, with cooperative and savings banks increasing 
their market shares in retail banking services. As shown in Figure 3.6.2, the 
number of branches of both types of credit institutions has grown since the 
1970s, with the exception of a brief period of contraction for credit 
cooperatives in the late 1980s. The growth has been significantly more 
pronounced for the savings banks, whose branch network has surpassed all 
others in 2000. The credit cooperatives, on the other hand, have maintained 
a small but gradually growing foothold in the market.  
Figure 3.6.2 Number of bank branches in Spain, 1974-2009 
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Paralleling the growth of their branch networks over the past two 
decades, credit cooperatives have expanded their activities but have a 
relatively small share of the market. In terms of market shares for domestic 
customer deposits and loans, the relative share of cooperative banks has 
increased from 4.6% for deposits and 2.4% for loans in 1990 to 6.9% and 
5.3% by the end of 2009, respectively (Table 3.6.1 and Table 3.6.2). Savings 
banks have also grown, especially in the loans market, overtaking 
commercial banks in terms market shares over the last 15 years. The figures 
below also show that the increased market share of savings banks and 
credit cooperatives, especially in the credit sector, came at the expense of 
other credit institutions, particularly specialised credit institutions that 
failed in the mid-1990s.79  
Table 3.6.1 Market shares of Spanish banks in the credit market 
  Total loans  Mortgages 
 1990  2009  1990  2009 
Commercial banks  50.4%  43.5%  25.2%  36.8% 
Savings banks  27.5%  48.0%  50.1%  55.7% 
Credit cooperatives  2.4%  5.3%  1.4%  6.5% 
Other credit institutions  19.7% 3.3%  23.2%  0.9% 
Source: Bank of Spain. 
Note: Figures correspond to market shares in private loans to resident non-financial sectors.  
Table 3.6.2 Market shares of Spanish banks for customer deposits 
  Total deposits  Demand deposits 
Savings & term 
deposits 
  1990 2009 1990 2009 1990 2009 
Commercial banks  48.6% 36.7% 70.5% 51.3% 39.3% 32.6% 
Savings banks  42.8% 56.1% 25.7% 43.9% 50.0% 59.6% 
Credit cooperatives  4.6% 6.9% 2.6% 4.4% 5.4% 7.7% 
Other credit institutions  4.1% 0.2% 1.2% 0.5% 5.3% 0.2% 
Source: Bank of Spain. 
Note: Figures correspond to market shares in private deposits from resident non-financial 
sectors.  
                                                      
79 The specialised lending institutions are comprised of official credit institutions, Instituto 
de Crédito Oficial, and Entidades de crédito de ambito operativo limitado (ECAOL), which 
disappeared in 1994 and 1996. The remainder of the banks in the “other credit institutions” 
category are electronic money institutions that continue to operate today.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 89 
 
Table 3.6.1 also highlights a key characteristic of Spanish credit 
cooperatives. Today, much like savings banks, these institutions have a 
more significant lead in the mortgage market than in the overall credit 
market, benefiting mainly from the growth of the real estate and 
construction sectors. Most of the slack in the mortgage market following 
the disappearance of specialised credit institutions has been taken up by 
commercial banks, which have seen their market shares grow from roughly 
a quarter of the total credits in 1990 to more than a third in 2009. The credit 
cooperatives have also seen growth in their aggregate market share, which 
has more than quadrupled in 20 years.  
The details for the market shares for different deposit products, as 
outlined in Table 3.6.2, highlight another important difference between the 
different types of banks active today. While commercial banks continue to 
hold a clear lead in demand deposits (i.e. overnight deposits), the market 
share of cooperative banks in other forms of deposits (7.7%) is higher than 
their share in the overall deposits market (6.9%). The reliance on less liquid 
forms of liability is a key distinguishing characteristic of cooperatives and 
savings banks. 
Table 3.6.3 Market shares of Spanish banks in regional credit markets 
 
Provinces with 
< 25 inhab./km² 
Provinces with 
25–75 inhab./km² 
Provinces with 
75–125 inhab./km² 
Provinces > 125 
inhab./km² 
  1990 2008 1990 2008  1990  2008  1990 2008 
Commercial  banks 37.3% 29.5% 52.5% 34.8%  58.3%  36.9%  59.5% 45.9% 
Savings  banks  54.5% 57.7% 39.9% 54.9%  39.5%  55.2%  37.7% 48.6% 
Credit cooperatives  10.7% 12.8%  8.1%  10.3%  3.1%  7.9%  2.8%  5.4% 
Sources: Bank of Spain, Eurostat and own elaboration. 
Notes: Information drawn from level-3 regional data covered under Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS 3). Other credit institutions are not included in figures. 
Figures correspond to market shares in private loans to resident non-financial sectors.  
 
One reason that cooperative banks may have relative advantages in 
the mortgage market and the longer-term deposits could be due to the close 
relationship they form with their customers. Indeed, Tables 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 
confirm that cooperatives (and to a large extent savings banks) are more 
active in less densely populated provinces. In summary, credit cooperatives 
are more active in areas with less than 75 inhabitants per square kilometre, 
where they represented over 10% of private loans and 12% of private 
deposits in 2008. In turn, the regional distribution of the market power of 
cooperative and savings banks has become more even, while commercial 90 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
banks remain more represented in densely populated (mostly urban) areas. 
These figures confirm that credit cooperatives provide access to finance, 
especially in more isolated areas.  
Table 3.6.4 Market shares of Spanish banks in regional customer deposits 
 
Provinces with 
< 25 inhab./km² 
Provinces with 
25–75 inhab./km² 
Provinces with 
75–125 inhab./km² 
Provinces with > 
125 inhab./km² 
  1990 2008 1990 2008  1990  2008  1990 2008 
Commercial  banks 41.9% 24.5% 48.7% 27.9%  50.8%  31.1%  51.0% 38.8% 
Savings  banks  50.7% 62.9% 42.3% 57.7%  45.6%  58.2%  45.5% 54.9% 
Credit cooperatives  9.6%  12.6%  10.2%  14.4%  5.7%  10.7%  5.2%  6.3% 
Sources: Bank of Spain, Eurostat and own elaboration. 
Notes: Information drawn from level-3 regional data covered under Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS 3). Other credit institutions not included in figures. 
Figures correspond to market shares in private deposits from resident non-financial sectors.  
 
Possibly due to increased competition in the sector, the earnings of 
most banks have declined over the last two decades and the cooperative 
banks are no exception. Figure 3.6.3 depicts the evolution of net interest 
earnings for commercial, savings and cooperative banks in Spain between 
the years 1985 and 2009. In the case of cooperatives, the net interest margin 
has declined from around 1.1% of assets in 1985 to 0.4% in 2009. The figure 
also shows that this decline replicates the situation for the broader sector, 
where both commercial and savings banks have realised equivalent drops. 
Despite the downward trend, cooperative banks maintain higher relative 
earnings than their peers. This is most likely due to their lower funding 
costs and their traditional role in providing credit to households and 
smaller enterprises, which typically carry greater credit risks and are thus 
associated with higher interest rates.  
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Figure 3.6.3 Evolution of net interest margins as share of assets in Spanish 
banking, 1985-2009 
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Credit cooperatives also contribute to the overall stability of the 
banking sector by maintaining high equity levels. Indeed, the average share 
of capital and reserves in total assets (4) has persistently remained around 
11.5% between 1990 and 2009, over two percentage points higher on 
average than those of commercial and savings banks.  
Figure 3.6.4 Share of capital and reserves in total assets in Spanish banking, 
1985-2009 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
Commercial banks Savings banks Credit cooperatives
 
Source: Bank of Spain. 
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Figure 3.6.5 Ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to loans in Spanish banking, 
1998-December 2009 
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Source: Bank of Spain. 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 has had a significant impact on 
Spain’s economy. The real estate and construction sectors have been hit 
particularly hard, which has led to a serious deterioration of the credit 
portfolios of the credit institutions. According to the Bank of Spain, the 
share of non-performing loans has exhibited a dramatic increase for all 
banks over the past two years (see Figure 3.6.5). Nevertheless, the 
worsening of the credit portfolio of cooperative banks has been more 
limited. Although the credit defaults have been higher for credit 
cooperatives – due to their traditional role of providing funds to smaller 
enterprises that often have higher credit risk – there has been a reversal 
during the crisis. Indeed, by the end of 2009, the non-performing-loans-to-
loans ratio remained at 3.8% for Spanish credit cooperatives and over 5.0% 
for commercial and savings banks.  
Several reasons can explain why the credit cooperatives have better 
mitigated the impact of worsening market conditions as compared to their 
peers. First, they have limited their exposure to the real estate and 
construction sectors where the losses have been most significant. While the 
credit to the real estate sector represented between 15% and 20% of the total 
loan portfolio of commercial banks, the same share has been closer to 10% 
for the credit cooperatives. The same also holds for the construction sector.  
Second, there is evidence that even within a given sector the non-
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credit cooperatives. For example, although the pre-crisis NPL ratios for 
household mortgages were comparable among all banks, by December 
2009 the credit cooperatives enjoyed a non-payment rate of 1.6%, compared 
with the rates of 3.0% for savings banks and 2.4% for commercial banks. 
Similarly, the NPL ratios in the real estate sector literally exploded for 
commercial banks and savings banks, climbing from a mere 0.5% in 
December 2006 to around 10% in December 2009. For credit cooperatives, 
however, the jump was less dramatic, going from 1.1% in December 2006 to 
7.6% in December 2009.  
The differences in the responsiveness of the non-payment rates may 
be a result of the particularities of the relationship between the credit 
cooperatives and their borrowers. In other words, the screening and 
monitoring advantages that credit cooperatives enjoy could allow them to 
incorporate correctly the borrowers’ exposure to adverse market conditions 
in their credit decisions. Indeed, the ability to decompose the borrowers’ 
risks into its components would go in line with the informational 
advantages highlighted by the literature on relationship banking.80 Other 
issues could also be at play. For example, differences in loan servicing 
practices could explain why the responses differ. The varying NPL rates 
may be a temporary phenomenon. Therefore, a complete assessment of 
these contrasting reasons needs to be conducted in the upcoming years, 
once the non-payment levels return to long-term norms.  
Going forward, a key challenge facing the sector is the banks’ access 
to liquidity markets. Typically, larger institutions can raise capital in 
domestic and international markets, which allows them to afford liquidity 
at lower costs. Smaller and less integrated institutions, however, may suffer 
from shortages, especially during times of crisis. In order to counter these 
challenges, the credit cooperatives under the Asociación Española de Cajas 
Rurales (AECR), which represent over half of the total assets of all credit 
cooperatives, have joined in a common mutual protection scheme (sistemas 
institucionales de protección,  or  SIP) in 2007. The system allows the 
participating institutions to share liquidity, guarantee the solvency of its 
members and facilitate access to capital markets. More recently, the 
                                                      
80 For a general discussion on relationship banking, see Boot (2000) and Elyasiani and 
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remaining credit cooperatives have also been encouraged by the Bank of 
Spain to join the scheme.  
To sum up, the service, performance, efficiency and solvency 
indicators shown above highlight that amidst their recent growth, credit 
cooperatives in Spain continue to serve the basic needs of their key 
customers. These banks, which represent a relatively small proportion of 
domestic deposits and loans, are more present in less remote areas, 
enhancing access. They have also maintained a steady cushion of earnings, 
which certainly is one of the key reasons that their capital ratios remain 
superior. More recently, the cooperatives have taken a less pronounced hit 
from the financial crisis. The recent move to strengthening the mutual 
support systems should further secure the future of cooperative banking in 
Spain. 
3.7  Finland  
In Finland, the first cooperative credit institution was founded in the 
beginning of the 20th century by Hannes Gebhard, the father of the 
cooperative movement in the country, which was based on the Raiffeisen 
model. In early times, in addition to the members’ deposits, the local 
institutions obtained their financing from the group’s central institution, 
the Lending Fund of the Cooperative Societies Limited Company (OKO), 
which channelled public funds to the local institutions. In 1920, the 
institutions were allowed to broaden their client base to attract deposits 
from non-members. A few years later, the Guarantee Fund for Cooperative 
Banks was formed to bear risks mutually, but only on a voluntary basis.81  
From a market share of just over 10% in deposits and loans before the 
Second World War, the group continually broadened its reach in terms of 
loans over the second half of the century (see Figure 3.7.1). A large increase 
in activity in the years 1945 to 1950 was due to a mandate by the Finnish 
government to use the cooperative banking sector as an intermediary to 
distribute loans to those settling out of the territories ceded to the Soviet 
Union.82 
                                                      
81 The participation in a legally binding guarantee fund was included much later, in the 
1970s. 
82 F.R. Marshall (1958,) “The Finnish Cooperative Movement”, Land Economics, Vol. 34, No. 3 
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Figure 3.7.1 Market share in lending during 1902-2010 in percentage points 
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Source: OP-Pohjola Group (2009). 
Throughout their history, Finnish credit societies have provided their 
services mainly in rural areas and to small farmers. This narrow focus first 
led to a temporary decline in market shares in the 1950s, mostly due to 
intense postwar urbanisation. By the 1960s, the credit cooperatives began to 
undertake operations in urban areas, delivering services to the total 
population, helping them recover their position in the market.  
By the end of the 1980s, domestic and foreign indebtedness in Nordic 
countries had reached historic highs. Finland’s foreign debt accounted for 
nearly half of the country’s GDP, up from a mere 15% in the early 1980s. 
House prices reached historic peaks, with the annual expansion of loans 
reaching over 20% between the years 1985 and 1990. Along with this 
insurmountable increase in the flow of credit came an increase in bad loans, 
particularly troublesome in the commercial mortgage market. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union posed complementary problems, wiping out nearly 
15% of the country’s exports. The result was an overheated economy and a 
weakening banking sector, which led to a significant devaluation of the 
currency and a strong decline in banking activities in early 1990s.  
The crisis led to a major restructuring of the banking sector and the 
birth of the modern-day cooperative model. Many smaller cooperative 
banks were reorganised and formed into a new confederation. The newly 
formed group emerged larger from the crisis, having taken over the 
operations of the savings banks. The banking sector as a whole also became 
more concentrated. As of the end of 2009, the total assets of the top three 96 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
banks, i.e. Nordea Bank plc, OP-Pohjola Cooperative Group and Pohjola 
Bank plc, represent more than three-quarters of the entire banking sector.  
The reforms that were enacted both as a response to the crisis and to 
implement the European directives paved the way for consolidation in the 
banking sector. In 1997, OP Bank Group was formed as the group’s central, 
which integrated the group’s central operations to a single institution.83 In 
the meantime, mergers and acquisitions (some of which were enforced by 
regulatory authorities) led to a drop in the number of commercial banks 
over the years. Within the cooperative banking sector, this consolidation 
battle was visible in the decrease of the number of local banks and branches 
(Figure 3.7.2). The number of local banks decreased from 250 in 1997 to 229 
in 2007. In 2005, the OP Group became a majority shareholder of Pohjola, a 
leader in non-life insurance. In 2007, the two groups formed the OP-Pohjola 
Group, in which Pohjola Bank plc continues to be a listed entity, owned 
partly by the group’s central and local banks.84  
Figure 3.7.2 Consolidation of local banks in Finland 
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Source: OP Pohjola Group (2009). 
                                                      
83 Besides the OP-Pohjola Group, there is a second group of cooperative banks, the Finnish 
Local Cooperative Bank Group, which consists of 42 independent banks located mainly in 
rural areas. 
84 The listed shares carry voting rights but are weighed differently than the shares held 
within the group. The group’s central, OP-Pohjola Group Central Cooperative, has effective 
control with its 56.9% of total votes, while the local banks have 13.2%. The rest (30%) is 
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In 2001, a reform of the sector took place with adoption of the Law on 
cooperative banks and other credit institutions established as cooperatives 
(1504/2001).85 Under the new rules, the OP-Pohjola Group Central 
Cooperative was granted a role to supervise and monitor local banks on 
their liquidity, solvency and risk management practices. Moreover, the 
central institution and the local banks form a consolidated group that is 
jointly responsible for each others’ debts and commitments, i.e. joint-
liability. This mutual support system underlines a highly integrated 
structure. In effect, no local bank is allowed to fail; the only possible failure 
is that of the group as a whole. The model bears a resemblance to the model 
of the Dutch Rabobank, which combines liquidity management with local 
decision-making.86  
Today, the OP-Pohjola Group’s banking and investment arms are 
owned by its approximately 1.3 million members (see Figure 3.7.3). The 
group’s highly integrated structure is evident from its ownership structure. 
The members exercise their power directly by voting in the general 
assembly or, for certain decisions, through their representatives.87 The local 
banks own the central cooperative, which in turn wholly owns the group’s 
fund management and life insurance arms. The central institution also has 
majority voting power over the investment banking arm, Pohjola Bank.  
Over the past decade, following the reforms in 1997, the market 
shares for the OP-Pohjola Group have remained relatively constant, 
ranging from one-fifth in total assets to one-third in total deposits and loans 
(see Table 3.7.1). Meanwhile, the group’s share in non-traditional lines of 
business has grown. One example is the group’s non-life insurance 
activities, which have increased in importance ever since the merger with 
Pohjola to reach a market share of 25% in 2007. The group is also the lead 
                                                      
85 Additionally, general provisions on cooperative institutions are set out by the Cooperative 
Societies Act (1488/2001), covering rules on membership, limited liability of members, 
incorporation, internal governance structure, general management structure, reporting 
requirements, etc.  
86 Amidst this ever-closer integration, some of the local cooperative banks have chosen to 
remain outside the newly formed group. 
87 The members’ main task is electing the members of the supervisory board of the 220 local 
banks, with equal voting rights. The supervisory boards in turn select the executive board 
members and supervise the executive board, strategy and policy of the local banks. 98 | KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EUROPE 
 
provider of life insurance products through its fully owned subsidiary, OP 
Life Assurance Company plc, with a market share of 30%.88  
Figure 3.7.3 Organisational structure OP-Pohjola Group 
 
Source: OP-Pohjola, Annual Review, 2009. 
Table 3.7.1 Market shares of OP-Pohjola Group  
  Assets Loans  Deposits  Loans  to  enterprises 
1997  21.7% 30.8% 31.0%  25.5% 
2002  19.1% 31.4% 32.7%  26.4% 
2007  22.8% 31.1% 32.4%  25.7% 
Source: OP-Pohjola. 
Despite an increasingly broader product range and the inclusion of 
listed entities, the OP-Pohjola Group continues to focus on the needs of its 
clients, providing access to credit throughout the country. The group has 
maintained its lead in loans to farmers while housing loans comprise a 
major part of the credit portfolio. OP-Pohjola’s market share in lending to 
enterprises remains at a more modest 26% in 2007, which is below its 
overall market share in loans but nevertheless greater than its overall 
market share in terms of total assets.  
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As another indicator of access to banking services, it may be 
reasonable to examine the evolution of the branch network. As in other 
countries, increasing Internet usage has reduced the importance of an 
extensive physical network. In line with this change, the number of 
branches decreased from 745 to 630, while the number of online service 
contracts increased from 0.2 to 1.2 million contracts between 1997 and 2007. 
In 2008, the group enjoyed a leading position in its network coverage. 
Despite its second position in terms of total assets, the OP-Pohjola Group 
has the highest market share in terms of the number of branches (see Table 
3.7.2).  
Table 3.7.2 Finnish banking sector in 2008  
  Total assets  Employees  Branches 
  € million 
Market 
share 
Number 
Market 
share 
Number 
Market 
share 
Nordea Bank  219,961  62.1% 10,499 33.6%  345  21.5% 
OP-Pohjola Group   75,746 21.4% 12,752 40.8%  604  37.7% 
Sampo Bank  29,592  8.4% 3,060 9.8%  122  7.6% 
Aktia plc   9,540 2.7% 1,253 4.0%  76  4.7% 
Savings banks   6,713 1.9% 1,234 4.0%  212 13.2% 
Local cooperative banks   3,886  1.1% 729 2.3% 146 9.1% 
Other domestic banks  8,486 2.4% 1,701 5.4%  98  6.1% 
Total  353,924  100.0%  31,228  100.0% 1,603 100.0% 
Source: Federation of Finnish Financial Services (2009). 
Note: Foreign banks are not included in the figures.  
 
Ever since the crisis in the 1990s, the Finnish banking sector as a 
whole has maintained greater capital ratios than their peers elsewhere in 
Europe. In 2008 and 2009, the aggregated Tier 1 ratio of the OP-Pohjola 
Group remained constant at 12.6%, which was identical to the average ratio 
of the banking system in Finland in 2008 and remained slightly below the 
December 2009 figure of 13.2%.89  
                                                      
89 The jump for the system-wide figures for 2009 was largely attributable to the equity 
issuance by Nordea, which is by far the largest bank in the country. Pohjola Bank also 
contributed, albeit to a smaller extent, having engaged in an equity issuance worth €300 
million via a rights offering to its existing shareholders, including OP-Pohjola, in February 
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Since the onset of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007, the 
profits of the Finnish financial sector have declined.90 Nevertheless, the 
direct impact of the credit crunch on OP-Pohjola has also been relatively 
modest, whereas the worsening conditions on the economy and the 
financial markets were significant. The pre-tax earnings of the cooperative 
group dropped from historic highs in 2008 by 63%, to €372 million. This 
was mainly due to the poor investment performance in insurance activities 
with a loss of €417 million in 2007-08. Despite of this strong decline, the 
customer bonus – a form of fixed benefit distributed to all members91 – was 
raised by over 50% to €132 million. In 2009, profits went up to €464 million 
despite continuing losses in insurance and a significant decline in interest 
income on loans due to lower demand. These changes came along with an 
increasing expectation for future loan losses, which are likely to challenge 
profitability in 2010 and 2011.   
To conclude, the Finnish cooperative banking sector has undergone 
substantial change over the last century. Starting from a relatively 
dispersed structure, OP-Pohjola Group has integrated in successive steps 
over the second part of the century to become the second largest bank in 
the highly concentrated Finnish market. The model that exists today has 
emerged as a result of the reforms enacted in the aftermath of the 1990s 
crisis. Today, with its extensive mutual support and provision of 
centralised functions, the OP-Pohjola’s structure represents one of the most 
integrated models in Europe. Much like in other countries, the group has 
also widened the spectrum of its services and its structure. Despite these 
changes, the cooperative group has managed to retain its primary focus on 
housing loans as well as its leading position on agricultural loans, 
remaining devoted mostly to the domestic market and providing access to 
its clients through its extensive branch network. The group has also resisted 
the recent financial crisis relatively well. To sum up, cooperative banking is 
expected to continue to hold a dominant position in the banking sector in 
Finland.  
                                                      
90 Bank of Finland (2009), Financial Stability Report, Helsinki, December. 
91 The bonus is based on the number of transactions conducted by each member. In order to 
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3.8  Overall assessment  
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that cooperative banks in the 
seven European countries examined have followed different paths of 
development that range from capitalising on traditional forms of 
decentralisation to exploring new forms of hybridisation and   
centralisation. These new organisational forms have proved successful over 
time in some countries by allowing cooperative banks to overcome 
traditional weaknesses, to benefit from scale economies and to expand 
across the board. However, it is difficult to determine the optimal level of 
model deviation not to undermine the traditional value and overall 
coherence of the cooperative system.  
No single model can adequately capture all the common elements of 
cooperative banking in all these countries. Despite a shared historical 
background, cooperative banks evolved with differing predominance, 
natures and roles. Today, they display a great deal of variety among 
themselves and compared to other groups: a development that confirms 
the ‘common versus diverse’ nature of cooperative banks in Europe.  
The first distinction among the models studied is the access to capital. 
The cooperative models in some countries have moved from obtaining all 
their capital from their member-customers and retained earnings to the 
issuance of shares to non-members, i.e. Unione di Banche Italiane, which 
acts as a holding for several Banche Popolari, and Crédit Agricole. Other 
banks have formed groups where one or more non-cooperative entities 
within the group have access to external capital. Yet others have found 
innovative ways to issue hybrid equity-like products, such as subordinated 
debt issued by Rabobank Nederlands. This shift to external funding has 
obviously necessitated a provision to maintain members’ power.  
The second distinction is the level of integration in cooperative 
banking networks. Moving away from their fully decentralised historical 
roots, some of the European cooperative banks have developed prominent 
central institutions and formed network alliances over time. The level of 
integration ranges from centralisation of common replicable services 
provided, such as group representation, strategic advice, and basic support 
services, to more executive functions, such as risk and liquidity 
management, management of mutual support, supervision of local banks, 
and mergers and acquisitions. Using this classification, integrated systems 
are those that are found in Finland, France and the Netherlands. Austrian 
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centrals while the Italian and the Spanish cooperative banks appear as 
almost entirely decentralised. 
A third distinctive characteristic among the European cooperative 
banks is the gradual broadening of the scope of activities. Most of the 
institutions included in this study have some form of an investment 
banking arm. Examples include Crédit Agricole’s Calyon, Groupes Banque 
Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne’s (BPCE) Natixis, Raiffeisen Investment, 
etc. Some of the banks have also expanded their geographical coverage, 
most notably Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, Raiffeisen and Volksbanken. 
The product ranges have also grown, mostly in line with the banks’ overall 
development strategy. Several banks have taken up extensive activity on 
insurance markets, most notably the Finnish OP-Pohjola Group and the 
Dutch Rabobank.  
These differences operate alongside the key common features among 
the cooperative banks. All of the institutions included in the study continue 
to be owned by their member-customers, providing decision-making rights 
to their member-customers, such as the one member, one vote rule and 
bottom-up authority in key decisions, such as the election and dismissal of 
local directors. Where listed shares are issued, they come with no voting 
power. Another right emanating from ownership, the right to residual 
earnings, is also present in most cooperatives, although there are 
differences in form. Some institutions provide dividend payments to their 
members while others offer non-cash benefits. Although the group-level 
focus may be broader, the local cooperative banks operate within a given 
area, achieving a high degree of proximity with their customers, especially 
in isolated and remote areas. Some have achieved integration to facilitate 
external funding; however, all the cooperative banks included in the study 
continue to be primarily involved in deposit-taking and provision of credit 
to households and individual entrepreneurs, including small- and 
medium-sized entreprises (SMEs).  
The cooperative institutions’ primary reliance on deposit-taking for 
funding has meant that most cooperatives have maintained low leverage 
levels and have managed to remain relatively secure and stable in the first 
phase of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007-08. Furthermore, all the 
cooperative banks covered in the study are required to allocate a significant 
proportion of their profits as reserves. In some cases, these laws are 
supplemented by fiscal advantages. These policies have led to the growth 
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why the cooperative banks have been resilient to the worsening market 
conditions.   
For the way forward, what remains to be seen is how the European 
cooperative banks will respond to a changing environment. Their 
commitment to core banking, their ability to become more integrated while 
remaining member-owned, their ability to remain stable and their capacity 
to grow will certainly be the key determinants of success in the years to 
come.   
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4.  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND 
ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
he main objective of this chapter is to conduct an empirical 
investigation of the performance and role of cooperative banks in 
seven countries where they are active (Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain). The first part of the chapter 
discusses the main arguments for cooperative banks as a subset of STV and 
dual-bottom line institutions. The second part surveys the empirical 
literature on the performance of cooperative banks as well as their 
contributions to competition, regional growth and financial stability. Most 
studies have focused on a relatively narrow set of countries or issues, 
without taking a look at the broader picture. The lack of a comparative 
assessment of the conditions and roles of cooperative banks in Europe and 
institutional diversity – that is, the degree to which cooperative banks 
participate, together with commercial banks and savings banks – in a given 
financial system has motivated this chapter and the study as a whole. This 
is why the third part of this chapter reports the results of an empirical 
examination of the performance and roles of cooperative banks in the seven 
European countries mentioned above.  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.1 provides the main 
theoretical arguments for cooperative banks as a subset of STV banks. 
Section 4.2 offers a review of the empirical literature covering the 
performance of cooperative banks, the impact on competition, the links 
between small business lending and small banks (including cooperative 
banks), and the contribution of cooperative banks to the local and domestic 
economy and stability. Section 4.3 offers a description of the methodology 
used in a European-wide financial and econometric study of the 
performance of cooperative banks, their impact on competition, and their 
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role for regional economic growth and stability. Finally, the main results of 
the empirical analysis are reported in section 4.4. 
4.1  The main theoretical arguments for cooperative banks 
As was outlined in Ayadi et al. (2009), STV banks such as cooperative 
banks, savings banks and other STV institutions share the characteristic of 
being dual-bottom line institutions (DBLIs). This simply implies that they 
are not only profit oriented, but they also pursue other objectives (to serve 
their members and non-member clients in the case of cooperative banks, 
and the regional economy and society in the case of the savings banks).  
The balance between the different objectives of DBLIs changes over 
time and the relative weights of the two different objectives necessarily 
change in the course of time. Indeed, they need to change when conditions 
change. The stronger the competitive challenge, the more weight that needs 
to be attached to the financial objective that secures institutional survival as 
a precondition for providing socially relevant services. The competitive 
pressure may lead DBLIs to behave as aggressively as commercial banks 
and instead of focusing on their core business they may turn into more 
risky but potentially more profitable financial segments.  
4.1.1  Improving access to financial services 
DBLIs and in particular cooperative banks (because of their traditions, 
values and local roots) enable the provision of credit to lower income 
earning individuals and businesses with no or little collateral because they 
are able to reduce the transaction costs associated with screening borrowers 
as well as monitoring and enforcing repayments. In other words, these 
institutions effectively prevent opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
borrowers (Hansmann, 1996).  
Several models have been put forward on how cooperative banks can 
achieve this result. The common point in all the models is the close 
relationship between the cooperative and its customers as well as the 
members themselves. By maintaining proximity to their customers, 
cooperative banks are able to mitigate some of the information 
asymmetries, by substituting the screening role played by a bank’s lending 
officer with peer selection (Ghatak, 2000). However, the role of proximity 
was not limited to the customer-banker relationship. A cooperative’s 
members often came from the same locality, allowing them to exercise 
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banks themselves are often incapable of doing themselves. Several studies 
have highlighted the role of social sanctions within a tightly knit 
community, which may be a valuable substitute for the missing incentive of 
enforcement roles (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Besley and Coate, 1995).92  
The relationship between a bank and its borrowers is particularly 
vital for financing smaller firms, since for them close personal ties between 
bank officials and borrowers can facilitate the collecting and using of 
significantly more information than in the case of firms with a more 
distributed organisational structure.93 As banks grow and expand across 
borders, other objectives than satisfying the local borrower and other 
difficulties may emerge. A number of researchers have argued that larger 
banks are less capable of processing and transmitting the soft and relational 
information through their hierarchical structures.94 This would put local 
banks, such as cooperative banks, in a position to better respond to the 
needs of smaller local enterprises than larger and less regionally focused 
banks. Such a role provided by cooperatives with close ties in their 
communities is vital to grant adequate financing to small and medium 
sized enterprises.  
4.1.2  Fostering regional development  
Being DBLIs, cooperative banks play a special role in fostering 
local/regional economic development by mobilising savings (members’ 
deposits) and at the same time lending the funds they have mobilised in the 
                                                      
92 The three articles differ in the way that social sanctions may develop. According to Besley 
and Coate (1995), group lending leads to a durable and long-term relationship between 
lenders and borrowers. The longer duration implies that not paying back one’s debt is a 
reputational hazard, which is a potent sanction especially since all members stand to lose 
from non-payment by a single member. In turn, Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) focus on 
the informational advantages enjoyed by group members. Stiglitz’s (1990) model of peer 
monitoring assumes that neighbours have additional information that would not be 
available to the bank, which may lead them to raise social sanctions in the event of a non-
payment by another local member. Varian (1990) shows that when the repayment 
probabilities among agents are interrelated, the credit contract offered by the principle, i.e. 
the lender, should ‘internalise’ such linkages by making the credit to the entire group 
conditional on payments by each member of the group. 
93 For a survey of relational lending literature, see Boot (2000) and Elyasiani and Goldberg 
(2004). 
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region where they belong. In doing so, they help to prevent a ‘capital drain’ 
that may occur if savings are mobilised in one region in which economic 
activity is less developed and then transferred and lent in economically 
more active regions. This can induce migration, cement relative 
underdevelopment and even induce a downward spiral for the less 
developed region.95 Moreover, a sufficient supply of banking services helps 
to make cities and regions attractive for people who consider moving there 
or not moving away. Longer-term relationships between banks and local 
businesses tend to strengthen local businesses and even attract new 
businesses and create local employment. Moreover, local banks contribute 
to high and stable tax revenue, which also fosters the local economy, since 
they are less able and therefore also less likely than large internationally 
active banks to reduce their tax burden by shifting profits to countries with 
a favourable tax regime.96 
4.1.3  Mitigating intertemporal risk  
Whereas capital markets are particularly good at managing ‘intratemporal’ 
risk, they are less capable of dealing with intertemporal risk. In contrast, 
banks are in principle able to do just this by creating reserves in good times 
and reducing these reserves in bad times, provided that they wish to do so. 
Creating and unlocking reserves is a specific technique of risk 
management. Intertemporal risk is thereby ‘smoothed’, and utility 
increases. It is intuitive, and can be proven in a relatively simple economic 
model, that risk-averse people value this ‘storage’ option highly. This 
implies that having banks that can and want to create reserves in good 
times and unlock them in bad times would be socially valuable. However, 
it is important to understand that being able to mitigate intertemporal risk 
is not the same as having the incentive to do it and of wanting to do it. 
For example, cooperative banks are designated to perpetually 
accumulate capital owing to their institutional set-up. The reserves 
                                                      
95 A formal model showing that this ‘capital drain’ effect can occur and that savings banks 
can counter it is provided in a theoretical paper by Hakenes and Schnable (2006). The 
empirical support for the proposition advanced in the Hakenes and Schnable article is found 
in Hakenes et al. (2009). 
96 In an empirical study using a very broad data set, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) 
have confirmed that larger banks are more likely than small local banks to employ tax-
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accumulation can be used to mitigate intertemporal risk and to smooth the 
cycle.  
Unlocking reserves in an SHV bank can occur in two forms. One is 
the isolated or direct sale of the reserves if they have been created in the 
first place. The other possibility is the sale of the entire bank at a price that 
includes the value of the reserves. If the direct sale is made impossible by 
regulation, it may appear attractive to choose the second alternative.  
There is a conflict between what is optimal for the entire economy 
and what is optimal for the individual bank and its owners and managers. 
For the owners of an individual bank, disclosing and selling its reserves in 
good times is always more profitable than keeping them. Therefore, strictly 
profit-oriented bank owners or bank managers who act exclusively in the 
financial interest of a bank’s private owners would choose the more 
profitable option, that is, disclose and sell the reserves. And even if the 
managers would not want to act in this way, stock market pressure would 
force them to do it and thus expose the economy to higher intertemporal 
risk and cause severe social damage.  
The next step of the argument is straightforward. It would be socially 
valuable if bank managers and owners were not interested in disclosing 
and selling the reserves they may have built up or if it were not possible for 
them to act in this way. This is the case with savings banks, public banks 
and cooperative banks. They are not strictly profit-oriented, and because of 
their institutional and legal design they cannot be sold at their full value. 
Thus their managers can be expected to create reserves in good times and 
unlock them if there is a need to do so. Neither earnings pressure nor stock 
market pressure prevents them from doing something that amounts to the 
socially valuable function of intertemporal risk management.  
This argument has been developed by the economists Franklin Allen 
and Douglas Gale in a series of influential academic articles.97 It is an 
economically powerful and theoretically sophisticated argument for having 
and retaining banks that are not strictly profit-oriented and whose 
ownership position cannot be sold. These banks include public banks, 
banks owned by foundations that would not consider selling the banks – 
thus different forms of savings banks – as well as, to a certain extent, 
                                                      
97 See the original research paper Allen and Gale (1997) and, in a less formal version, Allen 
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cooperative banks. In a book that summarises their relevant research, Allen 
and Gale (2000) argue that macroeconomic shocks, i.e. manifestations of 
intertemporal risk, affect countries in whose financial sectors non-sellable 
and not strictly profit-oriented banks play an important role much less than 
other countries whose banking sectors are composed exclusively of private 
banks whose shares are listed and traded on a stock market. 
4.1.4  Capitalising on the value of diversity 
Competition is much more complicated than standard accounts of 
introductory economics textbooks, which only rely on established 
microeconomic theory, might suggest. According to a view that goes back 
to the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, competition is a process that 
is driven to a large extent by knowledge that exists and newly created and 
discovered knowledge, and by innovation. For competition to work, new 
ideas must be generated. But this is not enough. There must also be the 
possibility to transform these ideas into economic reality: invention must 
be translated into innovation.  
Financial systems develop over time; new instruments and new 
institutional forms are invented and used, and they may turn out to be 
more or less successful. As a matter of principle, it is impossible to predict 
what will be successful financial instruments and institutions in the future. 
A process of creative and dynamic competition must be based on openness. 
This argues for diversity. Diversity offers an optimal basis for new ideas to 
come to life or to disappear and also for old ideas to make their comeback.  
In the context of banking systems, openness and diversity imply that 
different institutional forms, different business models and objective 
functions should exist and be made sufficiently strong so that they have a 
fair chance of emerging successfully from the struggle in which different 
forms of organised banking activity compete with each other.98 The 
economic arguments that would suggest that one specific form of 
organising banking activity, namely that of the large private bank with 
many shareholders, is the best one, may on the face of it appear plausible, 
but they are by no means conclusive.99 So far we do not know enough 
                                                      
98 This argument was confirmed in Llewellyn (2009) for the case of building societies in the 
UK.  
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about the merits and the potential of different forms of enterprise, 
especially in banking and other financial sectors, to be able to assign a clear 
priority to one specific model and to obstruct the development of others.  
As Carbó Valverde and Mendez (2006) argue, diversity is all the more 
important in Europe, which is an economic and political region that thrives 
on the benefits of having a long tradition of diversity and that even aspires 
to make better use of this tradition. Diversity has economic benefits for 
Europe as a whole and the countries within the region, and it has its own 
cultural value that is worth preserving, since diversity fosters creativity in 
many respects.100 It is a characteristic element of this European tradition 
that there are many institutional forms in which economic activity is 
performed that are, in terms of their design and functions, located 
somewhere between the state and its centralised power structure and fully 
decentralised and purely private enterprise. There may be substantial 
benefits to having these hybrid forms. Just like savings banks, cooperative 
banks are a part of this tradition of diversity and openness. Neither the 
request of central governments to expand their powers nor an overly 
simplistic model of a market economy should be used to undermine this 
tradition.  
4.2  Review of the empirical literature 
4.2.1  Performance of cooperative banks 
Based on their governance structure, cooperative banks by definition have 
fewer incentives to maximise their profits than privately owned banks. In 
theory, this may translate into lower operational efficiency. However, the 
evidence for such an argument is mixed, as it remains dependent on the 
sample period and the region under study.  
In the US, Cebenoyan et al. (1993) find that the savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls) are as efficient as others, where efficiency is measured 
by a bank’s distance from the best practice cost frontier.101 Using a larger 
                                                      
100 This is one of the reasons why diversity is explicitly protected by the EU Treaty. The 
relevant legal norm in the context discussed here is Art. 295 of the EU Treaty. It states that 
EU integration policy must by no means undermine the norms, legal as well as economic, by 
which ownership is governed in the different member states. 
101 Cebenoyan et al. (1993) use a sample consisting of 559 S&Ls in the Atlanta Federal Home 
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data set, Mester (1993) finds that privately owned S&Ls are slightly more 
cost-efficient.102 When using observations from two US savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls), Esty (1997) concludes that cooperative banks were on 
the contrary less cost-efficient than privately owned banks.103  
In Europe, Valnek (1999) finds that the UK mutual building societies 
are more profitable than their commercial peers, where profitability is 
measured by return on assets.104 The author tried to explain these results by 
the absence of conflicts of interests between a bank’s debtors, i.e. 
depositors, and its owners. By aligning the interests of these two parties, 
cooperative banks effectively avoid the agency costs otherwise incurred by 
privately owned banks.  
In Europe other studies tend to confirm previous evidence. Using a 
large data set of German banks for the years between 1989 and 1996, 
Altunbaş et al. (2001) find that cooperative and public banks have slight 
cost and profit advantages over privately owned banks. The authors 
suggest that the results can be explained by the ability of these banks to 
obtain funds with lower costs, which emanates from their reliance on “less 
interest rate sensitive” retail and small business customers (p. 947). 
Similarly, Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) use a number of measures to 
compare the performances and risk characteristics of banks in 15 European 
countries from 1999 to 2004.105 According to the study’s findings, 
cooperative banks have slight cost efficiency advantages when compared to 
other banks, even though they are worse than commercial banks in profit-
making. The authors’ results also suggest that one potential reason for the 
relatively better cost-efficiency of cooperative banks’ may be their superior 
loan quality, which is a consequence of their low risk activities. More recent 
                                                      
102 Mester (1993) compares empirically the 1991 performances of 1,015 S&Ls (807 mutuals 
and 208 joint-stock corporations) by using the stochastic frontier and parametrical cost 
function models.  
103 Esty (1997) analyses the investment and funding strategies of two S&Ls in Louisiana from 
1982 to 1988. Initially similar, the ownership of the two institutions gradually diverged as 
one of the banks became privately owned while the other remained a mutual.  
104 The sample used by Valnek (1999) is relatively small, consisting of seven retail banks, 17 
major UK building societies and 11 UK retail banks for the years 1983-93.  
105 Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) use a sample of 181 large European banks with more 
than €10 billion of assets. The authors use return on assets, the ratio of costs to assets, and 
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evidence in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain, based on a 
number of measures of performance by Ayadi et al (2009), confirm that 
savings banks were at least as efficient as their commercial peers between 
1996 and 2006.  
4.2.2  Impact on competition 
Cooperative banks operate in the same competitive environment as 
commercial banks, at least within the EU. Although these banks operate 
under an identical legal and regulatory framework, the cooperative banks  
are to a large extent based locally. This invites the question of whether 
these relational and geographic advantages may translate into market 
power. The relationship banking practices of locally based banks may also 
create rents for local banks. Sharpe (1990) argues that the inside 
information gives the bank a certain degree of monopoly power in repeated 
transactions between a bank and its local customers, which may transform 
into gains for the bank by charging a non-competitive interest rate.  
In Europe, evidence is mixed. In Germany, Hempell (2002) examines 
the competitive behaviour of a large sample of banks for the years 1993 to 
1998 by applying the empirical methodology developed by Panzar and 
Rosse (1987).106 The author finds that privately owned banks (excluding 
large banks) seem to operate more competitively than cooperative and 
savings banks (with the exception of their head institutions). In explaining 
this result, Hempell (2002) argues that the regional demarcations of 
cooperative and savings banks might reduce competitive pressures in 
return for increased market power.  
Guiterrez (2008) conducts a similar study on Italian banking, covering 
the years 2000 to 2006. Much in line with Hempell’s (2002) study, the 
author finds that the Italian cooperative and (former) savings banks enjoy a 
                                                      
106 Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed models for oligopolistic, competitive and 
monopolistically competitive markets. Their approach uses the H-statistic (elasticity of total 
revenues with respect to changes in input prices) to express the competitiveness of the 
market. A competitive firm, i.e. a price-taker, would be less able to adjust its prices in 
response to changes in its input prices, unless, of course, the inputs are also used by other 
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greater degree of power than their commercial peers.107 In explaining this 
result, the author draws attention to the absence of some of the key factors 
often associated with a high market power.108  
More recent evidence by Ayadi et al (2009) in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy and Spain during 1996 and 2006 and based on the Lerner 
Index shows that differences in competition between commercial and 
savings banks are not significant, except in the case of Italy, where savings 
banks enjoy statistically significant higher market power. The authors also 
found that branch openings and branch density reduces market power for 
savings banks Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain.  
Other studies lead to less conclusive results.109 Fernandez de Guevara 
et al. (2005) analyse the impact of bank size on market power using data 
from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom for the years 
1992 to 1999. The results show that when other explanatory variables are 
controlled for, larger banks enjoy significantly greater market power than 
their smaller peers. The authors interpret these results as originating either 
from cost advantages or to the capacity of large banks to impose higher 
prices. Using a much larger data set of over 100 countries and covering the 
years 1990 to 2005, Bikker et al. (2006) confirm that there is a strong positive 
relationship between bank size and market power. Since most cooperative 
banks tend to be smaller than their commercial peers, these results put into 
question the validity of a broad statement that cooperative banks may be 
less competitive.   
Despite the potential hazards that lower competition may pose, 
Mayer (1988), Rajan (1992), and Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue and 
provide evidence that a highly competitive banking sector may also 
                                                      
107 This result was confirmed in Ayadi et al (2009) for the Italian savings banks, whereas 
differences between commercial and savings banks are not significant in Austria, Germany 
and Spain.  
108 As noted in the European Commission’s (2007) Retail Banking Inquiry, the factors that 
may grant European cooperative banks greater market power include: (i) barriers to entry 
due to inability to engage in hostile take-overs; (ii) undue advantages and tolerance granted 
by authorities; and (iii) practices that restrict competition through certain cooperation 
practices (i.e. price fixing, market sharing) among banks that share the same network.  
109 It is important to note that the measures developed to measure market power, i.e. Lerner 
and Panzar-Rosse indices, are heavily dependent on the underlying assumptions, i.e. that 
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counteract the likelihood of developing relationships with clients and may 
prohibit the flow of funds to smaller firms that are in their earlier growth 
stages. The next section provides evidence that cooperative banks fulfil 
such a role by providing funds where other banks operating in more 
competitive markets would shy away from.  
4.2.3  Small business lending and bank characteristics 
To examine the small business lending practices of different types of banks 
in the US, Keeton (1995) uses cross-sectional data for 1994 from seven US 
states. The author finds that banks with a higher degree of interstate 
presence lend significantly less to small businesses than their peers. The 
same result is also obtained for banks that are held by out-of-state banks. 
These results confirm that small business lending has a local element.  
Berger and Udell (1995) confirmed these results by using a larger 
sample of banks, finding that larger banks are less inclined to finance small 
businesses. Moreover, the large banks appear to distinguish between 
transparent and opaque borrowers, as evidenced by the less restrictive loan 
terms offered to the pool of borrowers that do receive financing. 
In Europe, using survey data on the financing patterns of a large 
number of German small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Harhoff 
and Körting (1998) empirically confirm the anecdotal evidence that many 
German businesses maintain lending relationships with a single bank.110 
More important, loans in cities are more expensive and require more 
collateral than those in rural communities. The authors interpret these 
findings as supporting the idea that a competitive market may be 
incompatible with strong relational ties, as was first mentioned by Mayer 
(1988).  
Another issue that arises in the context of SME lending is whether 
small businesses receive fewer loans from foreign banks based at a 
considerable distance from the borrower’s location. Such a hypothesis 
seems plausible, given the arguments outlined above. Foreign banks are 
often very large organisations. The decision-makers in these banks often 
speak a different language and are subject to different regulations than 
those applicable in the local environment surrounding the small business 
clients. This is a particularly important issue amidst the current wave of 
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cross-border consolidations. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) investigate it 
using Argentinean cross-sectional data from the end of 1998. The data have 
been provided by the central bank’s credit registry, and they include 
detailed information on loan characteristics. The authors find that the 
foreign-owned banks lend less to small businesses, particularly if the 
banks’ headquarters is located in a far away country and the businesses are 
opaque.  
4.2.4  Contribution to the local and domestic economy 
The local positions and the ownership structures of cooperative banks may 
also allow them to provide loans to customers that would be excluded by 
the larger commercial institutions. A number of studies attempt to uncover 
whether these banks contribute positively to the economic growth of SME 
businesses that would otherwise have no access to funds. 
Cosci and Mattesini (1997) find a positive relation between local 
growth and the number of cooperative banks operating in various parts of 
Italy. Similarly, Cannari and Signorini (1997) note that cooperative banks 
not only engage in credit rationing less but also have less risky portfolios. 
Usai and Vannini (2005) examine the consequences of the historical 
presence of local cooperative banks on long-term local growth, using 
regional data from 1970 to 1993. The authors find that the size of the total 
financial sector has little impact on economic growth. In turn, they find that 
cooperative banks and special credit institutions contribute more too 
financial development and thereby to regional growth. The authors argue 
that the relatively smaller and less complex cooperative banks are more 
suitable for providing funds for locally based SME businesses, rather than 
the large hierarchical privately owned banks.  
The literature has identified a number of channels through which the 
availability of local banks has contributed to regional growth. Hakenes and 
Schnabel (2006) argue that by investing in their local economies, these 
banks effectively prevent a ‘capital drain’ to other regions. Most important, 
the authors show that to become credible alternatives to private banks in 
local markets, the regional banks should either be subsidised by tax-
financed public guarantees, as in the case of savings banks, or operate as 
cooperative banks, engaging exclusively with their members. More 
recently, Hakenes, Schmidt and Xie (2009) use regional economic data for 
Germany to show that the presence of savings and cooperative banks has a 
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that this effect is significantly stronger in poorer regions. These results are 
confirmed in Ayadi et al (2009) for Austria, Germany and Spain, where 
savings banks are omnipresent.  
4.2.5  Earnings stability of cooperative banks 
The evidence suggests that cooperative banks tend to be more stable than 
commercial banks with lower volatility of returns (Groeneveld and de 
Vries, 2009). This is probably associated with three factors. First, they are 
able to use customer surplus as a cushion. Second, they tend to be less 
dependent on the more volatile whole-funding markets. Third, as argued 
elsewhere in the volume, they have less incentive and inclination to take 
excessive risk (Hansmann, 1996, and Chaddad and Cook, 2004). Fourth, 
they tend to operate in less risky retail banking markets (Groeneveld and 
de Vries, 2009). Furthermore, as many cooperative banks are part of 
substantial networks there is an element of mutual support. An additional 
factor is that cooperative banks tend to be more highly capitalised than 
their SHV counterparts (evidence in previous chapter). Groeneveld and de 
Vries (2009) also note that the empirical evidence suggests that the largest 
losses in cooperative banks tend to occur when they stray beyond the 
traditional scope of their business. 
The lower riskiness of the assets of cooperative banks was confirmed 
by the early results of O’Hara (1981) and Esty (1997). Fraser and Zardkoohi 
(1996) supplemented these findings by showing that cooperative banks 
have in general a lower insolvency risk.111 Using data of individual savings 
and loan associations (S&Ls) for the period of 1976 to 1986, the authors 
conclude that privately owned S&Ls appear to take substantially more risk 
than mutual institutions.  
                                                      
111 Fraser and Zardkoohi (1996) use nine different indicators as percentage of total assets to 
calculate the risk of a specific S&L. The indicators focus on different types of risks, including 
investment risks (service corporation investment, real estate investments, single family real 
estate loans and repossessed real estate), liquidity risks (cash plus marketable securities); 
accounting integrity (amount of goodwill); financial risks (leverage by equity and fixed 
assets) and profitability (net income). The econometrical model is based on Gorton and 
Rosen (1995) and Knopf and Teall (1994) and includes dummies for different ownership 
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Cihák and Hesse (2007) confirm that cooperatives have a more stable 
stream of earnings.112 The authors explain that this relative stability could 
be attributed to the inherently low profitability in good times and the use of 
consumer surplus as a buffer in hard times to keep proceeds relatively 
fixed over time. Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) highlight that the better 
loan quality and lower asset risk of cooperative banks is a source of 
stability.113 Iannotta et al. (2007) also use two methods to measure stability. 
The first measure compares the asset quality of banks by loan losses. As a 
second measure, they use the z-score, used also by Cihák and Hesse (2007), 
which measures a corporation’s capacity to absorb deviations in income.  
More recently, Beck et al. (2009) examine the stability of German 
banks under different ownership structures. The authors’ results confirm 
that savings banks and cooperative banks have higher z-scores than 
commercial banks, almost entirely due to the lower volatility of their profits 
over years.114 Two additional measures of stability, comprised of the ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans and the likelihood of distress,115 are 
also reported. Cooperative banks score better than their peers in terms of 
these two indicators, having a smaller share of loans as non-performing 
and facing a significantly lower likelihood of distress. Perhaps more 
intriguingly, while the authors confirm that larger commercial banks are 
less stable,116 possibly due to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem, the opposite 
holds for others. Indeed, larger savings and cooperative banks are found to 
be more stable, possibly due to their increased ability to smooth their profit 
streams, giving them an additional boost in terms of stability.  
                                                      
112 Cihák and Hesse (2007) used the z-score to measure the financial soundness for 29 OECD 
countries. The z-score uses the (volatility of) returns and the amount of reserves to indicate 
the change of running out of reserves. They used Bankscope to investigate their data set of 
16,577 banks for the period from 1994 to 2004.   
113 The lower asset risk for cooperative banks was earlier found by O’Hara (1981) and Esty 
(1997). 
114 Confirming the results of Ayadi et al (2009) for German and Austrian savings banks and 
for large spanish savings banks.  
115 The distress measure indicates “whether a bank has i) faced compulsory notifications 
about events that may jeopardise the existence of the bank as a going concern, ii) suffered 
severe losses of capital and extreme declines in return on equity, iii) benefited from capital 
injections from the deposit insurance scheme, iv) been subject to a distress merger, or v) 
been closed by the bank supervisory agency” (Beck et al., 2006, p. 13).  
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All in all, the results of the empirical research show that cooperative 
banks tend to operate more or less as efficiently as commercial banks. 
However, there are some notable exceptions to this result. For example, one 
common finding in the literature is that cooperative banks are more cost-
efficient but less profitable. The evidence is mixed on whether low profits 
are due to operational inefficiencies, a lack of capital market discipline or 
simply an unwillingness to enhance current profits by giving up customer 
value. The findings are mostly in line with the ownership structure of these 
banks, in that their purpose is not to maximise profits but rather to 
maximise their members’ surplus, which confirms their dual-bottom line 
nature. 
The reviewed literature also confirms that cooperative banks have 
less risky assets in their balance sheets. This could be a result of the 
informational advantages that these banks have concerning their clients or 
a more risk-averse approach to banking in general. There is also evidence 
that these risk attributes translate into more stable earnings streams for 
cooperative banks. There is some reason for concern that the informational 
advantages may lead to less competitive pricing. Focusing instead on 
distributional issues, a number of studies point out that cooperative banks 
are more willing to establish a long-term relationship with their clients, 
especially with SMEs, making them an integral player in enhancing 
regional growth.     
The next section delves deeper into the comparative analysis of 
performance, competition, contribution to growth, and earnings stability in 
the seven countries included in this study for the years 1996 to 2008.  
4.3  Investigating economic performance and role of cooperative 
banks  
The objective of the empirical investigation presented in this section is to 
examine profitability, efficiency, competition, earnings stability and the role 
in regional growth of cooperative banks in Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands from 2000 to 2008 and for two 
subperiods, 2000-2003 and 2004-2008 
The empirical analysis relies on two data sources. The primary source 
is the Bankscope database, provided by Bureau van Dijk. Preference is 
given to consolidated information on the balance sheets and income 
statements of commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. 
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large fraction of observations are unconsolidated. To facilitate comparison, 
benchmark figures for EU-15 countries are also provided whenever 
applicable.  
The database used for this study also includes the unconsolidated 
balance sheet and income statement information of local cooperative banks 
provided by the individual banks of seven countries covered in the study. 
The data was made available for the purpose of this study by the 
cooperative associations in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain. In addition to key balance sheet and income 
statement items, this secondary database also contained supplementary 
structural information, such as the territorial distribution of cooperative 
banks in these countries, their delivery channels (branches, ATMs) and 
number of employees.  
The distribution of the sample information across countries and 
between cooperative and commercial banks is given in Table 4.3.1. The 
empirical analysis also benefits from additional country-level indicators 
obtained from the European Commission’s Eurostat database.  
Table 4.3.1 Number of observations by type of bank  
  Commercial 
banks 
Cooperative 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Total 
Austria  423 650 515  1,588 
Finland  23 1,600  0  1,623 
France  1,227 671  254  2,152 
Germany  726 10,771  3,934  15,431 
Italy  1,093 3,749  516  5,353 
Netherlands  266 1,310  5  1,581 
Spain  642 790 813  2,245 
Total (7 countries)  4,400 19,541 6,037  29,978 
Total (EU-15)  7,657 19,656 7,058  34,371 
 
 
Several limitations of the final data set have to be mentioned at this 
point. First, instead of having one observation for each licensed institution, 
our data set contained a small number of cases where the data from several 
institutions were aggregated as a regional or provincial entity. This 
rendered the matching between regional economic variables with local 
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in spatial coverage was adapted according to the data set.117 Second, the 
data set provided a rather narrow view of the operations of cooperative 
banks. For example, a breakdown of different income and expenses 
elements as well as data on fixed assets was not available for the Dutch and 
Finnish cases. This introduced problems in the measurement and 
estimation of costs and reduced the power of the statistical tests due to 
increased variability. Third, the cooperative bank data set contained a 
number of missing observations and breaks in series. Some of this was a 
natural extension of our treatment of within-group mergers, i.e. pre- and 
postmerger entities are treated as separate banks. In other cases, the data 
was simply not reported by the local institution, which occurred 
predominantly for the Italian BPs. These introduced additional variability.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical analysis follows four 
steps:  
First, the primary database is used to compute bank performance 
using accounting ratios for the seven countries and for the EU-15 as a 
whole, when possible.  
Second, the competition indicator is computed and used to undertake 
an examination of the determinants of competition controlling for a 
number of explanatory variables including bank size, market capitalisation, 
entry, contestability and institutional diversity. Separate estimations are 
made to allow a comparison between cooperative banks, savings banks and 
commercial banks.  
Third, the determinants of regional growth in Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands are examined, paying 
close attention to the role of cooperative banks.  
Fourth, z-scores are computed and used to undertake an examination 
of the earnings stability of cooperatives, savings and commercial banks.  
The following subsections provide details on the estimation 
methodology. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in the 
following section.  
                                                      
117 In countries where the bank data were completely disaggregated, i.e. Finland, Italy, 
Netherlands and Germany, the regional data with the highest spatial detail (corresponding 
to Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics Level-3, or NUTS 3) was used. In other 
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4.3.1  Measuring bank financial and economic performance 
A number of accounting ratios are used to measure the economic and 
financial performance of banks. Two commonly used profitability 
measures, return on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE), are calculated 
by dividing the pre-tax profits of each bank by total assets and equity, 
respectively. As a measure of the economic efficiency of a bank, the cost-to-
income ratio is used, which is calculated by dividing the total operating 
costs by total operating income.118  
4.3.2  Measuring competition and market power 
To assess competition, the Lerner Index is used to measure the market 
power of banks by identifying the extent to which actual prices charged in 
a market diverge from those that could be expected if perfect competition 
obtained. The indicator is calculated by taking the difference between price 
and marginal costs119 and then dividing it by price. Under standard 
assumptions, prices converge to marginal costs, as competition in a market 
increases, implying that the index would converge to zero. Therefore, the 
greater the index is, the greater is a given bank’s market power.  
The index is a good indicator of the competitive conditions in a 
market. The following equation, obtained as a solution for symmetric 
oligopolistic competition, highlights this relationship: 
p
mc p
LERN
−
≡  (4) 
where p is the price of a bank’s earning assets (measured by total operating 
income/total assets) and mc is the marginal cost, Ed is the absolute value of 
the price elasticity of demand and N is the number of competitors in the 
territory where the bank operates. According to equation (4), firms can 
enjoy greater market power when the elasticity of demand is low, i.e. when 
the bank’s services are a necessity for consumers, or when the number of 
competitors is low. In either case, a bank can get away with charging a non-
competitive price, that is, one that significantly exceeds the marginal costs 
for a given financial service.  
                                                      
118 Due to data availability, cost-to-income ratio is calculated as the ratio of operating 
expenses to operating income, making the scores incomparable to some published figures. 
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4.3.3  Determinants of competition  
The objective for the second empirical step is to identify the determinants 
of competition, paying close attention to differences between cooperative, 
savings and commercial banks. The relationship to be estimated is as 
follows: 
it i it it X LERN ε μ θ + + = '  (5) 
where X is a vector of explanatory factors, μ accounts for bank-level 
fixed effects and θ is the vector of coefficients to be estimated.  
For each country, two separate estimations are undertaken, one for 
‘all banks’ (commercial, cooperative and savings banks) and one only for 
cooperative banks, in order to highlight statistical differences in the 
competitive behaviour of cooperative banks. Equation (5) is fitted using 
panel estimation with fixed-effects routine. 
The explanatory variables (X)  included in the estimation are 
identified as follows:  
a.  Concentration, size, efficiency and capitalisation: The first set of 
explanatory variables includes a measure of market concentration, 
bank size (logarithm of total assets), cost-efficiency (i.e. the cost-to-
income ratio), and market capitalisation (ratio of the bank’s total 
capital and reserves to total liabilities). Concentration is measured by 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for bank deposits, which is 
the sum of the squared market share of the firms in a given market.120  
b.  Contestability and barriers to entry: Contestability captures the 
extent to which competition may increase with the entry of new 
competitors to the market. The set of variables includes a measure of 
branch opening (growth in number of bank branches), an indicator of 
the distribution of branches (ratio of inhabitants to number of 
branches) and an industry-wide variable to account for foreign entry 
(ratio of foreign competitors to total banks in country).  
c.  Other control variables: Differences in bank ownership are 
controlled by including a dummy variable that takes the value 0 for 
commercial banks and 1 for cooperative banks. Lastly, the magnitude 
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of retail banking in each country is controlled by including the 
logarithm of total deposits in the market. 
4.3.4  Cooperative banks and regional growth 
The third empirical step assesses the impact of institutional diversity on 
economic growth. Two general assumptions are made for this purpose. 
First, the analysis is conducted on a regional basis to accurately capture the 
contribution of local institutions. The locations are based on the 
administrative regional distribution of cooperative banks in the seven 
countries included in the study. Second, institutional diversity is measured 
by the cooperative banks’ regional presence, the total assets of cooperative 
banks divided by regional GDP. It is assumed that this measure adequately 
incorporates the relative importance of the cooperative model in a given 
region.  
The data on bank-level indicators are obtained from the respective 
cooperative banks database while the regional GDP is obtained from 
Eurostat. The procedure is a simplified version of dynamic panel model 
followed in Carbó Valverde et al. (2003), first introduced by Holtz-Eakin et 
al. (1988) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The dynamic panel procedure is 
employed since the lagged GDP values may partially explain the 
subsequent behaviour of some of the variables over time (Sala-i-Martin, 
2002).  
The main aim of the empirical tests is to examine the sign and 
direction of causality between the presence of cooperative banks and 
regional growth. As noted in Carbó Valverde et al. (2003), the direction of 
causality may be disentangled by running two models, where each variable 
is used as an endogenous and explanatory variable. 
We consider the following simple autoregressive model: 
t i i t i t i t i x y y , 1 , 1 , , ε η β α + + + = − −  (6) 
where y, the endogenous variable, is explained by its lagged value and the 
lagged explanatory variable, x, and unobserved region-specific effects, 
ηi .121 The subscripts i and t represent region and time period, respectively. 
                                                      
121 Longer autoregressive terms were not included since the GDP growth data only covers 
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The (time-invariant) region-specific effects (ηi ) can be eliminated by taking 
first-differences so that: 
) ( ) ( ) ( 1 , , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 , , − − − − − − − + − + − = − t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i x x y y y y ε ε β α    (7) 
Two panel regressions are run, one in which the endogenous and 
exogenous variables comprise GDP growth and cooperative bank presence, 
respectively, and another in which the opposite holds. The direction and 
the sign of causality between these two parameters are then assessed by 
examining the signs and significance of the coefficient estimates for β.  
4.3.5  Measuring cooperative banks’ earnings stability 
The fourth step of our empirical investigation is to analyse the stability of 
cooperative banks versus commercial banks. Following Cihák and Hesse 
(2007), z-scores are used as a measure of individual bank risk. They are 
computed for Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Spain in order to highlight the impact of different ownership structures 
in a consistent manner where differences between cooperative banks, 
savings banks and commercial banks exist in this respect.  
The index (Z) is calculated for each bank-year observation according 
to the following equation: 
RoA
i
RoA
i it it
it
A E
Z
σ
μ +
=
) / (
 (8) 
where E/A is the equity capital as a share of assets and μRoA and σRoA are the 
mean and standard deviation of pre-tax return on assets (RoA), 
respectively. The index measures a corporation’s capacity to absorb 
deviations in income. More specifically, the z-score shows how many 
standard deviations from the mean income have to fall to make the 
corporation insolvent by depleting its equity. The greater the value, the 
lower is the probability of default.  
4.3.6  Determinants of cooperative banks’ earnings stability 
A number of exogenous variables are used to examine the determinants of 
bank risk. First, a dummy variable is used to identify the earnings stability 
of cooperative banks. Bank size is measured by total assets. Large banks 
benefit from diversification opportunities, which may allow them to better 
absorb shocks. Conversely, large banks could also be more risk-prone due INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 125 
 
to the implicit deposit insurance guarantees they enjoy. In order to 
distinguish between the stability of banks with different ownership 
structures and different sizes, an interaction variable for the size of 
cooperative banks is also included. 
Other explanatory variables are also incorporated to control for bank-
specific factors and market conditions. The cost-to-income ratio is included 
to account for differences in efficiency between banks. A dummy variable 
for listed institutions is included in order to control for governance issues 
relating to commercial banks. In general, better governed and more 
efficient banks should be able to absorb shocks better, implying a higher z-
score. However, it is also possible that these effects will be less important 
once other individual characteristics are accounted for.  
Market concentration, which also serves as an indicator of sector-
wide competition, will be measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). There are different and partially compensating effects that 
concentration can have on the risks taken by a bank.122  
Lastly, in order to control the impact of external imbalances and the 
ease with which capital can flow in and out of the country, an indicator 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2008) on financial openness will also be 
included in the estimation exercise. It is expected that more open markets 
will also be more volatile and open to external shocks due to the speed with 
which capital flows can enter and leave the country. Although this variable 
is not directly related to diversity in banking, it is nevertheless included to 
control for the differing levels of current and financial account imbalances. 
The equation to be estimated is given as follows: 
 
it it i i it it it u X C C A A Z + + + × + + = ' ) (ln ln 3 2 1 θ β β β α  (9) 
 
 
                                                      
122 The current literature provides little guidance on the net impact of concentration on a 
bank’s earning stability. The ‘trade-off’ view, recently advocated by Allen and Gale (2004) 
and empirically supported by Beck et al. (2006), claims that despite the efficiency gains, less 
concentrated and more competitive markets exacerbate agency problems and thereby lead 
to instability. Boyd and de Nicolo (2005), however, counter this argument by noting that the 
supra-normal loan rates that banks charge when concentration is low may lead to higher 
bankruptcy risks for borrowers, which may translate into a source of instability for the bank.  126 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
where the following parameters are used: 
i  = bank  index; 
t  = year; 
Z  =  z-score as described in equation (9) 
ln A  =  natural logarithm of total assets; 
C  =  dummy indicator for cooperative banks; 
ln A × C  =  interactive variable on size of cooperative banks; 
X  =  other explanatory variables, including cost-to-income ratio, listed 
institutions dummy variable, HHI, and financial openness index. 
 
In order to ensure that the results are robust to procedural choice, 
each estimation stage is composed of a pooled OLS regression and a fixed-
effect panel regression, which accounts for unspecified individual effects.  
4.4  Main results 
4.4.1  Profitability, efficiency, competition and earnings stability 
This section reports the comparison of profitability, efficiency, market 
power and earnings stability for commercial, savings and cooperative 
banks in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain during the period between 2000 and 2008. All comparisons are based 
on unweighted averages and the difference-in-means tests to highlight 
statistically significant divergences between cooperative banks and other 
banks.  
Regarding profitability measures, Table 4.4.1 and Figure 4.4.1 depict 
the evolution of the return on assets (RoA). The findings point to mixed 
results. Comparing cooperative banks with other banks, the results show 
that statistical differences exist for all countries except France and Italy. In 
particular, cooperatives exhibit comparable or slightly superior earnings 
than commercial banks in Germany, Italy and Spain. In Finland, 
cooperatives enjoy a larger profitability margin than their commercial 
peers, although the figures point to a closing gap over the years. When the 
performance of cooperative banks is compared to that of savings banks, the 
differences are more moderate, with the exception of France, where savings 
banks are significantly less profitable.  
The results for return on equity (RoE) in Table 4.4.2 and Figure 4.4.2 
validate most of these findings. German cooperatives continue to 
outperform their peers (both commercial and savings banks) while French 
cooperatives are statistically indistinguishable from other banks while INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 127 
 
remaining clearly more profitable than the savings banks. The results 
change significantly for Finland, where cooperatives are indistinguishable 
from other banks, and for Spain, where commercial and savings banks 
become more profitable.  
In terms of cost efficiencies, the results remain evenly divided. In 
terms of cost-to-income ratios123 (Table 4.4.3 and Figure 4.4.3), the 
commercial and savings banks are slightly more efficient than cooperative 
banks in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands while the opposite holds 
for France, Italy, Finland and Spain.  
Turning to market power, Table 4.4.4 summarises the Lerner Index 
estimates. The average Lerner Index for the EU-15 is 26.5%. Statistical 
mean-difference tests show that cooperative banks exhibit less market 
power in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands while the opposite holds 
in France, Italy, Finland (albeit at a lesser degree) and Spain. 
It should be highlighted that the use of the Lerner Index to determine 
market power could suffer from a type-I error – i.e. erroneous rejection of 
no market power – when there are consistent differences in cost efficiencies 
of different banks. After all, a high mark-up could simply be a reflection of 
low marginal costs, completely independent of a bank’s ability to charge 
high prices, which is what the index intends to measure. Indeed, a quick 
look at Table 4.4.3 and Table 4.4.4 reveals that countries in which 
cooperative banks are more cost-efficient (Finland, Italy and Spain) are also 
where these banks have greater market power. For this reason, the results 
obtained in this section have to be interpreted with care, taking account of 
the possibility of an erroneous judgement. The estimation procedure that 
will follow in Section 4.4.2 will include the cost-to-income variable to 
control for the impact of cost efficiency.  
In terms of earnings stability, Table 4.4.5 and Figure 4.4.5 show the 
key results. In all countries other than Germany and Spain, cooperatives are 
significantly more stable than other banks. In some cases the differences are 
astounding, i.e. France and the Netherlands, where these banks enjoy over 
50% greater stability as measured by the z-score. Moreover, in Germany, 
cooperatives score better than the country’s commercial banks (but not the 
                                                      
123 It should be highlighted that cost-to-income scores are calculated on the basis of 
operating income and expenditures due to data availability. For this reason, the figures 
might not be readily comparable with published results.  128 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
savings banks) while for Spain no difference exists between the two types 
of banks.  
To sum up, the results above highlight that despite slightly lower 
profitability, the cooperative bank model is not consistently different than 
other banks in terms of efficiency and market power. In turn, these banks 
enjoy a stable cushion of earnings, reducing their likelihood of insolvency 
and contributing to their stability. These results stand in marked contrast to 
the notion that cooperative institutions are, without exception, less efficient 
while enjoying greater market power. In addition to providing cases where 
cooperative banks are comparable (if not better) than their peers, our 
findings also highlight the role of diversity in contributing to broader 
financial stability.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 129 
 
Table 4.4.1 Return on assets (RoA) in percentage points, unweighted averages 
AUSTRIA FRANCE  GERMANY  ITALY  FINLAND  NETHERLANDS  SPAIN   
EU15 
(All) 
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2000-2003  0.79  0.96  0.59 0.62  1.10 0.97 0.48  0.41  0.51 0.44  0.82  1.02  1.11  1.19  2.18 n/a 0.93  0.44  0.99  0.92 1.02 1.05 
2004-2008  0.76  0.99  0.51 0.57  1.17 1.01 0.67  0.44  0.50 0.38  0.93  0.86  1.22  1.06  1.81 n/a 0.86  0.46  n/a  0.93 0.95 0.84 
2000-2008 0.77 0.97  0.54*  0.59  1.14  0.99  0.58  0.43  0.51*  0.41  0.89  0.96  1.17  1.11  1.99* n/a 0.89 0.45*  0.99  0.92 0.98*  0.93 
Obs. 32,000  1,390  2,128  15,362  4,529  1,623  1,565  2,228 
Note: An asterisk (*) signifies that the score for the cooperative bank was different than the average for other banks with statistical 
significance level of 5%. 
Figure 4.4.1 Return on assets (RoA) in percentage points, unweighted averages 
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Table 4.4.2 Return on equity (RoE) in percentage points, unweighted averages 
AUSTRIA FRANCE  GERMANY ITALY  FINLAND  NETHERLANDS  SPAIN   
EU15 
(All) 
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2000-03  10.7 11.3 8.8  9.2 13.8  11.6 9.1  6.1  9.7  9.4 10.2 9.4 12.3  24.9  22.2 n/a 12.5  6.0  11.8 10.6 10.3 15.5 
2004-08  10.0 11.6 6.8  8.0 15.3  10.9 8.5  6.1  8.7  7.3 11.9 8.9 13.7  20.5  17.6 n/a 13.3  6.6  n/a 12.3 10.2 12.7 
2000-08  10.4 11.5  7.5* 8.6 14.6  11.2 8.8  6.1 9.2* 8.3 11.2  9.2*  13.1  22.2  19.8 n/a 13.0  6.4* 11.8 11.4  10.3*  13.9 
OBS  31,970  1,390  2,128 15,362 4,526  1,623  1,565  2,228 
Note: An asterisk (*) signifies that the score for the cooperative bank was different than the average for other banks with statistical 
significance level of 5%. 
Figure 4.4.2 Return on equity (RoE) in percentage points, unweighted averages  
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Table 4.4.3 Cost-to-income ratio† in percentage points, unweighted averages  
AUSTRIA FRANCE  GERMANY  ITALY  FINLAND  NETHERLANDS  SPAIN 
  EU15 
(All) 
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2000-03  78.9 73.7 81.7 82.8  73.3 71.4  79.7  86.4  88.5  87.9 81.3 71.1  77.1  62.2 57.1  n/a 61.8 70.8  50.0  72.7 56.2  70.6 
2004-08  76.7 72.7 79.5 79.3  69.4 67.1  74.1  83.9  87.1  85.5 78.1 67.4  74.3  59.2  56.0 n/a 55.0  66.6 n/a  71.9 60.8  74.4 
2000-08  77.7  73.1 80.3* 81.0 71.3 69.1*  76.8  85.0  87.8*  86.7 79.4  69.3*  75.5  60.4 56.5* n/a  57.8 68.5*  50.0  72.3 58.7*  72.8 
Obs.  32,780  1,390  2,127 15,362 5,317 1,623 1,565  2,221 
Notes: 
†
Due to data availability, cost-to-income ratio is calculated as the ratio of operating expenses to operating income, making the scores 
incomparable to some published figures. An asterisk (*) signifies that the score for the cooperative bank was different than the 
average for other banks with statistical significance level of 5%. 
 Figure 4.4.3 Cost-to-income ratio† in percentage points, unweighted averages  
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Table 4.4.4 Market power indicators (Lerner Index) in percentage points, unweighted averages  
AUSTRIA FRANCE GERMANY  ITALY FINLAND  NETHERLANDS  SPAIN 
  EU15 
(All) 
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2000-03  26.8  34.6 26.3 24.8 36.5  34.1  27.2  23.5  18.5  19.0  27.9  34.9  28.6  42.4 48.5  n/a  44.0  35.8 51.4 35.2 47.9  33.4 
2004-08  27.9  36.6 28.1 27.7 37.3  38.7  32.1  24.8  18.9  20.5  30.0  37.5  30.3  37.7 49.8  n/a  45.5  39.8 n/a 35.6 43.8  29.5 
2000-08  27.4  35.8  27.5*  26.3  36.9 36.6 29.8 24.2  18.7*  19.8  29.1  36.1*  29.4  40.1 49.2* n/a 44.8  38.0*  51.4 35.4  45.7*  31.2 
Obs. 24,739 1,224  1,735  13,362  4,228  1,398  1,365  1,427 
Note: An asterisk (*) signifies that the score for the cooperative bank was different than the average for other banks with statistical 
significance level of 5%. 
Figure 4.4.4 Market power indicators (Lerner Index) in percentage points, unweighted averages  
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Table 4.4.5 Earnings stability (z-scores), unweighted averages 
AUSTRIA FRANCE GERMANY  ITALY  FINLAND  NETHERLANDS  SPAIN 
  EU15 
(All) 
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2000-03  35.8  25.9 34.6 32.5  27.3 61.3 32.6  27.9 31.2 32.3  34.8  47.2  45.8  19.9  24.6 n/a  31.5  48.3 16.7  50.1  54.8 79.0 
2004-08  36.0  28.8 40.7 32.8  25.8 58.2 41.0  28.7 33.2 36.8  33.6  43.7  41.0  19.9  25.5 n/a  28.4  47.1 n/a  54.8  53.3 61.2 
2000-08  35.9  27.6 38.6* 32.6 26.6 59.7* 37.0  28.4 32.3*  34.6  34.1  45.5*  43.1  19.9  25.1* n/a 29.7  47.6* 16.7  52.3  54.0*  68.8 
Obs. 32,427 1,381  2,109  1,5158  5,267  1,620  1,562  2,209 
Note: An asterisk (*) signifies that the score for the cooperative bank was different than the average for other banks with statistical 
significance level of 5%. 
Figure 4.4.5 Earnings stability (z-scores), unweighted averages 
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4.4.2  Determinants of competition 
The determinants of market power are shown in Table 4.4.6. A regression 
based on a pooled sample of all EU-15 banks is also included in the first 
column to allow for comparisons. As described in Section 4.3.3, the 
dependent variable, the Lerner Index, was estimated for each bank. A 
dummy variable to identify cooperative banks (‘cooperative dummy’) is 
included in all regressions to assess the level of market power after all 
relevant aspects have been controlled. As in all the empirical exercises, the 
data set covers only commercial, cooperative and savings banks.  
Turning to the results, bank concentration, measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for bank deposits, has a strong 
positive impact on market power in all samples, except in Spain. This result 
is easily interpretable since banks in countries with a high concentration 
rate are likely to have a greater market power due to their overwhelming 
presence.  
The second and third rows measure the impact of bank size on 
market power. The second size variable, “Size-squared”, checks whether 
size has a non-linear impact, for example, whether both larger and smaller 
banks may enjoy greater market power than medium-sized banks. When 
considered in combination, size has a U-shaped impact on market power in 
all countries except France and the Netherlands. In other words, both large 
and small banks enjoy greater market power than their medium-sized 
peers, confirming Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos’ (2007) results. This 
could be due to the predominance of smaller banks in local markets, where 
their extensive branch networks and banking relationships may act as 
barriers to entry, and the dominant position of larger banks across the 
nation.  
As noted in the analysis of unweighted averages for market power in 
Table 4.4.4 and Figure 4.4.4, there is an inverse relationship between cost-
to-income and market power. This implies that banks that have low costs 
are able to enjoy greater power. One potential explanation is that being less 
costly could imply that the bank is able to obtain a greater margin at any 
given price, which could be the driving factor behind high market power. 
In Italy and the Netherlands, well capitalised (or less leveraged) 
banks appear to enjoy less market power. This finding probably has to do 
with the choice of sample period. Since our sample includes several years 
with a rapid rise in asset prices, being leveraged might have contributed to 
greater profits and thus a higher mark-up in markets where liquidity is INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 135 
 
more or less homogenous. For other countries, this effect appears to be 
offset by the fact that banks with a better capital position often have easier 
access to external funding and thus lower marginal costs when compared 
to their less capitalised competitors.  
Turning to barriers to entry, branch growth appears to have either no 
impact or a positive impact (except in Germany) while foreign entry 
appears to improve competition in Germany and Finland (although the 
opposite is true in Spain and Italy). Moreover, increasing branch network 
density implies significantly lower market power in several countries, 
notably Austria, Finland and Italy.124 Put together, these findings point out 
that market power is low in countries where the branch network becomes 
more densely populated while immediate growth in branch networks is 
often associated with increasing market power.  
Perhaps the most important result in the table is the signs and 
significance levels of the coefficient estimates for the ‘cooperative dummy’. 
The results show that cooperative banks have less market power in the 
pooled sample of Austria, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, while the 
opposite holds for Finland and Italy.125 A comparison with the Table 4.4.4 
and Figure 4.4.4, the differences between cooperative banks and other 
banks diminishes significantly once various factors, most notably cost-
efficiency, are controlled for.  
To sum up, our results show that both in the pooled EU-15 sample 
and in four out of the seven countries included in the study, cooperative 
banks have less market power. It is important to highlight that the results 
on market power should be interpreted with care since the estimation 
procedures have taken a narrow view of bank operations due to the 
restricted estimation of the cost function. As noted in the beginning of 
section 4.3, this has been largely due to unavailability of data on the 
breakdown of income and expenditure items, such as interest and non-
interest income and fixed assets. Therefore, a more definitive analysis 
should consider alternative methods for measuring market power and 
enrich the cost estimation exercise with the use of more detailed data on 
income and expenses. 
                                                      
124 Confirms previous work of Ayadi et al (2009).  
125 Our finding of greater market power for Italian cooperative banks is confirmed by 
Guiterrez (2008).  136 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
Table 4.4.6 Determinants of market power in the EU banking industry, 2000-2008, random-effects panel regressions 
 EU-15  AT  DE  ES  FI  FR  IT  NL 
Concentration, size, efficiency and capitalisation          
0.028 0.533 6.479 -0.713 0.171 0.045 1.108 0.173  Concentration, HHI deposits 
(0.000)** (0.002)** (0.000)** (0.012)* (0.000)**  (0.720)  (0.000)**  (0.200) 
-0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 0.013 -0.005 -0.005  Size, log of assets 
(0.000)** (0.839) (0.000)**  (0.006)**  (0.000)** (0.031)* (0.005)** (0.235) 
Size-squared (log of assets)²  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 
  (0.000)** (0.045)* (0.000)** (0.014)* (0.000)** (0.605) (0.000)**  (0.111) 
-0.895 -0.882 -0.900 -0.893 -0.910 -0.865 -0.898 -0.910  Cost-to-income score 
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
-0.017 0.031 -0.003 -0.023 -0.007 -0.010 -0.026 -0.121  Capitalisation, capital & reserves / total liabilities 
(0.000)**  (0.055) (0.559) (0.060) (0.344) (0.585)  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
Barriers to entry and contestability          
-0.000 0.300 -0.133 0.330 0.041 -0.001 0.246 0.017  Branch growth 
(0.997)  (0.002)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.834)  (0.005)**  (0.097) 
0.000  -18.195  0.048 0.051 -6.464 0.001 -0.335 0.011  Branch density, inhabitants per branch 
(0.353) (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.026)* (0.001)** (0.711) (0.000)** (0.927) 
0.070 -0.358 -2.226 0.241 -0.759 -0.003 0.589 0.327  Foreign entry, number of foreign subsidiaries  
(0.000)** (0.174) (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.928) (0.000)** (0.053) 
Other control variables          
-0.003 -0.011 -0.007 -0.014 0.012 -0.024 0.007 -0.002  Cooperative dummy  
(0.001)** (0.010)* (0.000)** (0.005)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.005)**  (0.425) 
-0.007 0.100 0.123 0.007 -0.019  -0.025  -0.042  -0.025  Market size, log of total deposits 
(0.000)**  (0.009)**  (0.000)** (0.521) (0.004)** (0.500) (0.000)** (0.063) 
1.085 0.406 -1.113 0.904 1.210 1.239 2.047 1.325  Constant 
(0.000)** (0.271) (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.014)* (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
R² (pooled sample)  0.975 0.954 0.966 0.971 0.996 0.921 0.955 0.988 
Observations  23,876 1,220 13,368 1,395  622  1,692  4,233  1,346 
Note: *, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1%, respectively; p-values within parentheses. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 137 
 
4.4.3  Cooperative banks and regional growth 
This subsection turns to the question of whether the regional presence of 
cooperative banks contributes to regional growth. A first look at the raw 
data in Figure 4.4.6 hints at a positive relationship between lagged 
difference in cooperative bank presence and current GDP growth. The 
positive relationship appears particularly strong in Finland and the 
Netherlands while being somewhat weaker in Austria and Germany. For 
Spain, France and Italy, the impact of cooperative bank presence on growth 
is ambiguous, possibly due to missing observations or less detailed 
regional coverage.  
The scatter plots do not account for the fact that the direction of the 
causality may indeed be running in the opposite direction. More 
specifically, it is entirely possible that lagged growth could enhance bank 
presence. For example, increased economic activity could lead to an 
expansion of regional demand for loans, especially among the local sectors 
comprised of households and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
translating into more activity for cooperative banks with a strong foothold 
in these markets.  
In order to avoid making potentially wrong statements based on the 
direction of causality, a series of Granger-causality tests are run, the results 
for which are summarised in Table 4.4.7. The table displays the coefficient 
estimates for the explanatory variable, i.e. estimate for β in equation (7), 
and the degree of significance for the coefficient (p-values). Two tests are 
run to account for causality running in each direction, summarised in two 
panels.  
As detailed in the first panel on the left, cooperative bank presence 
has a significant positive impact on growth rates in four countries (Austria, 
Germany, Finland and the Netherlands) as well as for the pooled sample 
(EU-7). The impact is particularly strong in Finland and the Netherlands, 
where a lagged increase of 1% in relative activities of cooperative banks (i.e. 
assets-to-GDP ratio) leads to more than 61% and 300% increases in GDP 
growth, respectively.  138 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
Figure 4.4.6 Impact of cooperative presence on regional growth 
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Table 4.4.7 Regional growth and cooperative bank presence: Granger-causality 
tests 
COOP. PRESENCE ￿ GROWTH 
(Cooperative presence causes GDP growth) 
GROWTH ￿ COOP. PRESENCE 
(GDP growth causes cooperative presence) 
 Coeff.  estimate,  β   p-value  Coeff. estimate, β p-value 
EU-7  3.147 (0.000)** 0.002 (0.001)** 
AT  8.708 (0.000)** -0.009 (0.039)* 
DE  2.728 (0.000)** 0.003 (0.001)** 
ES  3.425 (0.396) -0.001 (0.676) 
FI  61.108 (0.001)**  0.000  (0.863) 
FR  3.542 (0.833) 0.000 (0.589) 
IT  4.855 (0.225) 0.000 (0.754) 
NL  304.428 (0.000)**  -0.001  (0.000)** 
Notes: All results are based on fixed-effect panel regressions for differences in GDP growth 
and cooperative presence parameters. The reported coefficient estimates correspond 
to β in equation (7). The regressions also include autoregressive terms for the left-
hand side variable, although the coefficient estimates are not included, to save space. 
* stands for significance at 5%; ** stands for significance at 1%.  
The second panel of columns on the right summarises the results for 
the causality tests running in the opposite direction, i.e. explaining 
differences in presence with changes in growth. For Germany and for the 
pooled sample, economic growth has a positive impact on the presence of 
cooperatives. In both cases, the relationship between presence and growth 
is self-reinforcing.126 Several interpretations of this result are possible. 
Cooperative banks have a significant market share in SME lending, which 
are often acknowledged as the drivers in most EU countries, notably in 
Germany. This could be the reason that the impact of growth on bank 
presence is particularly strong. Increased cooperative bank activity may 
                                                      
126 The Granger-causality tests reported in the table should be interpreted with care due to 
the potential simultaneity bias that could arise when the two variables, differences in GDP 
growth and cooperative presence are co-determined simultaneously. The use of the 
instrumental variables (IV) approach is made difficult here due to the unavailability of 
reliable covariates for regional cooperative presence. Nevertheless, the results from two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regressions (not reported here) with lagged variables as 
instruments confirms the robustness of the results for the pooled sample, Finland and the 
Netherlands. Table 4.4.7 does not incorporate this procedure since the use of lags as 
instruments is not commonly accepted as a reliable method and leads to a significantly 
lower number of observations, which ultimately undermines the power of the tests.  140 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
serve as a multiplier, enhancing the allocation of credit and thereby 
increasing growth even further. Another interpretation is that increased 
availability of cooperative banks may mitigate some of the access problems, 
thereby giving the larger population the means to prosper and contribute 
to economic growth.  
Interestingly, for Austria and the Netherlands, the impact of growth 
on presence is negative, implying that regions with worsening growth 
records do not have an equivalent outflow of cooperative activity. This 
result could be a reflection of the commitment of cooperative banks to 
remain as the key provider of banking services to the underprivileged 
regions. It could also be a particularity of the two economies, where 
demand for the services provided by cooperatives hold up better than the 
rest of the economy in times of difficulty. Notwithstanding these two 
arguments, cooperative banks in the two countries appear to fulfil a 
stabilising role by remaining in areas experiencing poor growth and 
thereby contributing to future growth. 
To sum up, our results show that cooperative presence appears to 
have a significant pro-growth impact in Austria, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands. For Germany, there is a self-reinforcing effect: more growth 
enhances activity, which in turn increases growth further. For Austria and 
the Netherlands, however, a different pro-growth dynamic is at play: 
cooperatives maintain their activities in areas experiencing low growth and 
thereby help soothe income differences.  
4.4.4  Determinants of earnings stability of banks 
In order to further analyse the role of cooperative banks, this section 
reports the determinants of stability, paying close attention to whether 
being a cooperative actually implies greater stability once alternative 
explanatory variables are accounted for.  
The results of the regressions that examine the determinants of 
earnings stability are given in Table 4.4.8.127,128 The odd-numbered columns 
                                                      
127 In order to eliminate outliers in our data set, bank-year observations outside the mid-95 
percentiles of the z-score distribution are removed from the sample. 
128 For each country, two separate procedures are followed to ensure that the results are 
robust. The left-side column for each country shows the pooled OLS results. In order to 
control for the impact of shorter series, dummies that correspond to the number of reported 
years are also included in these regressions. In the second column, the results of fixed-effect 
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correspond to ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, which pool the 
data into a single sample by not distinguishing between observations 
corresponding to different time periods or countries. In turn, the even-
numbered columns take advantage of these differences and report the 
results of fixed effects (FE) panel regressions.129,130 
The results of the empirical exercise are as follows: 
Regarding the country-specific estimators, the coefficient estimate for 
financial openness index is negative (except for Spain) and has a high level 
of significance in almost all regressions, except for some of the pooled OLS 
results, reinforcing the view that that more open systems could be more 
risk-prone.131  
Bank concentration, captured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), has a positive impact on earnings stability except in Spain and the 
Netherlands.132 With the exception of both the OLS results and fixed-effects 
estimates for Austria, the coefficient estimates are highly significant in at 
least one of the regressions. More important, the coefficient for the first two 
columns that accounts for all countries reveals that banks in more 
                                                                                                                                       
(FE) panel regressions are reported. However, the use of this procedure means that a 
number of individual-specific time-invariant variables, i.e. the savings banks dummy, listed 
institutions, etc., are dropped since these effects are absorbed by the fixed intercept 
estimates.  
129 The panel regression procedures fully take into account bank-specific effects. It is 
therefore not possible to include the time-invariant dummy variables saving bank, listed 
institution and the two country dummies. 
130 An alternative method, namely the random-effects method, was found to be 
inappropriate due to individual effects that are uncontrolled by our estimators. More 
specifically, Hausman specification tests revealed that random-effects estimations did not 
appropriately capture all individual effects that were readily accounted for in the fixed-
effect models.  
131 The significance of the result on financial openness should be tempered by the fact that 
the index varies between 2.0 and 2.5 for the country-year observations. In other words, the 
impact of moving from an open to a less open financial system would have a very modest 
impact (a drop of 1.5 to 7 standard deviations for the corresponding z-scores) for the 
countries in the sample. 
132 Supplementary regressions (not reported here) using the asset concentration of the top 
five banks (CR5) lead to similar results. 142 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
concentrated systems are able to secure steadier earnings streams over 
time.133 
Turning to bank-specific factors, the impact of cost-efficiency, as 
measured by the cost-to-income ratio, is less clear. Consistent results can 
only be established for Austria (where no impact exists) and the 
Netherlands (where efficiency is negatively related to stability).  
The main results of the empirical exercise are obtained by examining 
the size and ownership parameters. First, bank size, captured by the 
log(Asset) variable, appears to influence stability inversely. In other words, 
on average larger banks (commercial or otherwise) have less stable 
earnings. This could be confirming the hypothesis that institutions that 
deem themselves as ‘too-big-to-fail’ indeed take more risks, i.e. engage in 
moral hazard. The impact of size on stability is particularly striking when 
individual effects are controlled for by the fixed-effects panel regression 
procedures. The coefficient estimates for the interactive variables [log(Asset) 
× Cooperative bank] and [log(Asset) × Savings bank] show that size is a less 
destabilising factor for cooperative and savings banks.134 In France, the 
countervailing factor (the summation of the coefficients for log(Asset) and 
log(Asset)  × Cooperative bank) is positive, implying that the bigger 
cooperatives are simply more stable than banks of all sizes.  
In order to verify whether cooperative banks are simply more stable, 
not withstanding their size, the OLS estimates also include the dummy 
variable for these banks. The coefficient estimates for this dummy variable 
show that French and Dutch cooperative banks are more stable than other 
banks; in these countries, the size of a cooperative has no impact on the 
stability of its earnings. The coefficient estimates for interacting variables 
show that holding all other factors constant, smaller cooperative banks 
perform below the country average while l a r g e r  o n e s  h a v e  m o r e  s t a b l e  
earnings than banks of all sizes. The results are identical but less 
pronounced in Germany, where the offsetting impact of savings bank size 
is relatively small.  
                                                      
133 This finding is in line with the findings of Beck et al. (2006), who use a sample of 69 
countries over the years 1980-97 to show that systemic banking crises are less likely in 
systems with more concentrated systems.  
134 This result is in line with the findings of Beck et al. (2009), who explain the finding by 
noting that larger cooperative and savings banks may have an added advantage in 
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Table 4.4.8 Determinants of stability (z-scores) 
  ALL COUNTRIES  AUSTRIA  FINLAND  FRANCE 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial openness index  -2.385 -4.851 -2.563 -5.420 0.105 -4.588 0.187 -1.069 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.349) (0.000)** (0.893) (0.000)** (0.907) (0.039)* 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  17.642 59.816 31.430 16.145 33.393 50.020 34.938  158.289 
  (0.217) (0.000)** (0.921)  (0.790) (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.697) (0.000)** 
Cost-to-income ratio  -8.823 -1.591 -7.065 -2.413  -16.037 6.227 -14.077 -0.464 
  (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.148)  (0.108)  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)**  (0.775) 
log(Asset)  -2.574 -9.475 1.113 -7.403 -8.666 -13.245 -2.339  -8.541 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.468) (0.000)** (0.095)  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
log(Asset) x Cooperative bank  3.096 3.508 4.333 6.034 6.758 6.210 0.769  21.539 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.008)** (0.001)**  (0.192) (0.071) (0.590)  (0.000)** 
log(Asset) x Savings bank  2.675 6.366 -4.591 2.204  ..  ..  1.204 23.345 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.008)**  (0.180)    (0.245)  (0.000)** 
Cooperative bank  -7.592  .. -16.160 .. -60.666 .. 28.498 .. 
  (0.002)**   (0.125)  (0.238)  (0.019)*  
Savings bank  -4.841  ..  35.808  .. .. ..  4.035  .. 
  (0.151)   (0.001)**       (0.648)  
Listed institution  4.501 ..  10.116  ..  -49.059  .. 2.184 .. 
  (0.000)**  (0.010)**  (0.016)*   (0.242)   
Constant  60.670 83.252 39.997 70.913  141.902  49.946 72.240 17.124 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.039)* (0.000)** (0.020)* (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.009)** 
Observation & country dummies  Yes .. Yes .. Yes .. Yes .. 
Procedure  OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
Observations  27,107  1,303 1,617 1,943 
R-squared  0.149 0.141 0.135 0.137 0.108 0.297 0.308 0.201 
Notes: For coefficient estimates, robust p-values are in parentheses. OLS: ordinary least squares pooled regression; FE: fixed-effect panel regression. * and ** 
refer to statistical significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. For FE regressions, only the within R2 is reported.  144 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
Table 4.4.8 (continued) Determinants of stability (z-scores)  
  GERMANY ITALY  NETHERLANDS  SPAIN   
  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Financial openness index  -2.516 -2.535  ..  ..  ..  ..  5.663 -0.400 
  (0.000)** (0.000)**          (0.242)  (0.695) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  808.776 1,079.998 -127.193  47.747  -195.423 37.672  33.413 -477.762 
  (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.172)  (0.006)** (0.027)* (0.065)  (0.921) (0.000)** 
Cost-to-income ratio  5.985  -1.473 -13.458 -1.040 -51.700 -6.627 -51.176 -3.514 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.263)  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.094) 
log(Asset)  -0.170 -7.094 -1.856  -12.898 0.455 -8.158 -3.538  -15.085 
  (0.750) (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.592) (0.000)** (0.019)* (0.000)** 
log(Asset) x Cooperative bank  0.632 4.046 -1.313 2.363  -2.453 -0.748  1.783  3.810 
  (0.256) (0.000)**  (0.007)**  (0.001)** (0.076) (0.484) (0.249) (0.025)* 
log(Asset) x Savings bank  1.645 7.015 3.746 0.412  41.598 2.194 -3.079 -4.734 
  (0.007)** (0.000)** (0.009)**  (0.831)  (0.000)** (0.864)  (0.158)  (0.019)* 
Cooperative bank  -0.686 ..  1.620  .. 54.664 .. -2.301 .. 
  (0.856)  (0.691)   (0.000)**   (0.871)  
Savings bank  -6.302  .. -19.966 ..  -318.227  .. 55.857 .. 
  (0.140)  (0.070)   (0.000)**    (0.003)**   
Listed institution  -8.013  ..  1.948  .. -17.027 ..  9.392  .. 
  (0.009)**   (0.264)   (0.000)**  (0.035)*   
Constant  19.466 35.088 71.636  111.259  85.302 105.584  123.053  206.623 
  (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Observation & country dummies  Yes .. Yes .. Yes .. Yes .. 
Procedure  OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
Observations  13,691 5,148  1,394  2,011 
R-squared  0.024 0.321 0.065 0.285 0.163 0.197 0.099 0.134 
Notes: For coefficient estimates, robust p-values are in parentheses. OLS: ordinary least squares pooled regression; FE: fixed-effect panel regression. * and ** 
refer to statistical significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. For FE regressions, only the within R2 is reported.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 145 
 
4.5  Conclusions  
The results summarised above confirm that there are no consistent 
differences between cooperative banks and their commercial and savings 
bank peers in terms of profitability, cost-efficiency, and market power, 
while cooperative banks, especially the larger ones, enjoy greater earnings 
stability than their commercial peers.  
When using financial indicators (RoA and RoE), cooperative banks 
are slightly less profitable in all countries with the exception of Germany, 
Spain and Finland.  
In terms of cost efficiency, the differences between cooperatives and 
other banks are also mixed. Cooperatives seem to enjoy significant cost 
benefits, in terms of cost-to-income in Finland, France, Italy and Spain, 
while scoring lower in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands.  
In terms of market power, the results are once again mixed. In 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, cooperative banks have a 
significantly less market power while the opposite is true for Italy, Finland 
and Spain. In Germany, smaller banks as well as larger banks enjoy greater 
market power; these results could mitigate some of the differences 
favouring cooperative banks. These results have to be interpreted with care 
in order to avoid making erroneous judgements due to the close 
relationship of mark-ups with cost-efficiencies. 
In terms of stability of earnings, cooperatives are significantly more 
stable than other banks in all countries other than Germany and Spain, 
where savings banks are taking the lead. In some cases the differences are 
astounding, i.e. France and the Netherlands, where these banks enjoy 
greater stability. These results confirm the expectation that cooperative 
banks enjoy a stable cushion of earnings, reducing their likelihood of 
insolvency.  
In terms of contribution to regional growth, regional presence of 
cooperative banks has a positive impact on GDP growth in most countries, 
most notably in Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. For 
Germany, there is a self-reinforcing relationship between cooperative 
presence and growth. Quite intriguing, in Austria and the Netherlands, 
cooperative banks appear to play a stabilising role, maintaining their 
presence in regions experiencing low growth and thereby contributing to 
future growth. These findings call for re-examination of the role of 146 | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
cooperative banks, especially in regions where growth is depressed, either 
cyclically or persistently.    
Taken together, these findings imply that in addition to coexisting 
with other banks under similar conditions, cooperative banks have 
responded to shifts in market developments while fulfilling an integral role 
of contributing to stability and regional growth in their economies.  
Table 4.5.1 Comparison of cooperative banks with other banks 
   Performance & efficiency 
   RoA  RoE  Cost-to-income 
Market 
power 
Earning 
stability 
Austria   - -  -  +  + 
Finland   + 0  +  - + 
France   0 0  +  0 + 
Germany   + +  -  + + 
Italy   0 -  +  - + 
Netherlands   - -  -  +  + 
Spain   + -  +  - + 
Note: n.a. = No data were available for comparison; +/- signify that cooperative 
banks scored more/less preferably (in difference in means test with a p-value 
< 5%); 0 means that there was no significant difference between the two types 
of banks.  
Table 4.5.2 Determinants of market power  
  Bank size  Foreign entry  Branching 
Austria   0 - - 
Finland   0 - - 
France  + - - 
Germany  U-shaped +  - 
Italy  + - + 
Netherlands   + 0 - 
Spain  0 + + 
Note: +/- indicate the sign of the coefficient estimate, i.e. statistically different from 
0 with a p-value of less than 5%.  
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Table 4.5.3 Causal relation between cooperative presence and regional growth  
  Impact of presence on growth  Impact of growth on presence 
Austria   + - 
Finland   + 0 
France  0 0 
Germany  + + 
Italy  0 0 
Netherlands   + - 
Spain  0 0 
Note: n.a. = No data were available. +/- indicate the sign of the coefficient estimate 
(statistically different from 0 with a p-value < 5%). 
 
Table 4.5.4 Banking sector determinants of earning stability 
  Coop. 
banks 
Coop. 
size 
Sector 
concentration 
Cost-to-income 
All banks  - +  +  - 
Austria   0 +  0  0 
Finland  0 0  +  +/- 
France  + +  +  - 
Germany  0 +  +  +/- 
Italy  0 +  +  - 
Netherlands   + +  0  - 
Spain   0 +  +  - 
Note: n.a. = No data were available for comparison. +/- indicate the sign of the 
coefficient estimate when it is statistically different from 0 with a p-value < 
5%.  
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5.  FINAL CONCLUSIONS  
n 5 June 2008, the European Parliament issued a Resolution containing 
the following statement: 
The diversity of legal models and business objectives of the financial 
entities in the retail banking sector (banks, savings banks, cooperatives, 
etc.) is a fundamental asset to the EU’s economy which enriches the 
sector, corresponds to the pluralist structure of the market and helps to 
increase competition in then internal market.  
An earlier report (Ayadi et al., 2009) argues as follows: “not only legal, 
political and risk-related considerations serve to highlight the need for a European 
banking model based on diversity…” 
In an uncertain market environment, diversity has advantages as it 
cannot be predicted which form of corporate structure or business model is 
best suited to all particular circumstances. As put by Ayadi et al. (2009), the 
case for diversity includes: 
Reducing institutional risk, defined as the dependence on a single 
view of banking that may turn out to have serious weaknesses under 
unexpected conditions such as the current crisis. 
Leaving aside the merits of any particular business model, there are 
powerful systemic benefits to be derived from diversity of business models 
and ownership structures in the banking sector, to which cooperative banks 
contribute alongside other banks. Indeed, cooperative banks as members’ 
institutions are not subject to the short-term pressure of the capital market 
which can induce banks to take excessive risks and ultimately undermine 
their stability. They are likely to enhance competition and access because of 
their different business model centred on proximity to the clients and 
relationship banking. Their local character and their particular focus and 
expertise on the local community also tend to reduce powerful centrifugal 
tendencies in the financial system.  
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All in all, a pluralistic approach to ownership and business models is likely 
to be conducive to greater financial stability and regional growth. With 
their contrasting capital structures and business strategies, SHV and 
cooperative banks balance their risks and activities differently. Systemic 
risk is thereby reduced and access improved. The more diversified a 
financial system is in terms of size, ownership and structure of businesses, 
the better it weathers the strains produced by the normal business cycle, in 
particular avoiding the bandwagon effect, and the better it adjusts to 
changes in customer preferences. Ultimately, a diverse system is a 
prerequisite for stability and growth. 
The issue of having a financial system populated by a diversity of 
organisational forms is as significant as the merits and drawbacks of each 
particular form of organisation. The case for sustaining a powerful 
cooperative sector in the financial system is wider than any alleged intrinsic 
merits of the cooperative model. 
This has important public policy implications. The debate particularly 
emphasises the expected role of different types of financial institutions to 
finance the real economy, to contribute to systemic stability and to promote 
inclusion. This raises the role of dual-bottom line or STV institutions to 
fulfil other equally important objectives than mere short-term shareholder 
value creation. This suggests that financial performance and economic 
efficiency are neither the only nor the ultimate standard of assessment. 
These are indisputably important but they are not sufficient to assess the 
contributions of STV institutions to the economy. Allowing for new 
standards of assessment that take into consideration the variety of 
objectives of STV institutions would emphasise the value of diversity in the 
European banking sector. Beyond such assessment, the functional 
implications of diversity (such as regulation, financial stability and 
liquidity creation) merit further investigation.  
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ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN 
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY DIRECTIVE  
The SCE (Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 and Directive 2003/72/EC) 
shares many similarities with the European Company Society (SE), which was 
introduced earlier in 2001 for public limited companies. Much like the SE, the 
SCE allows cooperatives to be created either via a merger of several existing 
institutions or by conversion of an existing cooperative with sufficient cross-
border activities. A third option, not available for SEs, is also established to 
enable the creation of cooperatives from scratch by five or more natural persons 
from different member states.  
Other familiar characteristics includes a minimum capital requirement of 
€30,000; limited liability of shareholders; specific provisions for single 
registration within the EU; a requirement to have at least one general meeting 
per year; and the flexibility afforded to two-tiered structures that allow distinct 
management and supervisory bodies, as in Germany, instead of a single 
administrative body.  
Less common provisions reflect the organisational differences between 
cooperatives and investor-owned corporations. The principal objective of an 
SCE is the satisfaction of its members’ needs and interests. Accordingly, the 
benefits, participation and voting rights of non-members are limited. The 
Directive distinguishes between two types of membership: user-members and 
non-user members. In principle, user-members are understood as those who 
“expect to use or produce the SCE’s goods and services” (Art. 14). Members’ 
admittance is subject to the approval of the management or administrative 
organ, with the possibility of appeal to the general meeting of the cooperative. 
Members are also entitled to their subscribed capital should they decide to 
terminate their membership, which has to be paid within three years upon 
resignation. These repayments may be adjusted in proportion to the losses 
charged against the SCE’s capital.  
The voting rights of the user-members are allocated in accordance with 
the ‘one member, one vote’ principle. A partial (and restricted) exception is 
provided when national laws permit the number of votes to be determined in 
proportion to the members’ participation in the cooperative’s activities. 
Depending on the laws of the member state in which the SCE has registered 
offices, non-user-(investor)members may also be admitted and may be granted 
some voting rights, but those rights cannot exceed 25% of the voting power of all 
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The law was transposed into national laws of the member states by 18 
August 2006. Since then, there have been no major cooperatives that have taken 
up the new SCE vehicle. One key reason could be that most cooperatives engage 
in local activities and have little reason to go beyond their region, never mind 
national borders. The slow conversion process may also be explained by the 
complexity and rigidity of the codes existing in different countries. Although 
these explanations could be true for the smaller institutions, they are less likely 
to hold for large and highly integrated systems, which already engage in 
international activities. Another factor in explaining the low pick-up is the 
presence of significant tax-related obstacles between member states.135 Primary 
concerns include tax charges that are triggered by the transfer of assets and/or 
head offices between different member states. Although these challenges are 
partly mitigated by the individual cases brought to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), a more decisive, community-wide solution could be more effective 
in the future. In addition to these challenges, the value-added taxes (VAT) 
applicable to cross-border intragroup transactions could explain why the vehicle 
has not been taken up. In these cases, various methods that allow the definition 
of a group to transcend national borders could help make the SCE more 
palatable.136 
 
 
                                                      
135 The tax obstacles for SEs and SCEs are highly similar. For an extended discussion of the 
challenges faced by public limited-liability corporations and the proposed policy responses, 
see CEPS (2008).  
136 The Commission adapted on 28 November 2007 two associated proposals for a directive 
(COM (2007)746-7) to modernise VAT, allowing financial institutions and insurance firms to 
claim the tax charges on their intragroup transactions, provided that they opt for taxing 
their services. As for corporate taxation, the intragroup transfers will not be subject to 
taxation under the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which would allow 
companies to pool the group’s profits to a single consolidated base defined by common 
rules, thereby annulling the impact of cross-border profit shifting on the organisation’s tax 
obligations. Despite significant discussion during 2007-08, the CCCTB project has 
progressed rather slowly due to fundamental differences among member states.   
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ANNEX 2. DEMUTUALISATION OF UK 
BUILDING SOCIETIES  
lthough technically speaking, building societies in the UK are not 
cooperative banks (not the least because, by regulation, they are not 
“banks” and do not offer the full range of banking services), as 
mutuals they are a subset of STV banks. It is instructive, therefore, to 
consider the case study of the UK where in 1986 the law was changed to 
allow mutual building societies to convert to SHV (Public Limited 
Company – plc) bank status. As a result, in the second half of the 1990s, a 
powerful trend emerged towards demutualisation. Eleven building 
societies (accounting for 75% of the combined assets of all building 
societies), including the largest (the Halifax, which merged with the Leeds 
Permanent in 1995 and effectively undertook a combined demutualisation) 
converted to plc status. 
A demutualisation could only occur if two-thirds of existing members 
voted in favour of it. Unlike in continental Europe, demutualisation of 
building societies involved payments to current members as the concept of 
intergenerational legacy was not enshrined in British law. Although the 
reserves of building societies were built up over several generations of 
members, on a demutualisation the current members had claim on the 
economic value of the mutual. In effect, members were ‘compensated’ for 
surrendering the benefits of mutuality. In essence, demutualisation 
involved the appropriation of the mutual’s intergenerational endowment 
by the current cohort of members. This also implied that potential future 
members had no say in the process and the current generation of members 
could deny future generations the benefits of membership of the mutual. 
This represented an intergenerational transfer of benefits and wealth (to 
current members from the accumulation generated by past members and 
the benefits of potential future members) and, under these circumstances, it 
may not be surprising that members tended to vote in favour of 
demutualisation so as to make a claim on this intergenerational transfer. In 
total, £35 billion was distributed to members including to ‘carpet-baggers’ 
who opened accounts solely in order to gain membership and vote for 
conversion and reap the windfall.  
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This arrangement is generally not possible in other European 
countries and the new SCE statute requires that in the case of a cooperative 
bank, the reserves of any converted bank must be transferred to another 
cooperative bank or otherwise used for purposes of general interest. Above 
all, they cannot be appropriated by the current members.  
Since the wave of demutualisations in the 1990s, most remaining 
mutual building societies in the UK have put in place various mechanisms 
(such as charitable assignments) to prevent current members from having 
any claim on the economic value of a demutualised society. 
By 2008 all the converted building societies had lost their 
independent status either because they were purchased by other banks (e.g. 
Abbey National and Alliance and Leicester were purchased by Bank 
Santander) or because they failed and needed to be taken into public 
ownership (Northern Rock and, to some extent, Bradford and Bingley).  
As argued in chapter 2, although both SHV and STV banks create 
value for their owners the nature and ‘usability’ of this value differs. This is 
where problems began to emerge when the value of a mutual (as measured 
by reserves) became ‘excessive’. As building societies’ reserves were built 
up, the implicit or embedded value to the owners was steadily increased. 
However, this value could not be released to the owners while the building 
society remained as a mutual and conversion to plc status became one way 
that embedded value could be released to members.  
Curiously, mutuals are potentially vulnerable when they have too 
little capital but also when they have too much. The former is because it is 
more difficult for a mutual to augment its reserves other than through 
profits, and the latter because it encourages members to seek to unlock 
embedded value by changing the society's structure. Apparent ‘success’ (as 
measured by profits and the build up of excess reserves) for a mutual can 
sow the seeds of its own destruction! 
A central feature of a plc bank is that there is a continuous repricing 
of its value through changes in the stock market price of shares. Ownership 
rights are tradable and the shareholder can sell and claim the full value of 
his or her stake in the company: the shareholder is able to liquidate in full 
his or her ownership claim on the bank. This is because the value of the 
company is reflected in the current share price. It also means that, if a new 
shareholder wishes to acquire a claim on the value of the company that has 
been built up over many years, it can do so but has to pay the market price 
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building societies, as new shareholders can buy into the accumulated value 
of reserves simply by opening a share deposit. Past accumulation of 
embedded value is not reflected in the price of the ownership claim. 
This in turn leads to an important and crucial distinction between 
what will be termed locked versus open  value for owners. In effect, the 
ownership stake in a mutual is locked within the firm as there is no way that 
owners can liquidate that value other than through conversion to SHV (plc) 
status. On the other hand, the ownership stake that an equity holder has in 
a plc can be immediately unlocked in the secondary market in shares. This is 
precisely where problems began to arise with building societies in the early 
1990s, because they had built up substantial reserves and hence the value of 
ownership stakes by their members. 
The distinction between the creation of value for owners in plcs and 
mutuals is given in Table A1, where a distinction is made between locked 
and open value-creation for owners. This not only illustrates the distinction 
between  locked and open value, it also highlights what is perhaps the 
fundamental difference between a mutual and an SHV bank. If a mutual 
uses its ‘margin advantage’ through its pricing (higher deposit rate/lower 
loan rate), value is created in usable form for owners by virtue of their being 
customers. By definition, this is not possible for a plc. Similarly, if a plc 
distributes profits after they have been earned (dividends or bonuses) open 
value is also created for owners in usable form.  
It is when we come to retentions that the major distinction emerges. 
In the case of a mutual, value is created but in non-usable form. With a plc 
such retentions also create value but in a usable form. This is because the 
value created will normally be reflected in the share price and hence it can 
be liquidated by owners. In this way value can be extracted at very little 
cost and without fundamentally disturbing the ownership structure of the 
firm.  
Table A1. Value creation for owners: plcs vs mutuals 
Value Created Via  Mutual  Plc 
(1) Margin advantage exploited in pricing  Open  n/a 
(2) Distributions of profits  n/a  Open 
(3) Retention of profits in reserves  Locked  Open 
 
In summary, therefore, the two key distinctions between the mutual 
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giving value to owners in the price structure of its products and services to 
a greater extent than can the plc, and while value is created in both cases 
when reserves are increased, it is open in the case of the plc but locked with 
the mutual. There is one exception to this in that the Britannia Building 
Society (now the second largest) has a membership reward scheme which 
is a form of dividend payment made to members.  
Problems emerged when the value of building societies (as measured 
by reserves) became ‘excessive’ because reserves represent locked value 
(LV). On the other hand, low mortgage rates and high deposit rates 
represent open value (OV). When the ‘margin advantage’ was used to 
increase reserves, the ratio of locked to open value (LV/OV) rose, which 
resulted in members seeking to transform LV into OV by liquidating the 
reserves. The main way of doing this was through conversion. 
The economic rationale for the demand for conversion could be 
regarded as a demand by existing members of societies to unlock their 
entitlement to locked value. In practice, however, it became opportunistic in 
that the motive was to secure windfall gains (sometimes amounting to 
several thousand pounds for individual members) which could also be 
reaped by new members who made deposits at building societies with the 
sole purpose of pressing for conversion and expropriating a share of the 
reserves. These new opportunistic members came to be known as ‘carpet-
baggers’.  
For a more detailed discussion of the reasons for conversion see 
Drake and Llewellyn, 2001.  
The subsequent history of the demutualised building societies 
indicates that problems emerged on both sides of the balance sheet. Abbey 
National (the first of the societies to convert) encountered problems 
because of its diversification on the assets side of the balance sheet, while 
Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley failed because of diversification on 
the liabilities side as they became excessively dependent upon 
securitisation and wholesale funding.  
It is not to be expected that building societies would be immune from 
the enormity of the banking crisis: collateral damage was inevitable. 
Nevertheless, building societies have generally been less scathed by the 
financial crisis than have banks in general and demutualised building 
societies in particular. In fact, such converted building societies proved to 
be the most vulnerable as they moved too far away from their traditional 
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What is doubly sad is that some of the most battered banks are 
former building societies – those once prudent institutions woven 
into the fabric of British life. 
None of the demutualised institutions has survived as an 
independent institution, and two have failed and been taken into state 
ownership. While many banks faced serious financial problems in the crisis 
and needed state injections of capital, only two medium-sized retail banks 
actually failed and they were both previous building societies that had 
demutualised partly in order to undertake business that was not feasible or 
allowed as a mutual but which proved in the end to be the origin of their 
downfall. 
The experience of converted building societies in the financial crisis 
has led to a reappraisal of the wisdom of mutual building societies 
converting to plc status. It has been argued, for instance, that:  
today the demutualisation dream lies in tatters. All of the building 
societies that did it have either gone or are shadows of their former 
selves…a perfectly viable industry which performed a vital public 
service in a reasonably well managed responsible fashion, has 
been completely destroyed (Warner, 2008). 
A lot has been lost in the British financial system as a result of the 
large-scale demutualisation of building societies in terms of systemic 
diversity, a critical mass of mutuality in banking and the benefits to 
competition that this brings, and the intrinsic merits of the mutual model in 
some areas of finance. The largest building society to convert was the 
Halifax. For many years it operated as a very successful bank and had a 
dominant position in some retail markets. However, it too succumbed to 
the temptations of new business models and was eventually forced to seek 
refuge within LloydsTSB. A former director of the Halifax as a mutual has 
argued, “With hindsight, [conversion] was a mistake that damaged a fine 
business” (Kay, 2008). More generally, The Times, in a leading article, has 
also questioned the wisdom of demutualisation:  
Of itself, the move to plc status was harmless. But it had two 
dangerous elements. It liberated those once cautious building 
society bosses to diversify into new activities, and provided them 
with the capital to do so. It also loaded them with remuneration 
packages so poorly structured that they encouraged short-term 
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A study by the Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-owned 
Business (Michie and Llewellyn, 2009) has considered the possibility and 
feasibility of remutualising Northern Rock and possibly other concerted 
building societies.  
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ANNEX 3. ESTIMATING THE COST FUNCTION  
he estimation of the cost function follows the translog frontier cost 
function treatment followed in the procedure in Fernandez de 
Guevara and Maudos (2007). In the simple approach followed there, 
a bank’s costs (c) are assumed to be a function of a bank’s key output, i.e. 
total assets (A). Due to the unavailability of data on fixed income, we use a 
two input model based on the cost of deposits (w1) and labour (w).137 A time 
trend variable is also included to account for changes in efficiency that may 
be due to technological improvements over time.  
The cost equation to be estimated is defined as follows: 
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where  
I  =  bank index; 
t  =  year; 
ln c  =  natural logarithm of total operating costs; 
ln w1  =  natural logarithm of price of deposits, measured by 
operating expenses/customer deposits; 
ln w2  =  natural logarithm of price of labour, measured by 
personnel expenses/total assets; 
ln A  =  natural logarithm of total assets; 
Trend  =  time trend. 
                                                      
137 The use of more detailed formulations, such as the multiproduct function and the use of 
capital inputs, was made difficult due to the unavailability of a detailed breakdown of 
incomes and expenditures, notably interest and non-interest components in Finland and the 
Netherlands.  
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In order to obtain a measure of competition, which will be discussed 
in the next section, it is also necessary to get an estimation of the marginal 
cost, i.e. changes in costs arising from incremental increases in output, 
faced by each bank. Using equation (2), marginal cost can be written as a 
function of average costs (cit / Ait): 
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Lastly, the cross-country comparisons envisioned in the study require 
the estimation of a common cost efficiency frontier for all banks in the 
sample. However, a robust cross-country analysis of bank efficiency 
requires controlling for heterogeneity in environmental conditions which 
are beyond the responsibility/influence of bank management. The 
environmental variables are GDP per capita at constant prices, population 
density (inhabitants per square kilometre) and bank branches per capita in 
each national market. In addition, country-level dummy variables are 
introduced to control for the influence of other country-specific issues, such 
as regulatory and institutional factors. Of related interest 
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In a banking environment dominated by the shareholder-value (SHV) 
institutions, non-SHV institutions such as savings banks and others have 
been criticised for being an exception to the rule, for being relatively 
inefficient, for not being subject to the discipline of the capital market and 
corporate control, and for having weak corporate governance 
arrangements.  
Drawing the lesson from the banking crisis, this CEPS study stresses 
that there are economic and welfare benefits to be derived from 
institutional diversity in the financial system. In particular, the study finds 
that: 
•  There are no radical differences between savings banks and their 
commercial peers in terms of profitability, efficiency and earnings 
stability. 
•  A larger critical mass of savings banks (and other STV institutions) is 
likely to enhance competition in the financial system. 
•  The evidence also suggests that savings banks contribute to a 
reduction in social exclusion and offer wider access to financial 
services. 
Institutional diversity is thus found to have a positive and significant 
effect on regional growth, indeed the local focus of most saving banks 
appears to contribute positively to regional development.  
 
The case for diversity includes, as the study suggests, “reducing 
institutional risk, defined as the dependence on a single view of banking 
that may turn out to have serious weaknesses under unexpected conditions 
such as the current crisis”. 
On the strength of the case studies on the national savings bank 
systems of Spain, Germany and Austria, the report concludes that “the 
crisis has made it even more evident than before how valuable it is to 
promote a pluralistic market concept in Europe and, to this end, to protect 
and support all types of ownership structures without abandoning the 
principle of ‘same business, same risks, same rules’”. The investigation of 
the role of savings banks in this study demonstrates the value of their 
presence in terms of the financial, economic and social welfare of the 
countries in which they operate.  
 
 
 
 